The William L. Holland Prize Winner

Citizen Movements and China’s Public Intellectuals in the Hu-Wen Era

David Kelly

China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia

Kevin Sheives

State, Society and Democratic Consolidations: The Case of Cambodia

Kheang Un

Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia.

Yong Cheol Kim, R. William Liddle and Salim Said

Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan

Apichai W. Shipper

The Shadows of Kashmir and Bombs in the Pakistan-India Conflict.

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Review Article

Books Reviewed (listed on pp. 178)
Pacific Affairs

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* The William L. Holland Prize for the best article published in Volume 78 (2005-2006) of Pacific Affairs has been awarded to

Paul Waley

for his article published in Volume 78 No.2, Summer 2005, pp. 195-215

Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The State and Civil Society in Japan

Dr. Waley’s study uses a range of groups concerned with rivers as a prism to provide a fresh perspective on the nature of civil society in Japan and usefully takes issue with conventional interpretations that see civil society as being locked into a close (but sometimes antagonistic relationship) with the state.

The William L. Holland Prize recognizes the success of this article and serves to honour the memory of Bill Holland’s dedication to open and accessible scholarship.

The article may be viewed at our website: www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca
Winner of the fourth William L. Holland Prize

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Public Intellectuals and Citizen Movements in China in the Hu-Wen Era

David Kelly

Citizenship implies a termination of subject status, a “right to hold rights” recognized and safeguarded by the state. The emergence of citizen movements in China today and the relationship between citizen movements and public intellectuals are the focus of this paper. Citizen rights movements of different orders—rural migrant workers (mingong), urban homeowners (yezhu), and investors in company shares (gumin)—help us gauge the role of specific rights, in particular property rights, in shaping the content of citizenship contention. Lawyers and journalists have moved into the role of “public intellectuals” able to contest these rights. Finally, both citizenship and intellectual politics in China are heavily coloured by dilemmas of political identity. While Chinese politics is destined to remain Chinese, this does not preclude it from being a hybrid featuring a Chinese citizenship.

China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia

Kevin Sheives

China’s involvement in Central Asia occupies an under-researched and emerging area of Chinese foreign policy, one which primarily revolves around its attempts to maintain regional stability in and around its periphery, strengthen its energy security in the region and maintain stable relations with the United States. Through its codominance with Russia of the nascent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it has and will likely continue to find cooperation with SCO member states over the former two issues, but will encounter some difficulty in finding cooperation regarding the latter. The PRC’s relations with Central Asia hold important short- and long-term implications for understanding the role of Xinjiang in China’s foreign relations, China’s energy security and its relations with the US. Furthermore, Sino-Central Asian relations function as a proving ground for testing the viability of China’s grand strategy, effectively articulated by Avery Goldstein, in a specific foreign policy setting. Beijing’s Central Asian policies reflect its larger geopolitical strategy, meant to ensure its peaceful rise to regional prominence, assuage fears of a China threat and focus on domestic development. This study concludes that China’s relations with Central Asia meet vital national interests in regional stability, energy security and stable US-China relations, while achieving secondary benefits crucial to its grand strategy of a peaceful rise.

State, Society and Democratic Consolidations: The Case of Cambodia

Kheang Un

This article argues that certain conditions are crucial to democratic consolidation, and that an imbalance in the power configuration between state and society impedes democratic consolidation. After democracy was introduced, Cambodian elites continued to employ patronage and corruption to advance their interests and strengthen their positions through the provision of benefits to members of their patronage networks. These networks extended throughout and crosscut formal po-
Political institutions. The embeddedness of these elements in Cambodian politics prevents democracy from consolidating, because consolidation requires both the establishment and strengthening of vertical and horizontal accountability institutions. Following the introduction of democracy in 1993, there have been new elements of civil society, including most importantly non-governmental organizations, attempting to transform the imbalanced relationship between state and society. However, their efforts have been an uphill struggle, given the unequal power configuration between state and society. The state appears to be strong in that it can silence and oppress government opponents; however, the state apparatus is apparently weak in providing services and ensuring the rule of law. In the meantime, civil society has not acquired sufficient strength to pressure the state to adopt meaningful reform due to its exogenous and endogenous weaknesses. This paper concludes that the sober reality is that civil society cannot really contribute substantially to democratic consolidation until Cambodia has a larger urban, educated population, a larger middle class, and more experience with the idea of non-political “secondary associations,” which can build up “social trust” and generate “norms of reciprocity” that deviate from standard patronage networks.

Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia
Yong Cheol Kim, R. William Liddle and Salim Said

With Third Wave democratization, civilian supremacy has been firmly established in Korea but not in Indonesia. What accounts for this disparity? Structural factors are important, but must be turned into political resources by the human actors who shape policies and institutions in particular contexts. In Korea, four successive presidents made strategic and tactical decisions that smoothed the transition and produced a consensual and definitive outcome. In Indonesia, President B.J. Habibie and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto laid a foundation for civilian supremacy, but progress stalled under Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. External pressure from political opposition and civil society forces was important in both countries. Indonesia and other new democracies with fragile civilian supremacy can learn much from the Korean experience.

Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan
Apichai W. Shipper

Scholars have consistently characterized political life in modern Japan as consisting of a strong central government in a homogenous society, in which defining membership rules and state responsibilities has been a monopoly of the state. In recent years, Japanese citizens have responded to an influx of foreigners and a lack of government programmes to assist unskilled Asian workers by organizing support groups to help unprotected foreigners, groups that are pushing local governments to accept responsibility for caring for all their residents. In addition, the 1998 NPO law, which granted incorporation authority to local governments, has deepened partnerships between certain support groups and local governments. The larger role that small foreigner support groups play in redefining membership rules and state responsibilities in Japanese society demonstrates the increased political strength and independence of civil society organizations.
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Citizen Movements and China’s Public Intellectuals in the Hu-Wen Era

David Kelly

“Gongminhua wansui! (Long live citizenization!)”

In written Chinese, “citizenization” is formed by a simple concatenation of gongmin (citizen) and hua (transform into). The word sounds harsh in English, but no worse than most technical words in Chinese. The article from which this declaration comes is entitled “Siyouhua yu gongminhua” (privatization and citizenization). My translation of the final passage runs:

In summary, I am firmly convinced that privatization is citizenization, and citizenization is privatization in a higher sense. There can be no citizenization without privatization, it’s the fons et origo from which citizenization stems; without citizenization in this sense, it would be impossible for the present historicity of developed societies, whether of East or West, to exist.

Only with citizenization, as a state of inner privatization rendered external, can the maximum safeguard be given to all the individual persons—who make up the cells of the total population of any society—to own assets and control capital; only then can their capital appreciate and their wealth expand effectively, finally being expressed as assets owned and capital held by the citizenry as a whole. Only then will human society be able to develop together from part to whole to all mankind.

What crime is there in privatization?! Privatization is citizenization! We are entitled to raise our arms and loudly shout, “Long live privatization! Long live citizenization!”

The reduction of citizenship to private property rights is rhetorical, of course, but the usage is telling. Indeed, this neoliberal interpretation of citizenship is but one of several rival readings of the term, although it is by no means dominant. Neoliberalism is a very troubled word, not least in contemporary China, where it has been used as a scare word by the New

* The author is grateful to the editor and anonymous readers of Pacific Affairs, and to Dr Michael Dowdle, for critical comment and insights.

1 These are the closing words of an article found on 10 June 2005 by a Google News search on the word gongminhua. See <http://www.tianyabook.com/jingji/0823022.htm>. 
Left, social democrats, the Right, and more recently by writers with official affiliations like the Central Translation Bureau. This article, however, focuses on a wider phenomenon of which the debate over neoliberalism forms a part, namely citizenship formation and the emergence of citizen movements in China today and the relationship between citizen movements and China’s public intellectuals. These are especially salient questions in the rapidly evolving new style of government ushered in by the transfer of power between 2003 and 2005 from Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, to the new guard of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.

Clearly, “citizenship” and hence “citizenization” are important floating signifiers in China that help mobilize major interests. Particularly when terms like democracy and freedom are still objects of suspicion, inviting the closure of Web sites or other media carrying them, the abstract norms attached to these words come into play, providing a protected discursive space. When talking about freedom and rights is forbidden, talking about citizenship may serve the same purpose, yet be risk-free—so far. Beyond this simple fact, however, we need to be aware of the different agendas and radically heterogeneous contents both of citizenship discourse, and of the groups mobilized around the discourse. We shall suggest that while the dynamics of “rightful resistance” and the state’s response to it are broadly homogenizing forces, leading to similar outcomes regardless of social sector, a number of differentiating factors, notably the varying property claims of peasants and urban homeowners or investors, are at work simultaneously.

Property interests interact with citizenship in a sociologically active sense. I shall examine recent developments surrounding both the debate and the movements, with particular emphasis on migrant workers, urban homeowners, and groups with closely related property interests. While there is often an overlap, this citizenship discourse is analytically distinct from earlier discussions of civil society in China. These stemmed largely from considerations of the breakdown in the 1980s of socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, where an essential issue was the gradual emergence of a realm of autonomy from the state under conditions of state

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3 Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic, eds., Civil Society in China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
monopoly of the public realm. This autonomy was moreover largely attributed to associations, ranging in scale from the local to the national (like Poland’s Solidarity) and legitimate (excluding mafia-like underworld groups), and organized in opposition to, or without reference to, the state. These attributes are not excluded from the citizenship discourse, but the fact that citizenship emerges in nation-states of many kinds means that as a political category it is less implicated with liberal democracy in a teleological sense. Civil society is arguably necessary but not sufficient for democratization, whereas enhanced citizenship is neither. The contingent relationship of citizenship to democracy is potentially important, but it is not the initial focus of research.

We then turn to another shaping force in contemporary China, namely the stratum of public intellectuals. In a reciprocal causal mechanism, the public intellectual’s role is modifying, while also being modified by, extensions of citizenship. Here threads may usefully be drawn from recent work on “rightful resistance” in China, which provide both broad comparative perspectives and thick descriptions of phenomena of essentially the same order as those described here. Studies of rightful resistance attend to the “opportunity structures” created when the state falls short in the delivery of promised rights and protections. Citizenship, as the “right to hold rights,” is in itself an opportunity structure of special intensity and volatility. A gain or loss of citizenship is an event greater than the sum of its parts. This confers power on the gatekeepers, and on those who are able to influence them. Agencies of the state are not alone in competing for influence in this arena, but have been joined by intellectuals both in and out of the establishment and academe. Lawyers and journalists have in particular moved into the role of “public intellectuals” able to contest citizenship claims. At the same time, activists among the citizenry have shown a propensity for raising the stakes and exploiting even marginal leverage wherever the opportunity presents itself.

Finally, both citizenship and intellectual politics in China are heavily coloured by dilemmas of political identity. The atomic units studied in identity politics are acts of recognition. A range of attributes, from the biological or ascribed (gender, kinship) to the cultural or achieved (ethnicity, nationality, religion, social status) may contribute to an individual’s identity, but in all cases it is the recognition of this identity, by oneself or by others, that puts it into play politically. In the present context, “Chinese identity” entails a set

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4 This point is emphasized in; Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry, Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 2-3.

5 Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

of assumptions about historical destiny, political culture, national interest and other value commitments. The commitments involved in expanding autonomous citizenship are readily labelled liberal (if not neoliberal), which in turn is felt to entail Western, non-Chinese values. There is of course nothing abnormal or exceptional in such a situation: the issues of national image reflected in it can be seen as recapitulating a process that has taken place with local variations in Germany, Russia, Japan and many other modern states. In China the nation-state is strongly fused with anxieties concerning unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Xenophobia and suspicion of hybrids coexist with secular, cosmopolitan and outward-looking sources of identity. The future of political civilization and social harmony is bound up with the balance of power between these forces, because while Chinese political civilization is destined to remain Chinese, this does not preclude it from being a hybrid—a Chinese citizen society.

A. Citizen Movements and Citizenship in Social Science and in Chinese Society

The theory of citizenship has been a growth industry in the social sciences over the past 20 years, and exploration in Chinese studies, though more recent, has already yielded valuable work. The literature in Chinese is multiplying daily.8

The term gongmin (citizen) arose against the historical emergence of the Communist state. It was to an extent a replacement of the Nationalist term guomin in official political texts. Today it is close in sense to shimin, though the latter has a more narrowly “urban” focus (this is of course true also of the original, but not contemporary sense of “citizen” in the West). Shimin can often be rendered in English as “urbanite” or townsman, and where needed here, the latter rendering will be used. Both stand at some remove from the standard Chinese Marxist expressions renmin (the people) and qunzhong (the masses). The latter terms are implicitly contrasted with “the state,” more explicitly with the cadres who make up the political class. To be included with “the people” or “the masses” means to belong to the catch-all status group of the ruled. Social historians commonly point out the continuity of this category with traditional expressions like chenmin (the subjects).


Gongmin or “citizenry” is more inclusive than renmin or qunzhong, appearing in various PRC constitutions as the totality of members of virtually all status groups.\(^9\) It includes the people and the cadres, who together are the bearers of constitutionally provided rights and freedoms. It is necessary for the Constitution of the PRC, as for most others, to set up and mobilize such idealized constructs: citizens here are deemed to exist and to have rights, and there is an unstated contractual relation between the provision of these rights and the legitimacy of the government.

The contemporary sociological and political science literature on citizenship represents something of a radical shift from this. The emphasis, deriving in large part from the historical experience of Western Europe in the age of massive migrant inflows and “guest workers,”\(^10\) is on the heterogeneity and contested nature of citizenship in the real world. In the abstract sense, “really existing” citizenship implies a termination of subject status, a “right to hold rights” recognized and safeguarded by the state. But the bundles of enforceable rights so held varies as a function of complex, path-dependent, particular histories. In discussing the implications in the Chinese context, it is well to bear in mind Bryan Turner’s concern whether “…‘citizenship’ could apply easily to societies which have very different urban histories, or which have very different notions of ‘the public.’”\(^11\)

To speak of citizen contention in China in this sociological sense is not to disparage the abstract normative content found in the Constitution. But it does require analysis of the particular citizenship deals, games or packages in which this normative content is combined with the stuff of actual social life. Citizenship, as is often pointed out, is generally exclusive on at least some levels.\(^12\) What is dealt out in a particular citizenship package for one group may, intrinsically, occur at the expense of another group. Thus, citizen rights of urban communities in China are implicitly at the expense of the migrant workers who fail to qualify. When their abstract, equal citizen rights are demanded by migrant workers or on their behalf, the upshot may well entail an adjustment of the package of second-class citizen rights available to others.

The following sections look briefly at three important varieties of citizen rights movements: rural migrant workers (mingong), urban homeowners

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12 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance, p. 119: “Citizenship, in other words, excludes at the same time that it includes; it draws boundaries and ranks the populace.” Also Goldman and Perry, Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China, p. 3.
(yezhu), and investors in company shares (gumin). This will enable us to gauge the role of specific rights, in particular property rights, in shaping the content of citizenship contention. Revealed at the same time is the tendency of the Chinese state to blur these particularities by treating them all as challenges to authority and subjecting them to uniform handling.

**Citizen movements I: Rural migrant workers**

In China, there is an important notion of “village citizenship,” which refers to entitlement to membership of one’s village community, with implications for “local identity politics” as well as for formal democratic participation. Yet even those who qualify fully as village citizens (a concept somewhat like “parishioners” in Western countries) generally enjoy a reduced package of rights as compared to those available at the national level. The peasantry as a whole lack full citizen status, as Zhao Junchen points out in the passage quoted above. Kevin O’Brien has described the peasantry as occupying “an intermediate position between subjects and citizens.” The citizen status of urban dwellers is also highly variable, as shall be described below. As Qin Hui makes clear, while peasants were de-citizenized with the rest of the population in the early post-liberation years, the reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s, in particular the household responsibility system (HRS), allowed them to effect a partial re-citizenization in advance of the urban residents. These gains were then lost as the limitations of the HRS revealed themselves: increasingly fragmented holdings, declining agricultural vis-à-vis non-agricultural incomes, and greater wealth disparities.

The emergence of the mingong (rural migrant workers) that followed from the declining rural fortunes in the 1980s created a pool of people with even lower status and citizen rights. They are liable to be technically excluded from both village and urban community citizenship on the basis of residence. This pariah status is structurally induced and is at the root of the discrimination they face in making their livelihood, even though it is their labour that drives the export-processing industries to which China owes its high rates of economic growth.

Citizen movements among the mingong include clear demands for either village or urban citizen status. The latter is particularly contentious, because the city and regional governments involved are politically beholden to local

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14 “Villagers, elections and citizenship,” in Goldman and Perry, p. 228.

constituencies who feel deeply threatened by any major concessions to *waidiren* (“outlanders,” also referred to as *wailai de laodongli*, “the external workforce”). The central government has attempted to lessen the tensions by extending improved packages of rights to the *mingong*, and indeed abolished the formal barriers of the traditional *hukou* system (a *hukou* is a household registration, analogous to an internal passport). There are many ways for local governments to carry on discriminatory practices against the outsiders, however, such as demolition of their housing, which is of necessity cheap and low quality, on environmental or preservationist grounds.\(^\text{16}\)

Indirect conflict is also evident on a large scale. Perhaps the most important form of this is seen in the so-called *mingong huang* (“dearth of migrant workers”). This appeared early in the present decade, with a number of enterprises in the booming export processing towns of Guangdong and Fujian experiencing shortfalls when filling positions. By the summer of 2004, the dearth was clearly neither random nor ephemeral, but rather structural, large-scale and of growing concern. There are clear, unproblematic economic explanations for the shortage—the affected industries in China were moving up the technological ladder, and a true labour market was emerging, pushing the demand for workers of certain types and levels of skill beyond the existing supply. But a broader set of factors was evident as well. The “dearth” reflected, in economic terms, overall assessments made by potential migrants as to the opportunity costs of leaving their places of origin. These opportunity costs were kept low by a series of structural factors, including central and regional policies and, of key importance, the collective ownership of rural land.\(^\text{17}\)

If for any reason these opportunity costs were to rise, more *mingong* would tend to stay at home and a “dearth” would be bound to appear. This can be restated in terms of *mingong* labour being artificially cheap, but in sociological and political terms it is primarily a matter of the citizenship entitlement packages being too poor. If village citizenship were to be made more valuable, the *mingong* would have more reason to stay and fight for it. There is ample


\(^{17}\) Under the 1982 Constitution, agricultural land may not be owned privately. Rural cultivators, through long-term contracts signed with locally constituted collective bodies, hold usage rights only to their land. However, the latter, who often are de facto creatures of the local Party leadership, may transfer land from this regime, effectively privatizing it. They do this by declaring, on grounds of national interest, a change to non-agricultural usage. Despite vigorous attempts by the centre to ensure that such recourse to “national interest” is strictly limited, abuses have been rife and accelerating, as land has steadily emerged as a rich source of revenue for local governments. This is explored in David Kelly and Luo Xiaopeng, “SARS and China’s Rural Migrant Labour: Roots of a Governance Crisis,” in Phua Kai Hong et al., eds., *Population Dynamics and Infectious Diseases in Asia* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2005); and Peter Ho (*Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social Conflict in China*, Oxford University Press, 2005).
anecdotal evidence that this has indeed happened on a wide scale, though
strict empirical testing is still required. Qin Hui has argued incisively along
these lines:

[A]s we all know, the shortage of migrant labour in 2004 in particular
clearly showed that there were non-economic factors behind the
“price of labour being on the low side.” In my opinion there are
three such factors:

(1) A lack of collective bargaining rights: in recent years the system of
chambers of commerce has lagged far behind that of labour unions.

(2) The low comparative advantage of China’s agriculture is surely an
artificially induced factor. Generally speaking, in the present stage
of development, agriculture is indisputably a disadvantaged sector.
But in the last few years at least, it has been even more disadvantaged
than it normally would be; the main reason being that since the tax
reforms, the most obvious tax barrier, the farmers’ burden, has been
heavier than that of most other people. That’s why there was some
mitigation of the abandonment of arable land after the tax-for-fees
reform.

(3) Barriers to entering the market: at present only a few places [in the
labour market] are open to entry by migrant workers.

The “dearth” is thus an expression of the struggle for citizen rights. In
tactical terms, the method of struggle is “exit” or “voting with their feet.”

In 2003, the politics of migrant worker status was placed before a national
public in stark terms, in the Sun Zhigang case. Sun, who came from rural
Hubei, had a college education but, failing to find work, had in 2002 gone
to Guangzhou as a mingong. Picked up by the police on one occasion, he
failed to produce his identity documents and was held under powers of

18 See, in a large literature: Qin Ping, “Dearth of migrant workers is golden opportunity to
2004-08/10/content_123606.htm>; “Migrant labour shortage‘ forces us to wake up,” Changjiang ribao
; “Facing the ‘dearth of migrant workers’: External workers must become genuine citizens!”, Jinyang
05/content_859493.htm>; Zhang Dianchun, “The rights implications of ‘fair treatment for mingong,”

19 Qin Hui, “Polarisation is caused by inability to privatize land,” address to China Economic

20 Zhai Jicheng, “Mingong huang: xiaoji kangyi de jiji yiyi” [Dearth of migrant workers: the
positive meaning of negative resistance], in Ye Zi, ed., Cong jianfu dao fazhan [From burden reduction
to development] (Beijing: Central Translation Press, 2006), pp. 186-199.

amnesty.org/wire/July2003/China>.
“custody and repatriation” (shourong shencha), widely and arbitrarily used by the public security authorities as a catch-all measure to control “urban vagrants and beggars”—i.e., rural migrants. While in custody, Sun received a savage beating that resulted in his death. Despite a cover-up, the story was taken up by local media and quickly became a nation-wide scandal. The local authorities were eventually punished, but the after-effects did not stop there. A group of legal scholars in Beijing wrote a public letter to the leadership and, confronted with calls for reform from all quarters, the government eventually rescinded the practice of “custody and repatriation.”

Citizen movements II: Urban homeowners

Housing reform is a major dimension of overall economic reform, and continues to be a potential stumbling block for the government. It is closely linked to other sensitive issues. Affordable housing is considered a human right, and is written into many constitutions as a citizen (or civic) right. 22 Faced with an unmanageable burden of welfare housing allocated through the danwei (traditional socialist-era enterprises or firms) the Chinese government undertook to commercialize housing in the 1980s. Urban residents assumed title to their housing, which was sold off cheaply. 23

With population growth and urban expansion, the market for housing has become a major driving force in the market economy, accounting for up to a quarter of China’s GDP growth. 24 Encouraged in the early 2000s to help counter deflation, attention has shifted more recently to speculative tendencies in the housing market. The government issued instructions to curb speculation, which took effect in June 2005, but concerns linger that prices will not be held in check for long. Local governments are frequently charged with rent-seeking behaviour in the housing market. Various agencies, such as local bureaus of construction and real estate administration, are able to collude with developers and real estate agents to facilitate speculators by engaging in such practices as allowing forward purchase on credit. This helps keep the prices on an upward spiral.

Such behaviour also sometimes results in the transfer of housing ownership to agents or speculators without the prior knowledge of the current owners,

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22 See the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (Article 25 (1)). Discussed at <http://www.hrea.org/learn/guides/housing.html>.


when their usage rights are used as collateral for the loans. The deeper issue here is the lack of clarity in property rights regarding housing. This is the source of a nation-wide surge in activities in defence of citizen rights now taking place across the nation. So-called homeowners rights’ protection movements (yězhū wéiquan yùndòng) are common in every city, generally taking place in high-rise housing development projects, where homeowner committees (yězhū wéiyuánhuì) are flourishing, moving to replace the residents’ committees (jùmin wéiyuánhuì) which formed the lowest level of urban community governance in the past.

Citizen movements in defence of urban housing have a different format to corresponding movements in the country, reflecting among other things the different nature of the property rights at stake. The peasantry strive to protect their stake in collectively owned arable land. They face severe limitations in that the Constitution gives little room for their ownership claims and allows for legitimate requisitioning of land by transferring it from agricultural to other usage under the constitutionally valid grounds of “interests of state.” Urban homeowners hold their housing as private owners, and their titles, while by no means ironclad or completely unambiguous, are more difficult for predatory organizations to put aside or wilfully misinterpret. Conflicts frequently break out concerning transfers of the usage of public amenities, access to which is included in the sales contract for an apartment, such as car parks, community buildings and facilities (club houses, local shopping centres, access roads, etc). As well as the loss of access to these amenities, the homeowners are motivated by the very likely loss of value of their assets that is entailed.

With members living in close proximity to each other, to influential arms of the government and media, and comprising high proportions of people of middle income and high professional skills, the homeowners are in general better resourced to engage in rights protection than the rural disadvantaged. There is no reason to suppose that homeowners would feel a natural sympathy for the migrants pushed out of the cities, as happened in the Shenzhen “sorting” operation; indeed, they would form a natural constituency in favour


of such action, since it would very likely help to enhance real estate values in their city. As noted above, citizen rights do not have the universality or non-contractual nature of human rights, and there will be instances in which the citizen rights of one stratum occur at the expense of another. Nonetheless, it should not be thought that campaigns waged by homeowners are sedate affairs. The evidence from a large number of media reports is that they can be as bloody and protracted as those waged by peasants warding off enclosure in the countryside.

The strength of this movement to date lies in its ability to formulate strategies that avoid confronting the state head on, and which draw support from written law and central government policies. Other forms of housing-based citizen movements reflect the varying nature of property rights, such as the rights of those allocated housing by their work units (huabo), as opposed to owners and tenants of “rented-out housing” (jingzufang; see below).

As noted, urban movements have access to more resources, including intellectual support. An example is provided by Hua Xinmin, a noted campaigner for the preservation of Beijing’s hutongs, the old back streets and their neighbourhoods that once featured the traditional sihe yuan (courtyard house). Hua began her defence on environmental and preservationist lines, but to broaden her base she has increasingly drawn on the common interests of homeowners in strengthening the property law (wuquan fa), an amended draft of which was circulated for public comment in mid-2005. She has emphasized the different categories of private ownership found in the urban sector, deriving from the historically contingent circumstances under which the CPC issued residents with housing. In addition to housing bought under post-reform market conditions, for example, there is “rented-out” housing (jingzufang), whose owners notionally retained title when usage of their properties was requisitioned by the CPC prior to the Cultural Revolution.

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28 Zou, “Zhuhai xiaqu zhongde minzhu.”
30 Hua Xinmin, “Defend citizen’s real estate rights at the source.”
Ownership of land is collective; ownership of housing is private. Land and housing were both “good” in the Party’s value system, while intangible assets like capital and securities were not. But a market economy that does not allow for the existence of assets in liquid form is, of course, inevitably cumbersome and inefficient. Investment in listed company shares has been officially promoted as a channel for funding the transformation of state-owned enterprises, as a potentially massive source of funding for national development through the release of personal and household savings from low-yielding bank deposits, and as a means for citizens to share in the fruits of economic growth, and to secure their future incomes.

However, the stock market has performed poorly overall in recent years. “Despite robust growth in the economy, the market capitalization of stocks trading on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges—China’s two stock exchanges, with over 1,400 listed companies—has tumbled 45-55 percent from their peak levels in 2001.” Apart from sagging share values, investors suffer from generally poor dividend payments. Where profits have been made they are often soaked up by agency fees, questionable reinvestments, and corrupt and incompetent management.

Investment in the stock market is clearly a risky matter in any economy. Governments limit their exposure to adverse turns of fortune by advising the investing public to act prudently, spread their risks, seek competent advice and so on. Stock market downturns may have a range of electoral consequences but rarely prompt citizen action as such. State actions are implicated in a different way in the PRC, however, and the signs are that as with rural land, migrant rights and urban real estate, citizen movements connected to share ownership are in a process of incubation, due to a sense of shared grievance, loss of livelihood and vulnerability, all in turn traceable to imperfections of this part of the ownership system. In the summer of 2004, the “value-subtracting” tactics of private entrepreneurs, which enabled them to take over former public assets by means of management buy-outs (MBOs), became a focus of public concern. Qin Hui, the social democratic historian and public intellectual mentioned above, voiced warnings in the late 1990s, and now a Hong Kong-based finance expert, Lang Xianping,

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showed in detail how the abuses were staged. A policy directive limiting MBOs was issued in mid-2005, and Gu Chujun, the executive director of Greencool group, was arrested for corporate misdemeanours in July. Gu had sued Lang Xianping for defamation, having been a prime target of his exposés.

Striking down wayward CEOs here and there has, however, not allayed public opinion. Citizen movements focused on mismanagement of listed companies show signs of increasing. A related case is the “North Shaanxi privately operated petroleum incident,” which emerged in May 2005 following confiscation of the assets of private investors. In a public letter to the central government, the aggrieved investors state that officials of both Shaanxi and central ministries and commissions had repeatedly charged the investors and their attorneys and expert consultants with “creating instability in the name of ‘rights protection’ and ‘law.’” The overall format of this conflict follows that of the land and housing movement. A number of prominent “rights defence attorneys” ventured their hand in this case, eventually running afoul of the authorities and receiving legal penalties. This foreshadowed more recent moves, discussed further below, to limit the rights defence movements through the lawyers’ own professional associations.

We have examined in outline the relationship between the form of ownership of the assets being defended on the one hand, and the goals, operations and strategies of the citizen movements on the other. Despite the varying nature of the property claims in dispute, the state, whether through local mismanagement or system-wide anxieties regarding social stability, is imposing uniformity on movements of quite different origin. Thus, while the repression of villagers in Guangzhou in the Taishi and Dingcun incidents of 2005 achieved notoriety within and without China, the campaigns

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34 Qin Hui, “Yao ‘MBO,’ bu yao ‘MBO nian’” [‘MBOs,’ yes; ‘year of the MBO,’ no—some basic issues in property rights reform], in David Kelly editor, and Qin Hui, translator, “The Mystery of the Chinese Economy,” special issue of The Chinese Economy, vol. 38, no. 5 (September-October 2005).


of the Shaanxi oil investors, and those of humble defenders of parking lots in urban housing projects and jingzufang owners, have all seen their share of open or underhand repression. Moreover, they have adapted in closely similar ways along the lines analyzed in O’Brien and Li’s Rightful Resistance. This is the root of their ambivalence in political terms: a prediction of deepening democratization emerging from these campaigns would be misplaced, given that citizenship, even when expanding willy-nilly under the impact of economic development, is compatible with non-democratic regimes. Yet their opportunism and energy seem to demand accommodation from the state that is consistent with political reform in broadly democratic form. The potential thus exists for these forces to be woven into novel shapes.

B. The Role of Public Intellectuals

The activity of intellectuals has been referred to several times in the preceding accounts of citizen movements. It was noted that urban homeowners have better access to human resources of the kind exemplified by Hua Xinmin. This is however a relative statement only; all important categories of citizen movements have intellectual components. Of interest here are reciprocal formative processes which see, on the one hand, citizen movements making use of key formulations taken from the domain of intellectual discourse, and on the other, the reshaping of intellectual roles by new images of the citizen.

In a March 2005 lecture on “The Politics of Rights Protection,” Fan Yafeng gives a useful historical account of the intellectual origins of the rights defence movement, focusing on the emergence of a liberal mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s. Fan refers to three stages: that of “platforms” (1990-1999), that of “networks” (1999-2003), and that of “going social” (2003 to the present). Platforms were outgrowths of the post-Marxist dissenting discourse of the late 1980s known as the “new enlightenment,” and embodied in book series like Towards the Future and Culture: China and the World. This took an explicitly liberal turn with the emergence of a journal Res Publica, published in book series format and edited by the political scientist Liu Junning. The network

38 “Knowledge workers able to contest citizenship claims” has been adopted as the working definition for the purposes of this article. For a more diversified discussion, see Timothy Cheek, “Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals,” China Quarterly, 2006 (forthcoming).
Citizen Movements and China’s Public Intellectuals in the Hu-Wen Era

phase was a direct expression of the impact of the Internet. For Fan, this step signifies the expansion of the participating audience from the several score thousand (as attested by the print runs of periodicals like Res Publica), to the unknown but potentially vast numbers of Internet users. 41

“Going social” (shehuihua) reflects a situation in which, in Fan’s terms, “in China today, some basic liberal ideas, especially the rule of law and constitutional government, have gradually become accepted, have become mainstream discourses, and having done so, need to be transformed from ideas into operations.” 42 Fan estimates the proportion of intellectuals adhering to liberalism at 80 percent—a difficult claim to substantiate—but equally significant, he argues, are alterations in the language of the official media. Recent articles by Zhou Yongkang, the Minister for Public Security in the key Xinhua Newsagency, for example, were remarkable in avoiding mention of the word “dictatorship,” despite the legitimacy of this term in Communist party discourse. 43

Freedom and sociologically meaningful citizenship

Qin Hui is a widely respected public intellectual, an economic historian who has helped popularize left-liberal (social democratic) views on major issues of social justice in the reform policy. Qin frames his position with clear reference to the issue of the emergence of citizen society. This may be rephrased as the “creation of sociologically meaningful citizenship.” Some of his views were reflected in the following excerpt from a speech given in 2003:

**Conclusion:** China’s peasant problem has many aspects, behind all of which is the problem of the peasant becoming a citizen; even if they don’t become townspeople (shimin) they are entitled to enjoy townspeople’s rights. If our observations of the peasant problem are not understood in terms of enhancing their rights and interests, many things will become problematic. 44

More detail is provided in Qin’s book *Pastorals and Rhapsodies* (co-authored with his wife Su Wen):

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42 Fan Yafeng, “The politics of rights defence.”
Especially after 1949, when what slight amount of citizenship to be found in China was gradually eliminated, city folk became even more peasantised (or decitizenised) than countryfolk.45

...[I]n the final analysis, reform for both urban and rural society has been a reconstruction of sorts in which everyone, in both sectors, had to complete a process of changing from peasant to citizen, namely from dependents of the community to individual free people.46

Since their appearance in the mid-1990s, these scholarly views have increasingly been echoed in social agitation literature appearing on the Internet, often in the discourse on sannong (the “three-dimensional” agrarian issues: agriculture, rural politics and the peasantry), but elsewhere as well. An article entitled “Citizen status for peasants: key issue that a harmonious society cannot avoid” provides an example of the “sociologically meaningful” concept of citizenship, utilizing the official slogan of “building a harmonious society,” which has become emblematic of the Hu-Wen administration:

Presently, social discord in China is mainly seen in two major areas: the struggle for a living of the urban unemployed, and the lack of citizen treatment for rural peasants. In relative terms, the urban unemployed, being a relatively advantaged group, have trade unions etc. arguing for their rights; the Party and Government have issued “baseline guarantee” policies whose city coverage is fairly wide, etc., and the problems of which are finding or have found suitable resolution.

But the peasants’ lack of citizen status affects a broader domain: there are no peasant organisations at the national, provincial, city (prefecture), county, or township levels to mobilise arguments for their rights, and many rights bestowed on peasants by the Central Committee and State Council through regulations and by the National People’s Congress through laws still await implementation. This has become a crucial key point, a dilemma and a hot topic for social harmony in China.47

Rise of the Attorneys

The 1980s saw a shift in the centre of intellectual influence from philosophy—with which Mao Zedong had had a lifelong romance—to the formerly reviled empirical social sciences (including history, sociology and political theory). The 1990s, by contrast, were marked by the rise of

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economics. Throwing off the inhibitions imposed by Marxist political economy and well cast as high priests of “growing out of the plan,” economists emerged as key spokespersons in public affairs. Gaining favoured access to government and international funding, setting up important think-tanks, and exploiting developments in the discipline (which opened new areas of public policy to economic analysis, such as institutional economics), they commanded wide prestige. By the end of the decade, however, their appeal was noticeably waning, and many of the areas of broad consensus in their academic thinking—such as opening more sectors to market competition—were easier to justify in theoretical discussion than among those directly affected. Critical attacks on and internal divisions within the profession became more obvious. The limits of economics (like any single discipline) as a source of public policy seemed evident. Above all it was a discipline that seemed alienated from popular concerns and blind to genuine conflicts of interest, just as the “philosophy” promoted under the heading of Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought (MLM) had been prior to reform and opening up.

This set the stage for a powerful new grouping to emerge in the intellectual arena: legal scholars and, increasingly, practising lawyers. In retrospect it is easy to see a natural fit between the discipline of law and rising citizen consciousness. Rights in law are essential to citizenship in Western societies, and much of the law can be seen in schematic terms as a specialized, applied form of knowledge which in principle is the common property of all citizens. In China, special factors came into play. The intellectuals were an intrinsic component of the status system created by the attempted application of MLM, deriving considerable benefits, material and non-material, in return for their assumed unswerving loyalty to the party, of whose legitimacy they were the publicly anointed guardians.

The status system within which the intellectuals were encapsulated was in turn shaped by a politically imposed hierarchy of property forms that privileged state over collective and private ownership. To the extent that this hierarchy has been preserved despite market reforms and the emergence

50 I draw here on interviews with Wang Yi, public intellectual and legal scholar, conducted in Chengdu in January, 2005, and He Weifang in Beijing, in April 2006.
51 It goes without saying that the actual world of the law is often totally at odds with such idealized views. The fact that lawyers enjoy a bad—not to say horrendous—press in the West serves, however, to underline my point: citizens demand that the legal profession answer to their universal interests.
53 Kelly and Luo, “SARS and China’s Rural Migrant Labour.”
of a competitive sector as the unassailable deep core of the PRC political system, key segments of the intellectual stratum remain beholden to it. The *habitus* or default behavioural and attitudinal stylization of most intellectuals thus remains “in tune” with the officially ordained models handed down from the past.

Being in tune, of course, does not imply playing the same piece of music—only that when called upon one can do so without drawing unfriendly attention. The “action” in China’s intellectual politics is thus to be found at the margins of the central structure of the politically ordained hierarchy of property and status. It can be argued that this margin, a grey zone of blurred and ambiguous political identities, can be found at the close of the Jiang-Zhu era, expanding rapidly at the expense of the core. The Hu-Wen administration replacing it has been marked by an apparent determination to shrink the margin back to the *status quo ante*.

The philosophers, economists and now the attorneys have all had their hour in the sun because of the strategic assets they command in the evolving game of setting the boundary of the grey zone. Briefly, the economics profession, in particular its anti-establishment, critical liberal wing, had relatively little leverage available to it to argue for amending or beefing up the 1982 Constitution and its later amendments and regulatory extensions. Purists would argue that the task of economics is to take the constitutional order as a given, and solve problems of optimization within the parameters it provides. Thus, if the Constitution fails to provide limits to the clearly exploitative institutional arrangements that support the *mingong* economy, economists will be hard pressed to make policy proposals as economists *sensu stricto*, that is, without delving into ethics and political theory.

This limitation does not apply to legal scholars to the same extent. The sub-discipline of constitutional law was a powerful vehicle of reformist programmes in the 1990s, and continues to be so, as seen in an increasingly visible elevation of jurists into the formal political apparatus. The projection of the legal profession into the practical struggles for rights defence has followed in the wake of this, as seen in cases such as the intervention of Xu Zhiyong and others in the Sun Zhigang case, of Zheng Enchong in housing disputes in Shanghai, of Zhu Jiuhu in the Shaanxi oilfields dispute, and Gao Zhisheng and Lü Banglie in elections protests in Guangdong. To repeat,
China’s intellectual politics is receiving powerful impetus from citizen movements as they have opened new kinds of action space for intellectuals. Reciprocally, intellectuals have adjusted their public role to speaking as citizens—or their counsel—rather than as an “organic” elite of advisers to the state, or as detached professionals.

Another straw in the wind appeared in April 2006, when the Chinese Bar Association issued a set of “Instructions and Opinions on Handling Collective Cases.” These are cases involving more than ten litigants and typically occur “in situations such as land being requisitioned, housing demolished and occupants relocated, when people are resettled from areas affected by dam projects, enterprise downsizing, environmental pollution as well as safeguarding the rights and interests of rural migrant workers.”56 Lawyers wishing to act for such cases are now required to notify their local bar association, accept guidance and supervision, and refrain from using “non-legal” methods: “Lawyers are not to agitate or take part in litigants’ petitioning activities in collective cases… They are not to take part in or to suggest solving the case by such methods as litigants violating the social order, disturbing normal work of state agencies, etc.”57

These regulations, while apparently cutting off the freedom of action of lawyers who take up rights defence, are equally a testament to the growth of this “industry” to the point of seriously threatening the status quo.

C. A Chinese Citizen society: Citizenship and Identity Politics

The dimension of identity politics is vital in the interplay of citizenship and its intellectual defenders. Not only does the neoliberal reading of citizenship noted in the introduction to this article neglect the social citizenship marked by conditional access to public goods that was important in Marshall’s theory,58 it also neglects the shaping force of the state. Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s: interpreted broadly, this points to the contractual link between the citizen and the state that makes citizenship itself possible. The mere payment of tax, moreover, is insufficient. The state gives people the identity of “citizen.” In return, the citizens recognize the state as legitimate. Recognition of the rightness and acceptability of the state, its values, policies and agencies is close to the core meaning of legitimacy. It is hard to remain a citizen of the PRC without participating in this affirmation, at least to the extent of lip service.

57 Zhang Rongxiang, “Will China’s new regulation for lawyers restrict rights defence?”
Political civilization and development have, on the other hand, a lot to do with setting limits to this requirement. In a liberal democracy this is achieved by the state, for its part, legitimating oppositional politics, so that citizens may remain loyal to the state while opposing particular expressions of its interests. The detailed mechanisms set up to do this embody general principles and local variations that need no elaboration here. China is no liberal democracy now and will not convert to one soon. This on the one hand limits the full play of citizenship, but far from putting it completely out of play, makes its reinterpretation a strategic ideological arena. When identities change, existing institutions no longer fit. Changing the way in which people define and express their identity as citizens changes the fundamental equation of legitimacy.

Identity politics is not a one-way street. Legitimacy involves an act of recognition of the state. In return, the state recognizes the individual as a citizen with a specific status and attendant rights. Conversely, expressing reservations about the legitimacy of the state, its agencies and policies places this recognition under question, opening the individual to charges not only of criminality but of disloyalty to core values of the state: in the PRC, to non-Chineseness. The expansion of citizenship in China often requires expanding the zone of what is recognized as Chinese. Intellectuals who take on this task are confronted with deep-seated xenophobia and suspicion of hybrids. While by no means unique to China and far from enjoying a monopoly in the public sphere, these constraints on the pluralization of identity amount to a considerable force of inertia.

The differential aspect of citizenship is an important factor here. As noted, granting or enhancing the citizen status of one group may, and often does, threaten that of another. The government can go only so far in raising the terms of citizenship enjoyed by, for example, rural migrant workers, before its constituency among the established urban strata comes into question. Many social democracies have rung dramatic changes in their welfare policies, because of the financial burden they impose, to be sure, but also because tax-paying workers fail to identify, not only with childless mothers or humanitarian refugees from other countries, but with unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged members of their local communities, i.e., notionally “people like us.” “Why should we support people like that?” becomes a politically loaded question. The line of division between “people like that” and “people like us” is a key issue of identity politics.

The transition to a new citizenship identity, which includes broader groupings of “people like us,” is of course possible. It was among the salient explicit objectives of the republican and proletarian revolutionary movements.

59 Thus Lang Xianping, the financial expert mentioned earlier, was, following his critiques of SOE reform policy, attacked for his Taiwanese origins and Western professional training.
that shaped modern China. Workers and other disadvantaged people ("poor and lower middle [class] peasants" in the Cultural Revolution, for example) were declared to be the bedrock of society, entitled to the highest level of recognition and favourable treatment under newly forged redistributive policies. The revelation that building national identity from, so to speak, the ground up would not by itself ensure economic progress and social harmony lay behind the collapse of Maoism and the launch of the reforms. "Having nothing to one’s name" is a condition from which people generally seek release, and not one to which they aspire.60

Thus, a great deal of hope is attached to the formation of middle-class (or, better, middle-status) citizenship.61 Many intellectuals take the view that their role will be to expand the bonds of identity of this group downwards to the disadvantaged and upwards to the ruling heights. The truth of this remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Citizen rights defence movements in China have been observed for over ten years, but given their increasing public profile, they clearly deserve continuing study and analysis, particularly with regard to variations in their form and functioning. While some categories of these movements appear to point to destabilization of the status quo, others—notably the urban homeowners’ movements—are potentially sources of stability, allowing the state to reincorporate disparate interests. While not new in China, the language of citizenship is taking on important new content, as seen in the buzzword “citizenization,” which in addition to the abstract “place-holding function” found in the Constitution and other foundational texts, promotes sociologically specific “deals” and games. This essay commenced with the claim that “Citizenization is privatization!” Placed now against the backdrop of the variations we have studied, it should be clear that it is simply one interpretation among many.

It remains an important one, however, because rights in property are reliable sources of the opportunity structures that give impetus to rightful resistance. The interests and objectives of these movements sometimes overlap and sometimes involve tension. The state, currently in “containment”

60 “Yi wu suo you” [Nothing to my name], a song composed by the rock musician Cui Jian, was the anthem of the young people demonstrating for democratic reforms in the Tiananmen movement of 1989.

61 As expressed by a Central Party School sociologist: “In a society, it is relatively easy for barriers and conflicts to arise between the rich and the poor, while it is easy for middle-income earners to live in peace with either. Thus, if the proportion of middle-income earners is greater, tensions between rich poor may quite effectively be cushioned.” Wu Zhongmin, “Yìngdàng wanzhengde liji shehui gongzheng” [Social justice should be understood comprehensively], Zhongguo chengshi pinglun [China Urban Review], no. 1 (December 2005), pp. 26-31.
(shou) as opposed to liberalizing (fang) mode, is adopting a defensive stance and seems only too ready to charge the movements with inciting turmoil in the name of rights protection. This may promote more uniformity of response from the activists themselves. Nonetheless, the different categories of movements remain linked to the forms of the rights whose protection is in question. Citizenization should not be thought of as an accomplished social change, but as an expanding region where real and potential changes in social identity are mixed. The movements we have described take place in a region that attracts the attention of all sorts of agencies and agendas, and whose eventual political configuration remains an open question. It would be mistaken, for example, to think of the state as inherently opposed to the expansion of citizenship. Such an expansion is in fact entailed by many central policies. Thus the “Instructions and Opinions” on legal handling of collective cases, while shaking a warning finger at the weiquan lawyers, at the same time gives assurance that there is a place in the system for them, provided they remain within the bounds of acceptable behaviour.

The scope and intensity of these movements was on the increase when the Hu-Wen administration took office in 2003, and was given additional impetus by the SARS epidemic that erupted almost immediately after. The populace at large were witness to a serious failure of the system, of its ideological values and its mode of governance. While the administration was adroit in rectifying its setback, averting disaster and steadying the ship, rights as something that must be claimed by the citizenry itself were highlighted as never before. The rights movements continue to develop strongly even in the face of renewed policies of repression that came to the fore in 2004. Despite the odds against them fundamentally altering the political status quo, they are not to be ignored.

China’s intellectuals have confronted a crisis of relevance with the rise of the socialist market economy. Not only was their pre-eminence as knowledge workers threatened by the rise of market forces, pluralizing the nature of specialized knowledge and opening avenues for the social advancement of new elites, but the old esprit de corps which had sustained them as a stratum faced multiple threats. It was eroded whether they fled to ivory towers or technical specialization, or tried to set up shop in the marketplace as media personalities.62 The rise of “rights defence” owes a good deal of its cutting edge to the intellectuals. An elective affinity exists between their frustrated aspirations and the space opened by citizenization.

National University of Singapore, July, 2006

62 Goldman and Gu, Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market.
China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia

Kevin Sheives*

The past decade has witnessed a fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy. Its involvement in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as warming relations with the US and Russia, indicate a more assertive and responsible international diplomacy. One of the rapidly emerging arenas of China’s new posture is Central Asia, where, with Russia, it codominates the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a nascent multilateral venture. It has also greatly increased its energy imports from the region and has sought cooperation on a number of political issues. Throughout its history, the PRC has done little to influence Central Asia, partly due to its own instability along its periphery, and internal problems in the Chinese heartland. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has instituted warm relations with each of these four newly independent Central Asian states.1

Few scholars have thoroughly examined this emerging phenomenon, particularly since 2001, even though it remains crucial for understanding China’s regional strategy. Of note, two works are both comprehensive in scope and take into account the significant changes since 2001 in Sino-Central Asian relations, such as the SCO founding in 2001, 9/11 and improved US-China relations. In the first of the most recent works, Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman analyze the breadth of issues in Sino-Central Asian relations, inspired by the proceedings of a conference on the topic.2 Their book, while the first to incorporate changes stemming from 2001 and the most exhaustive work on the subject, fails to place Chinese interests in Central Asia into either a theoretical or clear policy framework and calculus. This omission is certainly not a reflection of the authors’ analysis or knowledge of the subject, but of their desire to reflect the scope of ideas and policy implications stemming from the conference. A second work, by Niklas Swanstrom,

* The author would like to thank mentor and thesis chair Christopher Marsh, remaining committee members Victor Hinojosa and Beck Taylor, fellow graduate students Tuoya Wulan and Justin Page, and multiple anonymous reviewers for their careful and energetic insights and suggestions.

1 This study will limit its focus to issues surrounding Chinese relations with the four Central Asian SCO member states: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Due to Central Asia’s geographic proximity and for the sake of clarity, “region” and “regional” denote Central Asia as well as Xinjiang when discussing transnational issues such as peripheral stability, ethnic relations and terrorism.

examines Chinese interests in Central Asia, and attempts to place Sino-Central Asian relations in a theoretical framework of traditional vassal relations between a dominating China and Central Asia. While offering a refreshing and nuanced view of Central Asian domestic politics and leadership, the work falls short of successfully placing Sino-Central Asian relations into a viable, theoretical framework. The vassal relationship Swanstrom describes is never theoretically defined nor does it carry throughout the article’s analysis. The article also presupposes both a domineering Chinese foreign policy and continually conflicting US-China relations, neither of which are commonly accepted tenets of recent Chinese foreign policy scholarship. China’s current foreign policy strategy is focused on assuaging fears of a China threat, rather than on creating situations where states in the region feel threatened or dominated by a rising China. Both a more engaging and responsible Chinese foreign policy and cooperation with the US on the War on Terror have contributed to much improved US-China relations since 2001. Swanstrom also makes two crucial errors in his analysis of Chinese interests in the region in relation to energy security and US involvement in Central Asia, which will be discussed below.

A work is needed that both clearly specifies and classifies the most crucial Chinese interests in Central Asia while successfully placing them into a theoretical framework and the broader foreign policy strategy of China. Chinese post-Cold War involvement in Central Asia has been driven by three crucial foreign policy concerns: regional stability, energy security and stable US-China relations. Sino-Central Asian relations are certainly not limited to these three issues alone; drug trafficking, water rights and HIV/AIDS remain important, as Gill and Oresman note in their report. However, these three interests drive China’s involvement in the region and the former two, particularly, serve as its consistent policy platform in the SCO. Each of these three issues will be thoroughly analyzed in this paper, and then classified in the conclusion by placing them into a policy framework of short- and long-term interests while noting the relative importance of each in Sino-Central Asian relations.

Furthermore, China’s relations with Central Asia must be successfully placed into a broader, more theoretical framework in order to understand the motivations of the PRC leadership and how Central Asia fits into China’s domestic, regional and international strategy. Is China’s Central Asian

approach just an amalgam of interests or is it part of a larger strategy by the PRC leadership? Do any tensions exist between China’s grand strategy and its specific national interests in Central Asia? An approach that answers these questions would not only provide a more nuanced and informed understanding of Chinese foreign policy, it would also provide an opportunity to test a current theory on the subject. Avery Goldstein successfully argues that China’s current foreign policy strategy pits Beijing’s increasing involvement in multilateral institutions and growing partnerships with major powers as a means of ensuring its peaceful rise (heping jueqi) and domestic economic development through responsible foreign policy in a world uncertain of the intentions of an increasingly more powerful China.6 Reassurance of the Asian and international community through active multilateralism constitutes the first of these two components, or outputs, of China’s grand strategy of a peaceful rise during the current area of unipolarity. Multilateralism serves Chinese geopolitical interests in assuaging fears about its ascension as an Asian and global power while also meeting specific national interests. A second component of Goldstein’s analysis includes the creation of partnerships and linkages with major powers in order to hedge against any balancing against China by engaging these powers in the short to medium terms. In its warming relations with both the US and Russia, Beijing has employed this strategy “by highlighting the advantages of mutually beneficial relations and clarifying the costs of acting contrary to China’s interests [in order to] maximize its leverage over those who could be the weightiest members of any hostile coalition.”7 China has managed to incorporate its involvement in Central Asia into the Sino-Russian strategic partnership fairly easily, while it has been more of a challenge to maintain its stable relations with the US in Central Asia, thus meriting a greater focus in this study. In the last decade, China’s peaceful rise strategy has matured at the same time as its relations with Central Asia have burgeoned. This offers an excellent proving ground for how this strategy fits into a specific foreign policy setting over time—in this case, Central Asia after the immediate post-Soviet years.

Xinjiang, Regional Stability and Counterterrorism

Much of contemporary Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asia results from the post-collapse conditions in the former Soviet republics. The primary concern for China during the immediate post-Soviet period consisted of the seemingly opposed objectives of achieving economic openness (mostly in non-energy trade and cheap consumer goods) with a newly independent

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7 Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge*, p. 132.
Central Asia while simultaneously maintaining ethnopolitical stability in its unstable northwest province of Xinjiang. Separatist movements in Xinjiang have actively and violently pursued independence, or at the least greater autonomy, since the PRC fully consolidated the province into China in the 1950s. Much of the violence surrounding this movement occurred during the 1990s, exacerbated by a host of economic, social and political issues such as urbanization, Han migration to the province, Beijing’s minority policies and economic disparities.8

In establishing transportation links between Xinjiang and predominantly Turkic Central Asia, China opened up the doors for not only trade, but also refugees fleeing from an independent and unstable Central Asia, as well as to increased cross-border interaction among the Turkic peoples. This interaction brought Pan-Turkic nationalism and imposed an economic burden, prompting Chinese officials to tighten their borders. Chinese fears of domestic unrest were well founded, as movements within the Turkic Uighur population in Xinjiang began to actively and, in some cases, violently pursue a similar independence in establishing a new state called East Turkestan. After a relatively peaceful decade, multiple bombs exploded in Xinjiang during 1992, with the Chinese government responding with continuous arrests of Muslim separatists. Fearful of the resulting domestic instability from economic openness in the border areas, China suspended much of its political and economic investment in Central Asia. Although Beijing perceived much potential from the region, it put on hold any increases in direct, concrete ties until each of the states, save Tajikistan, stabilized.

As the post-Soviet independence fervour died down, Central Asian leaders began to worry not only about their own political stability, but also their relations with their powerful neighbours, Russia and China. In part to quell the region’s own separatist tendencies, in April 1996, Kazakh and Kyrgyz government officials gave renewed support to Chinese policies in Xinjiang, providing further impetus for Beijing to step up the level of cooperation. Soon after, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Mutual Military Confidence-Building Measures (MMCBM). A prelude to the Shanghai Five summits, this agreement provided for a more relaxed military posture along the borders of these states, meant to help resolve pending border disagreements. In response to Central Asian support for Chinese policies in Xinjiang and a relaxed, traditional military threat from these states, China increased its police security along its borders and focused on clamping down on unregistered human movement in and out of Xinjiang.

Currently, much of the Uighur diaspora community organizes itself in

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8 For the most exhaustive and comprehensive study on the domestic issues in Xinjiang, see Frederick Starr, ed., Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).
Kazakhstan and to a greater extent in Kyrgyzstan. Depending on which source one consults, the Uighur population is roughly one million in the Central Asian states (concentrated in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), compared with eight million in Xinjiang. Throughout most of the 1990s, the former Soviet republics allowed limited freedoms for these émigré groups, permitting them to publish in domestic and international media and to organize small protests. As Islamist movements within their own borders became more active, and in some case more violent, Central Asian leaders began to acquiesce somewhat to Chinese demands to further restrict the rights of Uighur émigrés. Facilitated by extradition agreements signed by both Central Asian states with China, this acquiescence primarily took the form of deportations of suspected Uighur separatists back to China and minor efforts to control border security.

Uighur communities in Central Asia provide an impetus to separatist movements in Xinjiang in two important ways. First, they give a significant measure of moral support to the Uighur cause in Xinjiang. One must realize the psychological impact of ethnic kin in neighbouring states achieving independence on the psyche of those still under control of a different ethnic group (in the Uighur case, the Han Chinese). Minorities in Xinjiang have struggled for decades to achieve what neighbouring kin received seemingly overnight. A vocal and active portion of Turkic minorities in Xinjiang long for the independence their Turkic kin in Central Asia have found, and some are willing to express their frustration in violent ways. Second, due to the restrictions put in place by the Chinese government, Uighurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang do not have the kind of access that Central Asian Uighurs do to the international community of states, human rights organizations and international media. The Uighur diaspora communities in Central Asia provide important regional and international coverage of the Uighur cause, lobbying international organizations and governments to press Chinese leaders for greater Uighur autonomy in Xinjiang.

The need for a comprehensive regional strategy for maintaining ethnic stability in and around Xinjiang came to the forefront in the late nineties. Central Asia saw the worst of Uighur separatist tendencies: riots in Yili, Xinjiang, a city with a history of uprisings, in 1997, were in response to a severe Chinese clampdown on separatist activity called the Strike Hard (yanda) Campaign. Outside of China, multiple bomb blasts occurred in

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10 Author conversations with Uighurs favouring independence in Urumqi, Xinjiang PRC, 2001. Some were willing to use quite violent means to overthrow Chinese rule, yet others wanted to use non-violent means such as media exposure through poetry, dance and other expressions of Uighur culture.
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during 1998 and 1999, with the Kyrgyz government convicting three Uighurs for the blasts in Osh. As Uzbekistan began to see the economic opportunities of regionalization as well as the strength of domestic and regional extremist forces such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), various Uighur groups and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it approached the member states of the Shanghai Five to apply for membership where it previously had only served as an observer. In June 2001, the Shanghai group accepted Uzbek membership and listed it as a cofounder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, formed at the June summit. The addition of Uzbekistan to the SCO was crucial as the organization began to transform into more of a security, political and economic institution rather than a mere forum for border disagreements. The June 2001 declaration officially founding the SCO contains sparse mention of border disputes, only reaffirming the military dimensions of the 1996 MMCBM.

Before further incorporating counterterrorism into China’s Central Asian strategy, it is important to note that this study does not equate all violent Uighur separatist groups with terrorism in the sense that this term is thought of in today’s world. Even though the Chinese government equates the two in referring to the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism (kongbu zhuyi, fenlizhuyi yu jiduanzhuyi de sangu e shili)” in a myriad of forums, terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang do not appear to be one and the same. Moreover, counterterrorism is not China’s only policy objective in emphasizing regional stability in its relations with Central Asia. Counterterrorism towards Xinjiang separatist groups is one of many factors in China’s Central Asian strategy of maintaining regional stability. Regime stability, the reduction of ethnic strife, territorial integrity and even economic development in Central Asia are all important interests for China and its desire to maintain a stable internal and external periphery.

First, there has been sparse credible evidence of connections between Uighur groups and significant numbers of Uighur individuals with the Al-Qaeda network. Virtually all of the open source reports suggesting a significant connection between the two have come from Chinese government sources which have arguably been inflated in order to justify its crackdown in Xinjiang. It would be speculative to make a substantial Xinjiang-Al-Qaeda connection based on geographical proximity, ethnic similarities and scattered

11 The phrase “the three evil forces” was promulgated by the PRC leadership and has found its way into a host of Chinese and SCO documents. Chinese scholars and government officials often use “sange jiduanzhuyi” (three extremisms) in place of “sangu e shili” (three evil forces).
reports. Second, of the attacks in China that have been connected to “East Turkestan” separatist groups, few have been on civilian targets.14 Most, but not all, have been attacks on government officials, military convoys and security personnel. In the scholarly literature on the subject, terrorism often connotes attacks on civilian targets. This is not to say that attacks on military targets are legitimate acts, only that Xinjiang-related separatist violence in and around China should be kept in perspective in light of the current War on Terror and Chinese rhetoric about separatists in Xinjiang. Lastly, while separatists in Xinjiang receive the most domestic and international coverage, they are often not considered Beijing’s primary terrorist problem. Because of the implications for CCP rule and its legitimacy as representatives of the Chinese working class, the upsurge in Han worker unrest and the resulting terrorist incidents (even multiple suicide bombings) perhaps pose the greatest terrorist threat to regime survival.15

China’s reaction to the “colour” revolutions in Central Asia further highlights its emphasis on the full spectrum of regional stability issues, which includes but is not limited to counterterrorism. Its response to the recent Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan was shaped by China’s concerns for the maintenance of Kyrgyz policy on its Uighur population and its commitment to regional security cooperation.16 In March 2005, Chinese officials and SCO Secretary-General Zhang Deguang reiterated their desire for peace and public security in Kyrgyzstan, even though the Akayev regime chose not to use force to ensure their survival during the revolution. No matter how Central Asian governments arrive there, security and stability in and around China’s periphery remains a crucial issue, if not the most critical one, for the Chinese leadership in Central Asia.

Only two weeks after the Uzbek government’s crackdown on protests in Andizhan during May 2005 (which holds surprising similarities to the PRC’s 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in the number of casualties, media exposure and resulting relations with the US), Uzbek president Islam Karimov chose to make his first international visit since the massacre to China. Although this visit was arranged before the Andizhan events, China and Uzbekistan seized on the opportunity to cement their support for not only political stability, but also for the legitimate right of governments to forcefully and, if

necessary, lethally handle domestic disturbances to ensure political stability. During a press conference at the time of Karimov’s visit, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan reiterated the countries’ mutual desire to rid Central Asia of the “three forces,” further stating that “we support Uzbekistan government’s efforts to stabilize its domestic situation.” In an interview with the CCP-run Xinhua News Service, President Karimov, referring to the Andizhan events, stated that “cracking down on international terrorism, secessionism and radicalism is a priority direction of Uzbekistan’s policy” and that “only with the active participation of our neighbors and surrounding countries in this part of the world will our fight against transnational threats be effective.” As a shot across the bow to Turkic separatism, the state-run Xinjiang Daily ran an article coinciding with the Karimov trip which warned of the dangers of the “three forces” and advantages of Central Asian stability in relation to stability within Xinjiang. China’s foreign policy towards Central Asian states reflects its interest in stability around Xinjiang’s borders and an acceptance of an authoritarian model for governance for doing so. China’s message to Central Asia continues to be: maintain regional stability at virtually any cost. The PRC leadership knows that the ideals of counterterrorism and the “three forces” can be utilized to justify domestic crackdowns, but the emphasis remains on a multi-faceted approach to security and stability in and around Xinjiang’s periphery.

The events of 9/11 and the resulting US war in Afghanistan provided ample opportunity for the SCO to exert its influence in matters of regional stability and counterterrorism. However, the Sino-Russian dominated organization balked at active involvement in the war through multilateral financial support of the reconstruction process, primarily out of a lack of institutionalized procedures for handling regional security crises. In the lead-up to the annual June 2004 summit (two and a half years after the Afghanistan conflict began), each Central Asian SCO state save Tajikistan suggested giving aid to Afghanistan under the auspices of the SCO. Much to the chagrin of Afghanistan’s neighbouring Central Asian states, China and Russia did not press for a multilateral initiative. In a rare stand against the dominant Sino-Russian line, Uzbekistan virtually placed the blame for the lack of multilateral economic assistance on China and Russia. Significant, bilateral measures were taken by its members to assist in the reconstruction, yet no multilateral programme was set up by the SCO until the announcement of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group in November 2005.

If anything, the Global War on Terror and the subsequent US listing of a

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18 “Uzbekistan President Karimov on Visit to PRC,” Xinhua, 25 May 2005, FBIS.
previously unheard-of Uighur terrorist group (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) on its 30-plus list of terrorist groups pushed China and the SCO members less toward traditional political issues such as border demarcation and regional diplomacy and more towards security issues, namely regional stability and counterterrorism. In declarations, communiqués and statements jointly produced by SCO members, each state particularly emphasized eradicating the “three forces.” During the founding of the SCO, the six-nation group, spearheaded by China, created the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism to deal with the problems of regional and ethnic instability. Following the global emphasis on terror after 9/11, the six foreign ministers of the SCO issued a joint statement, asserting that the SCO is “to set the preservation of regional security and stability and the crackdown on the ‘three forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism as the cooperation focus of its member states” (emphasis added). From August 4-6, 2003 the SCO conducted its first multilateral joint military exercise termed “Cooperation 2003” (the first-ever joint PLA exercise on Chinese soil), emphasizing counterterrorism measures. In June 2004, the SCO opened a counterterrorist centre, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure or RATS, in Tashkent, furthering the organization’s focus on counterterrorism. It remains to be seen whether this centre will become more than an information-sharing institution. Difficulties have arisen since the founding of RATS as its director, former major-general of the Uzbek army Kasimov Temirovich, continues to press for Uzbek interests and often clashes with the SCO Secretariat in the day-to-day affairs of the SCO. However, the mere institution of RATS is itself a significant step. Furthered by a similar impetus from Russia, which possesses its own separatist problem in Chechnya, China has spearheaded most of the major efforts and institutionalization behind the SCO in matters of regional stability, such as the SCO’s secretariat in Beijing and Hu’s June 2006 call for a multilateral legal document among the SCO members similar in scope to its 2001 agreement with Russia.

China has consistently used the vehicle of the SCO to pursue its regional stability interests in Central Asia. As Goldstein argues, China does not abandon its national interests under the limiting rules and regulations of multilateral diplomacy. Rather, as a component of its peaceful rise strategy, China chooses to meet many of its national interests in a multilateral setting by achieving a side benefit of assuaging regional fears of Chinese

21 The author would like to thank Matthew Oresman, cofounder of the China and Eurasia Forum, for this point made during October 2005 discussions.
dominance.\textsuperscript{22} Central Asian leaders would rather interact with China in a multilateral framework like the SCO than deal with the daunting power bilaterally, where their interactions are not regimented and constrained by China’s desire for the maintenance of the SCO. China’s leadership of the SCO has provided both a limited opportunity to counter Russian domination over Central Asian policy and calm Central Asian fears of China felt after their nascent, post-Soviet statehood.\textsuperscript{23}

**Energy Security**

At a growth rate consistently hovering around 9 percent, rapid and somewhat gluttonous economic development in China has produced negative echo effects such as environmental degradation, economic disparities and, recently, an energy crisis. As a state develops economically, especially at the rate China has, its level of energy consumption rises as well. As long as China’s economy and booming population continues to climb at a rapid pace, so will its energy consumption. From 1991 to 2002, China’s energy balance decreased from 62.9 Mtce (favouring production) to -132.9 Mtce (favouring consumption), with 1996 serving as its final year with a positive energy balance.\textsuperscript{24} Recently, China became the second highest energy consumer in the world, surpassing Japan. China imports two-thirds of its oil from the Middle East, relying on much of the rest from Russia and to a lesser extent Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia. One Chinese scholar warns of China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil, asserting that “62% of Chinese oil imports are from the Middle East, and the percentage is growing, thus putting China into a disadvantageous situation as it becomes more dependent on Middle East oil imports.”\textsuperscript{25}

Due to the resulting energy crisis and fear of a possible supply disruption from a military conflict, the security of its oil supply and the volatility of prices, especially in the Middle East, which easily serves as China’s highest supplier, have become crucial issues in China’s sector.\textsuperscript{26} Most of the Chinese energy investment that occurs outside of the Middle East has occurred in the importation of Russian energy via road and rail. However, Chinese imports

\textsuperscript{22} Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge*, p. 124.


\textsuperscript{24} China Energy Group, *China Energy Databook*, vol. 6. (San Francisco, CA: China Energy Group, June 2004), table 7A1.2. All energy volume statistics are measured in tons of standard coal equivalent (Tce) or million tons of standard coal equivalent (Mtce).


of Russian oil have been hampered through an unstable relationship with Yukos, Russia’s oil giant, followed by Russian wavering about the terminus point of its Siberian pipeline between Daqing, favouring the Chinese market, and Nakhoda, favouring the Japanese market. Both the unstable flow and the highly competitive nature of Russian oil exports to Northeast Asia have driven China to look elsewhere for a secondary source of foreign energy beyond the Middle East. As domestic development remains a crucial tenet and end game of its peaceful rise strategy, China cannot succeed unless its energy security is strengthened.

Enter Central Asia. Strategically and geographically, Central Asia’s proximity provides secure access and obvious advantages in transportation efficiency. Politically, China co-leads the SCO, and it shares excellent relations with these states on important political issues, which can certainly influence the Central Asian governments’ decisions on energy development. Economically, the prospects are mixed. Energy products including oil, gas distillates, coal and hydroelectricity remain an excellent natural resource to Central Asia. However, one significant economic disadvantage is the tendency for these Central Asian states to delay investment in the transportation infrastructure needed for a healthy energy trade. If China were to increase its commitment to Central Asian energy, Sino-Central Asian energy trade would become a more crucial component of China’s geopolitical strategy towards the region.

At this point, road and rail constitute the only fully constructed options for transport, but even this infrastructure assists in providing a limited volume of the energy trade. One must keep in mind that Central Asia currently remains at best a secondary source of China’s energy security in comparison to the Middle East and other energy suppliers. Thus, an adequate, but not extensive, level of infrastructure might suffice to fulfill Central Asia’s current purpose as a secondary source of Chinese energy. Due to the varying capabilities of the four Central Asian states’ energy markets, a discussion of China’s bilateral energy trade with each of these states should further shed light on the potential for Chinese investment in Central Asian energy.

**Kazakhstan and the Sino-Kazakh Pipeline**

Kazakhstan remains Central Asia’s largest exportable energy producer, with proven oil reserves of six billion barrels and almost two trillion cubic metres of gas. However, since China is largely gas self-sufficient, Chinese gas imports from Central Asia have been limited, even though Kazakh state oil companies have hinted at the prospect of connecting a gas pipeline to the oil pipeline that runs from western Kazakhstan into Xinjiang. The market for petroleum products in Kazakhstan remains comparatively large. Chinese state oil companies have purchased large shares in Kazakh oil companies and fields as a result of Kazakhstan’s gradual privatization of its energy industry. As part of a 1997 agreement with Kazakhstan, CNPC (China National
Petroleum Company) purchased a 60 percent stake of the Aktyubinsk oil company, furthering its ownership position by purchasing an additional 25 percent stake in May 2003. CNPC helps develop multiple Kazakh oilfields, but has since pulled out of its involvement in one of the larger fields at Uzen. Another of the more notable Chinese inroads into Central Asian energy occurred in October 2005, when CNPC acquired all of the assets of PetroKazakhstan, a major oil company in the region. China’s importation of Kazakh oil has grown from virtually nil in the immediate post-Soviet years to roughly 650,000 Tce per year, constituting the bulk of China’s energy trade with Central Asia.

The pipeline running from western Kazakhstan into Xinjiang is perhaps the most significant, misunderstood and controversial aspect of China’s energy imports from Central Asia. After the pipeline project was agreed upon during the June 1997 accord, a series of delays followed in the feasibility and initial construction stages. The project became a sore point between China, CNPC and Kazakhstan, as neither side wanted to pay for its development. In the long term, pipeline projects can be very rewarding, as oil and gas can be transported at a comparatively higher volume and at a lower long-term cost. However, the short-term financial considerations, such as the project’s feasibility, security and logistics, are considerable, not to mention the hefty construction costs.

Finally, in June 2003, the Kazakh position shifted, as President Nazarbayev suggested speeding up the gradual construction of the pipeline. After years of wrestling over the costs, the project became a joint venture as the Kazakh government, the Chinese government and CNPC agreed to share the cost, beginning construction of the pipeline on September 28, 2004. It is currently in the final stages of completion. Of utmost domestic importance to China, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline will connect with a recently completed pipeline beginning in Xinjiang and then join with an extensive, refined-oil pipeline network, transporting the energy throughout eastern and southeastern China.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Only a limited amount of traditional energy resources reside in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the primary concern for China remains a fairly extensive network of electric power, connecting Kambarata and Naryn, Kyrgyzstan with Kashgar and Pachu, Xinjiang. Most of this electricity is produced by hydroelectric power, the only promising natural energy resource available to Kyrgyzstan. While this electrical grid may not be of importance to the whole of China, it

certainly provides needed energy to Xinjiang and its campaign for economic development. Since its civil war subsided in 1997, Tajikistan’s economy and politics have stabilized as the government has gradually privatized some of its economy, and much of its previous Islamic opposition welded itself onto like-minded Afghan Taliban groups. Energy reserves are sparse except for a large hydropower capability, the largest of the former Soviet Union republics save Russia. China’s interest in developing Tajikistan’s hydropower remains muted due to the difficulty in diffusing hydropower across the country and the underdevelopment of this resource by the financially strapped Tajik government.

Uzbekistan

Second in energy resource endowment behind Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan remains a potent economic and energy source for the Central Asian region. China receives much of this benefit through the recent introduction of gas and distillates imports from Uzbekistan. Transportation infrastructure is in great demand to import Uzbekistan’s high volume of gas deposits, as poor roads and railroads connect it to a growing transportation network between neighbouring Kazakhstan and then into China. In June 2004, Uzbekistan and China signed a series of joint agreements and cooperation measures. Energy cooperation headlined the document as Sinopec, China’s second-largest state oil company, agreed to further cooperate in developing and importing Uzbekistan’s energy deposits.

The energy cooperation interests of China, and in particular Sinopec and CNPC, will likely be realized in the long term as two proposed, yet currently not agreed upon, projects could signal a higher level of Chinese investment in Uzbek gas. A newly renovated gas pipeline connects Tashkent to Almaty, which would link it to the proposed gas portion of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline structure. Uzbek, Kazakh and Chinese firms have discussed this option, but neither the government nor the firms have agreed to such a deal. Logistically and financially, the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline project would provide a significantly lower initial cost than the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, as the gas pipeline would parallel the same route. This new proposed network of gas pipelines would bring Uzbek gas through Kazakhstan and into Xinjiang, where it would connect with the newly operational cross-country gas pipeline, pumping it to China’s coastal provinces.

In light of its bilateral energy trade with the region, Chinese energy investment in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has carried with it potential. However, its energy imports from Central Asia need to be placed in perspective. Chinese absolute energy imports from Central Asia have increased over the past decade, but they still do not constitute a significant percentage (they stand at less than .1%) of China’s overall energy imports. Furthermore, Kazakhstan (the primary exporting country among
the four SCO states) ranked only nineteenth and twenty-ninth in crude oil and refined oil imports, respectively, in China’s foreign energy supply in 2002, with the remaining SCO countries only contributing minimal amounts of distillates and other energy products. Thus, one can conclude that China has placed little of its current, or short-term, energy security in Central Asia. The recently completed pipeline will largely serve to transport Russian oil, as Kazakh fields still remain in the early stages of their development. On the other hand, China certainly has placed much of its long-term energy security in the region, as it has heavily invested in Central Asian network infrastructure and in equity oil partnerships. Construction of network infrastructure, such as pipelines and improved road and rail transportation, does indicate a shift towards Central Asia in terms of its long-term energy security. Currently, China possesses no importing pipelines that originate in a foreign country. Of the three projects that are currently operating, under construction or proposed, two are from Central Asia, with the Kazakhstan-China project having begun operations.29

China’s relatively stronger economic position should allow its oil companies to successfully compete with Russia in the long term for energy infrastructure left over from the Soviet years. However, this could become a sore point in the Sino-Russian partnership, as Russia has become accustomed to profiting from the transportation and logistical infrastructure of the Central Asian energy trade. While Central Asia will continue to remain a secondary option for China’s energy security even with a fully functioning pipeline network, important factors such as the instability and high transportation costs of Middle East oil, the lack of support for long-term energy trade infrastructure in Russia, the high level of energy resource endowment in Central Asia and, most importantly, China’s energy crisis, all provide China with enormous incentives to heavily invest in Central Asian energy in the long term.

Energy security relates to China’s peaceful rise strategy and Sino-Central Asian relations in an interesting way that could prove troublesome in the medium to long terms. According to Goldstein, China’s desire is to create an international environment in which it can focus on economic (and to a certain extent military) modernization.30 As mentioned earlier, energy security remains a crucial element of China’s economic modernization strategy. Although China has succeeded in outbidding Western and Russian firms for much of the energy rights in Central Asia, in the long term it might be forced to fiercely compete with those countries for this most precious economic resource in the world. In this scenario, China might be forced to

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29 The three pipelines are the Russian-Daqing oil pipeline and the two Sino-Kazakh oil and gas pipelines. As previously mentioned, the credibility of the Daqing project is continually in question.
30 Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, p. 12.
suffer a blow to a crucial component of its peaceful rise strategy, linkages and partnerships with major powers, in order to meet a vital national interest, economic modernization, that its peaceful rise strategy was originally designed to protect. While China would likely successfully obtain these precious energy resources from Central Asia in spending political capital it has earned with Central Asian governments, its relationship with major powers, namely the US and Russia, might suffer. In relation to the other component of Goldstein’s framework describing China’s peaceful rise, China has consistently used the SCO forum to support its bilateral energy imports from the region by involving economic arrangements and agreements in the SCO proceedings. However, both the variegated levels of energy resource endowment among the Central Asian countries and the heavy emphasis on regional security issues in the SCO limit any attempts by China to transform the SCO into more of an economic association. This reality also suggests that energy imports from Central Asia is likely a close second to matters of regional stability in China’s Central Asian policy calculus, an issue to be picked up below.

US-China Relations and Central Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars of international relations have assumed that the greatest traditional threat to the US remains China, due to its latent economic, political and military power. Beijing feels that the US has put in place military and economic alliances around its borders, with Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and economically with Russia.31 Furthermore, even the post-9/11 developments and the convergence of both states’ views on terrorism have not calmed all of the Chinese fears of US hegemony. If anything, the War on Terror has given Beijing more reason to fear the US, as it now possesses greater incentive, and to a certain extent more international legitimacy, to become increasingly involved in the world and, in particular, Asia. Through the introduction of US bases into the region, the nascent US presence in Central Asia poses a new arena where US-China relations are played out and their new “constructive and cooperative” relationship, formed as part of China’s peaceful rise strategy, is tested.

Before the coalition-led war in Afghanistan, US policy in post-Soviet Central Asia constituted a mélange of corollaries of its human rights emphasis, the post-Soviet denuclearization problem in the former republics and its foreign policies toward Iran and Russia.32 It was not until the

convergence of increasing Chinese involvement in Central Asia and the repositioning of US foreign security policy following the September 11 attacks that Beijing had ample reason to worry about US intentions in Central Asia. Only six days after the 9/11 attacks, the Uzbek foreign ministry opened the doors of its country to the deployment of US troops inside its borders. Over the following weeks, Tajik leaders allowed the US access to three of its airfields and Kyrgyzstan allowed the use of its airbases in its capital, Bishkek, and in Osh. Even a reticent Kazakhstan allowed passage over its air space and occasional use of its Almaty airport for necessary US air operations. Each of the four states (save Kazakhstan, due to its limited assistance) that accepted substantial US military access immediately received an extensive, though short-lived, increase of economic aid.33

Due to the rapidly increased US economic and security relationship with these Central Asian governments, Beijing initially became quite apprehensive of US intentions. The initial hesitation from the PRC leadership prompted US leaders to repeatedly reassure Chinese leaders that the US held no intentions of a permanent military presence in the region. The high level of threat perception China felt toward the US presence begs the question: Are the geopolitical interests of the US and China in Central Asia convergent or divergent? On the surface, the objectives of the US have been clearly articulated in eradicating the Taliban threat from Afghanistan and leaving no permanent military presence in the region. The Taliban government in Afghanistan had been a thorn in the side of the China and it has consistently spoken of the supposed financial, religious and operational connections between Al Qaeda and terrorist groups in Central Asia and Xinjiang.34 For China, one of its primary interests in Central Asia is regional stability and it seems that the eradication of Afghanistan’s fundamentalist influence has helped to ensure that stability.

On the other hand, China feels quite concerned about the long-term foreign policy implications of the ease with which the Central Asian states acquiesced to the US military presence. For the price of doubling or tripling foreign aid, these states (minus Kazakhstan) allowed the US to set up military bases and, in Uzbekistan’s case, multiple bases inside their borders. Beijing had worked quite hard in establishing the SCO, in which it could institutionalize and fulfil its domestic and geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Furthermore, China’s security ties with the SCO are closer than those

34 For one of the many examples, see Chen Lianbi “Sange ‘Jiduanzhuyi’ yu Zhongya Anquan” [The Three Extremisms and Central Asian Security] Dongou Zhongya Yanjiu, no. 5 (2002).
with any other Asia-Pacific organization, as over two-thirds of the PLA’s joint military exercises have been with SCO members and observers. For Zhong-nanhai, it seemed that successes in Central Asia (including granting large amounts of foreign assistance of their own to Central Asian governments) became quickly deflated by the US as it moved rather swiftly and with little resistance into Central Asia. China has developed a strategic relationship with Central Asia, but has seen each state lulled into varied levels of submission by the US.

Despite these conditions surrounding US-China relations in Asia and Beijing’s initial concern over the Central Asian bases, the PRC leadership has not chosen to let the US military presence in Central Asia become a major and consistent thorn in its side. As previously mentioned, China desires a peaceful rise to international prominence, concentrating on domestic development while simultaneously eliminating the notion of a “China threat.” Peaceful and stable relations with the US remain central to this strategy. Once the US military became settled in Central Asia, PRC leaders realized that angering the US over its prosecution of the Afghanistan War could hamper some of the many successes of US-China relations since 2001.

Since the initial stages of the Afghanistan conflict, Beijing has been hesitant to speak against the US presence in the SCO, where it previously had done so before their relations warmed. Recent events in the SCO forum provided an important test for China’s more subdued approach to the US military presence. During the July 2005 SCO Heads of State Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, the six-nation body issued a declaration that the coalition forces give “a final timeline” for their use of bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.35 A few weeks later, the Uzbek leadership called for the exit of US troops and equipment from their country within six months. The Astana declaration instilled a negative first impression on US officials, who hardly knew of the SCO before the controversial statement. Many initially interpreted the request for a timeline as a move against the US presence by China and Russia, the SCO leaders, who both expressed reticence of the US bases just after the beginning of operations in Afghanistan.36 However, both a strong commitment to the US military presence by Kyrgyzstan and a virtual neglect of the topic after the Astana summit by China and the other four SCO states, bilaterally and in future SCO documents, suggest that the contentious section of the declaration was primarily a move by the Uzbek leadership, perhaps to enhance its domestic legitimacy after the events in Andizhan.

Given the opportunity to criticize US hegemony and its use of bases in

36 State Department official, interview by author, Washington, DC, November 2005.
Central Asia, China balked due to the importance of maintaining stable US-China relations during a crucial time in China’s development. The Chinese (and Russian) position on the US use of Central Asian bases has been consistent since early 2002, even in the Astana declaration: do the mutually beneficial work of regime change, then leave when operations cease. Although China has cooled its initial rhetoric on the issue, the issue of US military presence in Central Asia will remain prominent in the mindset of Chinese leaders as the Afghanistan conflict winds down. In the short term, China’s more subdued approach to the US presence suggests that its desire for stable US-China relations as part of its peaceful rise strategy will trump its concern over the current level of US involvement in Central Asia.

Conclusion

Regional stability and energy trade have driven and will likely continue to drive China’s growing power in Central Asia while providing opportunities to enhance, or at least not damage, its warm relations with major powers, namely the US and Russia. Placing each of these three factors into a framework of short- and long-term interests will help produce clarity and efficiency in explaining the likely course of China’s involvement in Central Asia. Counterterrorism, regional stability and limiting foreign support for separatist causes in Xinjiang will continue to remain crucial to China’s policy objectives in Central Asia as it seeks cooperation on a number of measures, including military and law enforcement collaboration, deportations of suspected Uighur separatists and restrictions on independence-minded, Uighur diaspora groups. Much of this cooperation has occurred and will likely continue to occur under the auspices of the SCO, and provides a side benefit of assuaging regional fears of China’s growing power. Security and stability in and around Xinjiang will remain most crucial to China in both the short and long terms on a range of regional policy issues. Furthermore, if separatist violence increases and returns to the high levels found during 1996-1997, Beijing will proportionately increase its overtures towards Central Asia. Many of the internal economic, social, religious and political problems influencing the separatist movement have not been successfully solved, thus suggesting at least a continuation, if not increase, in separatist violence. Further SCO institutionalization will also increase Sino-Central Asian cooperation in these matters. Not only has Beijing’s view of Xinjiang remained perhaps the most important Chinese interest in Central Asia in the short term and through the initial development of the SCO, it is likely to remain crucial in the long term.

Energy security remains paramount to China’s existence as an economically developing state. As transportation infrastructure and supply investment continue to facilitate Chinese imports of Central Asian energy, more of its energy security and thus its geopolitical involvement will be focused on Central Asia. China has not significantly placed its current, or
short-term, energy security in Central Asia, as evidenced by the low percentage of China’s total energy imports that originate from Central Asia. However, Central Asia appears to remain crucial to its long-term energy security, as the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline constitutes its only transnational pipeline. The lack of significant short-term energy imports runs counter to the argument set forth in Swanstrom’s November 2005 article on Sino-Central Asian relations. He posits that “the most important reason for a Chinese presence in the region appears to be an effort to dominate Central Asia in order to secure China’s growing need for oil and natural gas.”37 The comparative dearth of energy imports from the region and interviews with Chinese and US government and academic sources both suggest energy security as a limited but long-term motivation for Chinese involvement in Central Asia. Although Chinese energy imports from Central Asia will likely play an important part in its long-term energy security strategy, it is at best a secondary motivation, behind regional stability, for its Central Asian policy.

Central Asia has also become an emerging arena where US-China relations are played out. Despite US successes in the short term in Central Asia, the likelihood of a long-term presence in Central Asia remains suspect. Swanstrom also argues that “there are no indications that the US will move out in the coming years, but on the contrary it seems that the US is strengthening its position in Central Asia.”38 In fact, a number of reasons suggest a more temporary US presence in the region, such as the return to pre-Afghanistan levels of economic and security aid, repeated statements by US leaders of the non-permanence of their bases in the region, the US withdrawal from Uzbekistan, a strong, but limited recommitment (for Afghanistan operations only) to the US presence by Kyrgyzstan and the ability of the US military to successfully conduct operations from bases in Afghanistan without utilizing bases in neighbouring Central Asian states. Evidence would suggest that at the least the US remains ambiguous about its active security involvement in the region; more likely is that its involvement, at the least beyond Afghanistan, is temporary and utilitarian in nature. China has committed itself to Central Asia for the long term, and only very limited scenarios exist that would increase US involvement in the region. If so, Beijing has positioned itself in the long term to hedge against the US in Central Asia, although current conditions suggest a more subdued US approach to the region and short-term toleration by China of the US military presence due to the importance it has placed on stable US-China relations. Thus, China’s balancing act against the US in Central Asia will more likely be a function of both the path of US-China relations and the maintenance of its peaceful rise strategy.

We can conclude that China’s entrance into Central Asia through the

37 Swanstrom, China and Central Asia, p. 570.
38 Swanstrom, China and Central Asia, p. 582.
SCO is primarily motivated by concerns (in relative order) of regional stability, energy security and, lastly, by its geopolitical concerns with the US. Not only did China spearhead the SCO prior to the current US military presence in the region, but Washington still remains unsure of its long-term intentions in Central Asia. Thus, one cannot assume that either the SCO or China’s Central Asian policy is purely motivated by global, or even Asian, power positioning, as it would be mere speculation to suggest that the SCO is a direct, Sino-Russian-led response to NATO, or an Asian version of NATO.\(^{39}\)

In the short term, the SCO has not merited serious foreign policy attention in US government circles when regional foreign policy problems arise. The US sees no reason to meet its interests in Central Asia through a multilateral organization like the SCO, especially one that is not quite institutionalized enough to meet those interests, when it can successfully do so bilaterally with individual states and their governments.\(^{40}\) Only if the SCO turns into more of a collective security organization, with elements such as politically charged, collective defense language and a credible, regional force arrangement, it then might be a credible threat to NATO or Western powers. While China has in the past used the podium of the SCO and Shanghai Five meetings to accuse the US of hegemony, this was more a reflection of China’s broader foreign policy ideology and practice during the 1990s than the SCO’s raison d’être.

For the short and long terms, regional stability and, in the long term, energy trade will serve as the primary determinants of China’s Central Asian policy, barring another conflict in greater Central Asia in which the US becomes involved. China has used its relations with Central Asia as part and parcel of its grand strategy of a peaceful rise. China’s involvement in the region is not a mere mix of bilateral relationships, but a focused, multilateral engagement of the region, primarily through an institutional framework, the SCO. China’s Central Asian policies remain congruent with Goldstein’s analysis. In other words, its policies are consistent with its active approach toward diplomacy and multilateralism in serving Chinese strategic interests and in regards to its relations with the US, a function of its desire to create and maintain stable strategic relationships with major powers. Central Asia remains one of the emerging arenas of Chinese foreign policy and it is crucial to maintain an efficient and guided theoretical and policy-relevant understanding of Sino-Central Asian relations.

Baylor University, Waco, Texas, USA, February 2006

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\(^{39}\) Zhao Huasheng, director of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, interview notes, October 2005.

\(^{40}\) State Department official, interview, November 2005.
Introduction

Since its inception in 1993, Cambodian democracy has struggled to “muddle through” like other “unconsolidated democracies,” in which elements of democracy, such as liberal constitutions and free and fair elections, mix with authoritarian and traditional practices, such as a lack of rule of law, rampant corruption, widespread patronage and executive usurpation of power. This paper investigates why Cambodian democracy has failed to consolidate, approaching the question by juxtaposing state and society rather than focusing exclusively, as most analyses heretofore have done, on political elites.

Much of the literature on democratic consolidation emphasizes the role of political elites. Elite behaviour and interactions, collectively termed “elite political culture,” certainly play an indispensable role in the process of democratic consolidation, because democracy would not function without elites’ acceptance of the regularity and predictability of “the rules, and limit of institutional system and legitimacy of opposing actors who similarly commit themselves…” The significance of elite political culture in the process of democratic consolidation, Larry Diamond argues, is twofold: first, elites’ political decisions are contingent on their beliefs; second, as leaders of a polity, the magnitude of their impact on political events is high.

The role of the elites, especially their consensus on the legitimacy of democratic institutions and rules, is crucial to the process of democratic consolidation.
consolidation. Although acknowledging that structural, institutional and cultural factors are important, Higley and Gunther contend that “elite convergence,” a process of interaction among elites, will eventually lead to “elite consensual unity, thereby laying the basis for consolidated democracy.”6

Consolidation also requires that political elites adhere to peaceful competition for power based on the foundation of rule of law, of mutual respect and tolerance devoid of rhetorical irritants that might lead to violence and the use of military force.7 As long as the elites have consensus and agreement on the democratic procedures, the elite-centred model argues, democratic norms and practices will become embedded first at the elite level and then radiate throughout the polity, establishing a firm foundation for democratic consolidation.

Most analysts of Cambodian politics utilize elite-centred models, arguing that the persistence of Khmer elites’ political culture of intolerance of opposition and absolutism are the causes of Cambodia’s troubling variation on democracy.8 Although elite behaviour partially contributes to the lack of democratic consolidation, the elite-centred analysis is incomplete because it fails to account for the dynamic of socio-economic and political changes of contemporary Cambodia.9 In an attempt to go beyond elite-centred models, this paper argues that the lack of democratic consolidation can be attributed to the absence of vertical and horizontal accountability. Horizontal accountability refers to the responsibility of one state institution to another, while vertical accountability refers to the responsibility of elected officials not only to voters but also to civil society organizations between election cycles.10 The absence of these institutions weakens state autonomy, allowing power to be retained by the elites. Consequently, the chance for democratic consolidation remains remote, as consolidation requires strong state institutions that protect people’s rights and prevent the state from resorting to the illegal use of violence.11

This three-part paper analyzes the lack of democratic consolidation using the concept of horizontal and vertical accountability. The first section, on the nature of the state under electoral democracy, focuses on how state elites

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7 Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 69.
employed patron-clientelism and corruption in consolidating their power. The second section examines how patron-clientelism, backed by corruption, is embedded in state institutions, rendering them ineffective in promoting further democratization. Further, it explores how patron-clientelism, backed by corruption, undercuts the independence and effectiveness of state institutions by detailing the workings of the judicial system. Lastly, I argue that the ability of state elites to consolidate their power through the use of patron-clientelism derives from the weakness of civil society in mounting meaningful pressure for institutional changes.

The Cambodian State Under Electoral Democracy

Cambodia’s electoral democracy, which emerged from the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, has brought about a multi-party system based constitutionally on a foundation of checks and balances. In actuality, the mechanism through which the state is governed has changed little since the socialist days of the late 1980s. In what follows in this article, the state is viewed as “a unit of action” that formulates and implements policy. Thus, within this conception, the state is virtually synonymous with the government—that is, comprised of a collective set of personnel and institutions that formulate and implement “authoritative decisions.”

The Cambodian state is structured by “interlocking pyramids of patron-client networks,” serving as a means of exclusion and inclusion in a multi-network competition. Theoretical analysis and contemporary discussion of patron-clientelism focus on “four features: an unequal character, uneven reciprocity, a non-institutionalized nature, and a face-to-face character.” However, additional elaboration on the notion of patron-clientelism is warranted to provide a clear understanding of how it operates in the Cambodian political context.

Face-to-face relationships are commonly found at the local level between villagers and village headmen or commune chiefs and also at all lower echelons of state institutions and social organizations such as political parties, police and army units. In higher-level politics, face-to-face relationships do not pervade entire patron-client networks. Cambodian politics can be characterized as being composed of a number of supra-networks that are made up of smaller networks. Each network has a patron who is the backer, or khnang, of his clients. Only patrons of the smaller networks have face-to-

face, intensive contact with their clients, and with their patrons situated higher in the political system. These small networks, as Eisenstadt and Roniger put it, “are mostly related to, and integrated into, large circles with a chain-to-center structure.”15 In other words, like many developing countries, the Cambodian state is built not on rational institutions in Weberian terms, but on patrimonialism.16 Following Harold Crouch, political scientist Dwight King defines patrimonialism as “a pattern of politics in which the ruler’s power derives primarily from his capacity to win and retain the loyalty of key sections of the political elite by satisfying their aspirations, especially their material interests, through the distribution of perquisites such as fiefs and benefices.”17

Patron-clientelism sustained through corruption greatly impacts democratic consolidation. In many parts of the world, patron-clientelism and corruption have prevented consolidation of state institutions, including the judiciary. Such developments prevent young democracies from consolidating while eroding the quality of old ones.18

Patron-client networks within the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the former Communist Party of Kampuchea that ruled Cambodia with Vietnamese military backing in the 1980s, were built in the 1980s and consolidated in the early 1990s. With skillful manipulation of patronage politics, Chea Sim, then the president of the National Assembly, was able to extend his power from the centre into provinces, appointing his clients to important provincial party and administrative positions.19 Through this informal personal network, Chea Sim had been able to wield enormous power, allowing him to frequently overstep formal rules while protecting the interests of his clients.20

Hun Sen—currently Cambodia’s prime minister and most powerful politician—began, from the time he became prime minister in 1985, to play Chea Sim’s game, cultivating “a network of loyalists in the provinces.” By using his power in the central government to secure a space wherein provincial officials’ interests and power bases were protected, Hun Sen consolidated these networks, creating “a sprawling and heterogeneous

16 Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System.
20 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, pp. 217, 332 and 333.
network of ministries, agencies, and provincial and local administrations whose members adhered to the rules of patronage.”21

The 1993 United Nations-sponsored elections were intended to create a new state in Cambodia following the installation of a framework for constitutional democracy. However, given the deep-rooted existence of patron-client networks, a new state characterized by independent institutions has never taken root. Political compromise in the form of a coalition government between the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral and Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the Royalist Party and the CPP added another layer of patron-client networks onto the pervasive existing ones.

Within and among these dense patronage networks, there also has been inter-party and intraparty suspicion, mistrust and fear, noticeably between FUNCINPEC and the CPP. To consolidate the CPP’s power and his own, Hun Sen manipulated the Cambodian transition, building on his patronage network, penetrating state institutions and the private economic sphere. The ability of this patronage network to operate beyond and in the place of state institutions has led to widespread corruption, violence and the exploitation of the country’s natural resources.22 Since ubiquitous, power-based patronage networks are sustained by endemic corruption, people are forced to bribe government officials in matters ranging from land registration, birth certificates and traffic citations to taxation. A World Bank survey found that rural households, urban households and foreign firms have to pay bribes for public services in 43, 53 and 68 percent of their total number of encounters, respectively, with public officials. Two out of three Cambodian households surveyed responded that corruption is worse than it was three years ago.23

Despite an international outcry and domestic protest against corruption, no high-ranking government official has ever been punished for corruption, and so the practice continues to flourish. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) report states:

At the moment, corruption in all its forms is zero-risk, high reward (in both absolute and relative terms) activity. … More significantly, there are no incentives to identify and report corruption. In fact all incentives—financial, political, career and personal security—favor inaction, or even complicity.24

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21 Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 211.
Corruption is hierarchically institutionalized in a way that Cambodians characterize as “thum si tam thum touch si tam touch” (the big eat big, the small eat small). Although both kinds of acts are detrimental to the overall social, political and economic development of the country, high-level corruption is an underlying cause of the lack of democratic consolidation in Cambodia.

**Patron-Clientelism, Corruption and Political Institutions**

Leading democratic theorists and comparativists have argued that democratic consolidation requires the existence of independent, effective horizontal and vertical accountability institutions. According to Diamond, for instance, horizontal accountability institutions include anti-corruption laws, anti-corruption bodies, an independent and effective judicial system and a strong parliament, while vertical accountability institutions encompass civil society organizations and the international community. Horizontal accountability institutions are designed to enforce the law and expose corruption. The creation and strengthening of these institutions occurs only when there is pressure from institutions of vertical accountability.25

Without autonomous functioning institutions, Guillermo O’Donnell contends, “any degree of democratization achieved is precarious and potentially explosive.”26 Independent institutions help promote horizontal accountability because the latter requires state agencies that have the power, both de jure and de facto, to oversee and to impose criminal penalties on any illegal activities committed by other state agencies and their leaders. Without independent institutions, actions of the political elites are constrained only by “the hard facts of existing power relations.”27 In a situation of political and economic competition, without rules and regulations, the consequence is the naked use of power.

In Cambodia, patron-clientelism sustained by corruption has become intertwined with formal institutions, rendering difficult if not impossible any effort to establish and strengthen institutions to effectively challenge the predominance of partrimonialism. The embeddedness of patron-clientelism in state institutions hinders the process of democratic consolidation in two ways. First, it undermines efforts to strengthen political institutions, making them ineffective, irresponsible and dependent. Second, even if institutions are created, their establishment is not aimed at strengthening state capacity but to service the interests of patron-clientelism.

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Although the Cambodian government has often declared that the rule of law, upheld by independent political institutions, is crucial for economic and political development, its efforts towards judicial reform have been few and weak. Since power, resources and loyalty flow through patron-client networks, any meaningful reform would be self-defeating because it would undermine, in Lao Mong Hai’s words, the elite’s “ability to use power in a self-serving or arbitrary manner.”

Theorists and comparativists have demonstrated that democratic consolidation also requires an independent and effective judicial system, which not only helps to break the vicious cycle of patronage, corruption and abuse of power, but also helps protect human rights and political and civil liberties. The Cambodian elites have kept the judicial system weak, corrupt and subservient to political manipulation.

Corruption in the courts is associated with the embeddedness of patron-clientelism in the entire judicial system, including institutions that are supposed to identify and punish corrupt clerks, judges and prosecutors. A prominent Cambodian human rights activist contended that judges’ irresponsibility and corruption are systemic issues. He added, “each individual when situated in a system that set them free from punishment … is inclined to engage [in illegal practices].” Interviews with court officials, judges and staff at the Ministry of Justice in 2002 and 2003 revealed that most appointments, promotions and transfers of clerks, judges and prosecutors involved bribery and connections. The resulting effect, not surprisingly, was that these people then used their positions to squeeze money out of those who come into contact with the judicial system. King Sihanouk baldly wrote in his Monthly Bulletin in March 1999, “[i]n today’s Cambodia, the God of impunity reigns side by side with the King of Corruption.”

Many of the judges, prosecutors and clerks whom the author interviewed acknowledged that their courts were not clean. Citing corruption in other state institutions, they did not apologize for the corruption within the judicial system, but rather argued that the scope of corruption within the court was not that widespread, nor did it involve as large sums of money as alleged by the public.

Corruption within the court system is not uniform. Some judges are more corrupt than others relative to the positions of their khnang, or “backing.” There are two kinds of judges: cav kram dael hean (daring judges) and cav  

28 Cited in Roberts, Political Transition, p. 166.
30 N 10, interview with author, 23 December 2002. In this paper, each interview is identified with a letter and a number designation. This designation is for the author’s own identification of the interviewee and it carries no other particular meaning.
kram dael min sawo hean (not so daring judges). According to a lawyer, daring judges are those who have “powerful backers (khnang thom) in the government or in the party.”

Like other government institutions, officials within the judicial system consider their position as a business wherein bribery is a form of investment. Most if not all of the officials within the judicial system, allegedly including those at the top, had to pay for their posts. After they are appointed, they work quickly to recoup their investment. Promotions and transfers to courts in more prosperous provinces and municipalities also require paying a bribe, because in these places, as one judge commented, “there are rich people who are willing to pay bribes [when involved in court cases]. There are cases with potential cash.”

Intervention by government or party officials on behalf of their clients also undermines the judiciary. In most cases, high-ranking government officials intervene by writing letters or telephoning judges or prosecutors. A judge said that the contents of those messages were completely legal, including phrases such as “requesting the court to resolve the case according to the law,” and “requesting the court to help look into the matter.” Sometimes, high-ranking government officials send their “fixers who are connected to big people” to the court to talk directly with judges and prosecutors.

Judges and prosecutors generally gave in when faced with intervention by high-ranking government officials. Such submission derives from either “affection” or fear. “Affection” is the product of reciprocal relationships in which people return favours for what others have done for them; such relationships have become standard and thus difficult to avoid in Cambodian society. One judge told the author, “Influence of intervention from a higher authority depends on the individual judge. Maintaining one’s stance is difficult. For example, they used to help our interests. What can we do in such a case?”

Fear of being punished was cited by judges and prosecutors as the most common reason for their submission to interference by powerful people. While doing their work, judges and prosecutors need to assess the surrounding political environment in order to maintain their jobs and ensure their safety. Although there was no direct threat involved, a judge said, “we, judges, have to follow because we know in advance the dimension of their

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35 J 1, interview with author, October 10, 2002.
37 J 15, interview with author, 03 October 2002.
38 J 2, interview with author, 14 May 2003.
power. If we do not comply, we will have a problem.” A judge admitted that concerns over job security and physical security affect his judgment of court cases. He said, “I want judges to be able to say precisely what they see. If they see [something] wrong, they say it is wrong... But in reality, judges feel really cold. If we do not compromise, they [powerful people] can remove us.” Therefore, it is not surprising that the courts often succumb to interference from other branches of government and powerful individuals.

Unsurprisingly, efforts at judicial reform have been at best lukewarm. Minor judicial reform was not aimed at ensuring its independence, transparency and effectiveness, but at serving elite interests and the interests of their clients. Prince Ranariddh’s 1997 criticisms about the judiciary sidestepped substantive issues and complained that no FUNCINPEC judges had been appointed. His central concern was getting additional posts for his own network.

The CPP-dominated government has been consistently disinclined to carry out judicial reform. Whatever action taken was on an ad hoc basis and the government continued to keep the judicial system fearful of executive power. In 1999, in an effort to contribute to reform of the judiciary, Prime Minister Hun Sen ordered the re-arrest of 68 people whom the PPMC had previously released for lack of evidence or released on bail. These re-arrests might appear desirable, given the public outcry over corruption within the judicial system, but constitutionally, it was a clear abuse of power by the executive branch. During this “reform process,” the Ministry of Justice suspended both the chief judge and the chief prosecutor of the PPMC, and the Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) subsequently removed these two people from their posts. Not surprisingly, given the deeply rooted patronage networks, the two were later promoted within the judicial system. The chief judge was assigned a post at SCM, and the chief prosecutor was given a post at the Ministry of Justice.

State and Society: Promotion of Institutional Changes

Focusing on the contingent choices of actors, Adam Przeworski argues that elites are willing to pursue reform if that reform benefits them. But in the current Cambodian situation, political elites already benefit politically and financially from the existing system. Thus, it would be overly optimistic

40 J 24, interview with author, 18 October 2002.
41 Roberts, Political Transition, pp. 135-136.
42 For the government version of the story see Pen Khon, Phnom Penh: Before and After 1997 (Phnom Penh: n.d).
43 Pen Khon, Phnom Penh, p. 94.
to expect them to voluntarily initiate meaningful reform when they face no challenge or threat. “The reasons for this should be self-evident… . Most people in positions of influence in the state bureaucracy, the parliament, and the party system,” Diamond writes, “have acquired their influence as a result of the system, and they are reluctant to push for change.”

Civil society can serve as a catalyst for democratic consolidation, since it can mobilize people against the power of the state and also monitor the accountability of state officials. Civil society means:

an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.

This definition offers analysts a full “picture of social forces,” their role in democratic processes and the nature of their organizational structures, and their attitudes toward democratic politics. Civil society contains many elements, including “pressure or advocacy groups” acting within the political system and politically passive groups operating outside of the system. With its ability to generate an alternative political agenda to hold state and government accountable, a lively civil society “can help transition get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, help deepen democracy.” Weak civil society and political parties encourage the growth of clientelistic networks that “serve at best as transmitters of temporary particularistic favours, not a channel to mobilize citizens into influencing policy formation.”

In Cambodia, the countervailing force to the elite networks is the civil society, constituted predominantly of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs refer to:

… private, non-profit, professional organizations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals … NGOs include philanthropic foundations, church development agencies, academic think tanks and other organizations focusing on issues such as human

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45 Diamond, “What Civil Society.”
49 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 9.
rights, gender, health, agricultural development, social welfare, the environment, and indigenous peoples.51

Since 1993 Cambodia has witnessed the emergence of civil society groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, labour unions and various NGOs. The paper’s focus on human rights and democracy NGOs should not be read as downplaying other civil society groups, such as the labour movement and private entrepreneurs, as potential forces for political change. Rather, the logic of such a focus is threefold. First, among all societal groups, these NGOs are publicly more active in the effort to promote judicial reform and good governance. Secondly, they are officially considered by the government and the international institutions and donor countries as partners in the judicial reform process and the promotion of good governance. Third, other civil society organizations, like trade unions and business associations, have strong interests in seeing less corruption, and a more reliable judiciary. Over the years they have tried, in open protests in the case of trade unions, and in consultation with the government in the case of the business community, to reform the state and its institutions. Addressing the development of all the various civil society groups, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Ashok Swain argues that NGOs can perform two types of functions, “supply side” and “demand side,” and further contends that NGOs that perform both tasks are crucial in promoting democracy and the growth of civil society. The supply side focuses on the provision of development projects and education on democratic values. This function can not only enhance the living standards of the people but will also increase people’s knowledge of civic culture, which in the long run will generate profound political changes.

The demand side of NGOs aims at raising people’s political consciousness and mobilizing them to challenge the power of the state. This form of participation can help to restrain the power of the elite while increasing the power of the society.52 NGOs can mobilize and organize people to protest, putting pressure on the state and state elites to respond and incorporate their concerns into policy reforms. More importantly, NGOs can limit the power of the state and its leaders by “checking, monitoring, and restraining” power exercised by them.53

In countries where political parties are weak, NGOs can also play a supplementary role to political parties by generating political participation and by sharpening the democratic skills of citizens. Increased participation and skills will consequently result in a rise in political advocacy and

53 Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, p. 239.
NGOs generate a “bottom-up” pressure that eventually brings about a “top-down” political transformation.

Since their inception following the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992, Cambodian non-governmental organizations (CNGOs) have engaged in the promotion of human rights and the rule of law through training and education. In fact, using Khmer traditional ideas such as Buddhism as a form of transmission in training and education campaigns, these organizations have brought new concepts of human rights, the rule of law and accountability to Cambodian society.

CNGOs have played the role of a watchdog through their extensive monitoring programmes that identify and help victims of human rights violations. They routinely assist victims of political violence, land grabbing and human trafficking by helping them file court cases and/or complaints to the appropriate authorities. Moreover, these organizations, especially La League Cambogienne pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l’Homme (LICADO) and Association des Droits de l’Hommes au Cambodge (ADHOC), have also played a critical role in exposing government violations of human rights, and the widespread impunity enjoyed by government officials.

These CNGOs also helped victims of human rights violations by providing legal representation to the poor and the victims of abuses, filing complaints against judges or prosecutors, or seeking private meetings with judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials to alert them when gross violations of legal procedures occur.

Much of the accomplishments of human rights and democracy NGOs have been limited and curtailed by the Cambodian judicial system. Thus far, the ability of CNGOs to push for systematic change in the judicial system has been limited. They use meetings to “persuade and encourage” law enforcement agencies and court officials to adhere to the rule of law. In some cases, human rights and democracy NGOs have appealed to the prime minister, the president of the senate, and the king to intervene in cases where court battles supported by the NGOs have been lost. Although these strategies have produced some results, they have strengthened neither the NGOs nor the judicial system. In fact, appeal to powerful politicians and the king strengthens the executive branch at the expense of NGOs and the judicial system, because the advocacy is not done in a systematic manner.

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More focused efforts were initiated by the Human Rights Action Committee (HRAC) through its subcommittee for judicial reform. This subcommittee, with assistance from the legal section of the Asia Foundation, has engaged in lobbying and advocating for structural change within the judicial system. At the top of the HRAC’s agenda is reform of the SMC, a constitutionally mandated guarantor of independence and effectiveness of the judicial system.

HRAC’s efforts to advocate for change have been limited by the CPP’s control of the judicial system and its antagonistic stance toward human rights and democracy NGOs. As one human rights NGO leader puts it, “the CPP rarely received us, rarely talked to us. We could meet the Sam Rainsy Party, the main opposition party, and FUNCINPEC but they could not do anything.” Consequently, the only accessible state institution for NGO activities is the National Assembly; in theory, the assembly could initiate legal reform but in reality it is, as a legal expert states, “a rubber stamp.”

With access to the government blocked, these NGOs have turned towards foreign donors for assistance in lobbying the government on judicial reform. Influencing government policy through lobbying donors and foreign embassies is therefore seen by NGO leaders as “a key strategy of advocacy.” Thus far, lobbying and advocating through donors has yielded limited results because of a lack of consistency and forcefulness among donors in pressing the government for change. This is because some donors take a realpolitik approach while others support democracy promotion. One Western diplomat stated that it is “one of the biggest problems” his embassy faced in dealing with the government, stressing that “[i]f I do this the French would be mad. If I do that the Japanese would be mad. But the Cambodian government used it as an excuse not to carry out reform.”

Restricted Political Space: An Impediment for CNGOs

The limited impact of human rights and democracy NGOs on the process of judicial reform arises from the nature of state-society relations and the characteristics of human rights and democracy NGOs. Decades of authoritarian rule, civil conflict and genocide in Cambodia have prohibited the rise of “a national public sphere for political action.” It was not until the arrival of the UNTAC in 1992 that such a public sphere was created,
securing a niche for the birth of the many NGOs that now form the backbone of Cambodian civil society. Although the government allows NGOs to exist, it restricts public space and refuses to accept the legitimacy of human rights and democracy NGOs.

Article 42 of the 1993 Constitution states that “Khmer citizens shall have the right to establish associations. … These rights shall be determined by law.” Twelve years have passed, and the government still has not passed the law governing associations. Since 1996 the government has drafted several versions of NGO laws, but none has been passed. Although their operations have not been overtly affected by the absence of an NGO law, many NGOs are concerned, as reflected in their 1999 statement, that government officials “may give discretionary interpretations of the status or standing of NGOs.”

Government disdain towards human rights and democracy NGOs also hinders their work. Although Cambodia has officially adopted a liberal democratic form of government, Cambodian leaders adhere to the discourse of so-called “Asian values” that emphasize communal rights, social order, stability and economic rights. Government leaders have consistently argued that as a post-conflict society, Cambodia should give priority to social stability and economic development over individual rights and political freedom.

As an NGO staff member noted, “[To the government,] the rule of law [and] human rights is another matter. … In the brains of government leaders the part that thinks about these issues is small.”

Officially, the Cambodian government considers NGOs significant partners in the process of social, political and economic development. In practice, however, the government values only those NGOs that engaged in economic development work. Prime Minister Hun Sen made the following statement during a 2002 interview:

Many NGOs are working right at the target areas of poverty, for which they deserve our encouragement and respect. … But it seems some NGOs do not attach themselves to poverty reduction. I feel regret for the money given by some countries to such NGOs, which spend most of their time in the city and in hotels for seminars. You see them everyday. They put on neckties and stay in air-conditioned rooms and act like a fourth branch of the government.

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65 Ledgerwood and Un, “Global Concepts.”
The government devalues human rights and democracy NGOs, arguing that they exist to ridicule the government for financial gain. According to Thun Saray, a prominent human rights activist and director of ADHOC, Prime Minister Hun Sen has publicly stated that human rights NGOs have to criticize the government in order to get funding from donors. This perception is echoed throughout the government, even in the agency responsible for promoting and protecting human rights, the Cambodian Human Rights Committee. There a senior official stated that the situation of human rights was not perfect anywhere, but that Cambodian NGOs exaggerated the reality of the human rights situation in order to attract donors’ attention and crucial financial support. “If [NGOs] do not scold [the government], donors won’t help them. So they shout as loud as they can. For some [NGOs] not lying means that they won’t have anything to eat.”

Since their inception in 1992, CNGOs have relied exclusively on foreign funding. The CNGO community is well aware of the consequences of such reliance on their socio-political status, independence and survival. In 1996, Thun Saray raised the concern that dependence upon foreign funding made CNGOs adopt a submissive role, taking on the donors’ agenda and approaches toward implementation of that agenda. Over a decade later, such reliance remains prevalent. As one NGO leader states, “At the present, [his organization] has no future alternative plans [in terms of funding]. If donors terminate [funding], [the organization] will collapse.”

When directly asked whether donors set the agenda for their organizations, many interviewees for this study responded negatively. However, information gathered from people with extensive knowledge about CNGOs and interviews with CNGO workers and leaders suggest that CNGOs worked within the parameters set by donors. An NGO leader said:

Before we were involved in legal aid. Now donors said that they stopped [funding] legal aid because of the problem that there was no progress. … Donors suspended human rights activities; they cut funding for education. … If we did not change our work, how can we continue to get money?

Furthermore, the government uses CNGOs’ close relations to foreign donors as a pretext to set tight political boundaries for these organizations. Although these NGOs can operate with relative freedom in the cities, they have faced tremendous challenges in rural areas. Since rural residents are

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71 N 14, interview with author, 08 January 2003.
the backbone of electoral victory, and hence the source of political legitimacy, the CPP has fiercely defended the rural heartland from competing political and ideological rivals to minimize alternative discourses to the CPP-dominated, state-centred narrative.

As the director of a democracy NGO stated, “Freedom of assembly exists in the city but not in the countryside.” In order to work in rural areas, NGOs must request permission from various levels of the government. “The need for permission to conduct activities in rural areas,” an NGO director pointed out, “is a form of control.” The CPP-dominated government is suspicious of human rights and democracy NGOs, fearing that they have, as one NGO director stated, “some kind of political backing.” To the government, a human rights NGO leader explained, the organizations are “the enemy hiding behind a sign which is called non-governmental organization while in actuality, [they] work to serve a particular political party.”

There are several fundamental reasons for this fear and suspicion. First, many leaders of human rights and democracy NGOs are overseas Khmers or former political prisoners who are strongly anti-authoritarian. Second, some of the issues these NGOs advocate, such as the rule of law, anti-corruption, accountability, judicial reform and protection of human rights, are also part of the opposition agenda. Third, these NGOs receive funding from foreign countries and international organizations that are interested in promoting democracy and respect for human rights in Cambodia.

Although up until recently the government had not taken legal action against human rights groups and had tolerated their existence, there were limits to their freedom of expression. Constricted political space restricts CNGOs’ activities and options in promoting political change. However, NGOs’ cautious efforts to be “apolitical” further restrict the scope of their activities. Kao Kim Hourn, executive director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), a Cambodian think tank, citing a survey of CNGO staff and leaders, wrote, “The local NGOs should actively promote the de-politicizing of their activities and concentrate on being neutral. In other words, local NGOs should not engage in any party politics or politics at all.”

The CNGOs’ attempts to be apolitical deprive them of the opportunity to become a viable force linked to other societal and political groups, such as trade unions and political parties. The absence of linkage to the masses and other societal groups turns human rights and democracy NGOs into isolated

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73 N 2, interview with author, Phnom Penh, 25 May 2003. See also Hughes, “Mystics and Militants.”
74 N 2, interview with author, Phnom Penh, 25 May 2003.
76 N 6, interview with author, Phnom Penh, 21 May 2003.
actors that can exert little pressure on the government—pressure insufficient to produce democratic consolidation. Diamond writes that in order to push for meaningful political transformation, a broad coalition of multiple forces and progressive entities within society is needed. He adds: “It is not enough for civil society to forge a common cause among themselves, across their otherwise diverse interests. They must also link up with sympathetic (or even opportunistic) forces in the state and the system.” Such solidarity failures,” Hughes writes, “limit the emergence of a coherent, pro-reform civil society.”

Although workers’ rights should logically be part of their agenda, human rights NGOs exclude union workers from their campaigns because they are seen as affiliated with the opposition party initially known as the KNP and later as the SRP. A human rights NGO director stated, “[Workers’ rights is] something KNP is pushing—we want to stay out of politics.” Although women constitute a majority of Cambodian industrial workers, one women’s NGO prevented garment factory workers from participating in the 1999 Women’s Day march for fear that these workers would get “political.”

The strategy of self-restraint prevents human rights and democracy NGOs from taking a firm stance on political issues and from mobilizing the public behind those issues. Some people, including NGO staff, argue that this should be the work of political parties, not NGOs and, to be fair, to take such a stance could be dangerous in the Cambodian context. But in countries where political parties and trade unions are weak, democratization can be advanced when NGOs step in to fill the vacuum. Experiences from countries such as Brazil, Chile, India and the Philippines show that for NGOs to be successful in promoting reforms and challenging vested interests, they have to engage in mobilizing the unorganized and disaffected groups. Given the country’s short-term experience with democracy, Cambodian human rights and democracy NGOs have been unable to fill this vacuum.

Structure and Values of Civil Society Organizations

Democratic consolidation requires “simultaneous democratization of the state and civil societies.” Citing evidence from a number of countries, Kim Ho-Kim further argues that civil society groups that have hierarchical, centralized decision making tend to be less effective in influencing the state. This is true in Cambodia, where democratic consolidation has been stalled by a simultaneous lack of democratization of both civil society and the state. This state of affairs results from the way that Cambodian NGOs emerged.
Cambodian NGOs did not gradually emerge out of a society with densely formed social capital. Rather, the rise of CNGOs was the product of the sudden availability of international funding, and of continued international political engagement and support. These factors conditioned the subsequent development of CNGOs. Hughes argues that donors had their own agenda, which consisted of promoting international perspectives in terms of building professionalism within NGOs, including financial transparency, office management and report writing. Such concerns overlook the significance of building a genuine civil society characterized by volunteerism and a close relationship between NGOs and grassroots activists. Consequently, growth in the quantity of NGOs has not been accompanied by an increase of political space in rural Cambodia.84

CNGOs did not arise from “spontaneous grass-roots energies”85; as such, the “voluntary aspect of traditional non-profit organizations is often absent and, at best, nascent.”86 Evidence from other countries reveals that in a democracy, large membership organizations generally have more leverage in lobbying the government for change because of their own potential to influence voting outcomes.87 Some CNGOs are aware of this fundamental issue; one director of a human rights NGO said, in reference to a lack of membership, “It is our weak point.”88

Second, the lack of membership is partly attributed to a lack of traditional associational formation. In the early 1960s, the anthropologist May Ebihara observed that “[a] striking feature of Khmer village life is the lack of indigenous, traditional, organizational associations, clubs, factions, or other groups that are formed on non-kinship principles.”89

The growth of civic organizations requires a civic culture that underscores equal, voluntary and participatory norms.90 Cambodian society in general is dominated by dense patron-clientelism. Historically, “Cambodia’s language and institutions are suffused,” David Chandler observes, “with the notions of hierarchy and ranking, deference and command, hegemony and servitude. Society is seen in familial, authoritarian terms rather than in terms of voluntary, supposedly “horizontal” associations.”91 Although this pattern of

84 Hughes, *The Political Economy*, pp. 146-158.
patron-clientelism has changed somewhat over time, its core elements have persisted, particularly in rural areas.

The lack of mass base membership also reflects how CNGOs operate, and how they view the people they claim to represent. CNGOs, including those in this study, tend to operate in ombudsman style, in which they take complaints from people and act on their behalf. A senior human rights researcher described the relationship between CNGOs and the people they represent as: “You tell me your problem. I will try to see the government or see the international community. This is typical NGOs’ work.”

Furthermore, once formed, a CNGO’s future development is influenced by the local political, cultural, economic and social context. Attributes that are associated with a liberal, Western notion of NGOs—such as accountability, transparency, equal participation and mass participation—are altered when the concept is transplanted to new soil.

The organizational structures, operations and internal governance of CNGOs fall short of being democratic. CNGOs’ organizational structures and operations, particularly those run by founder-directors, actually resemble those of state institutions, and are “characterized by autocratic, hierarchical and centralized management, with patron-client relationships a dominant feature.” However, many CNGOs have undergone a process of learning and adjusting to the new values that characterize liberal NGOs, and some improvements have been made in terms of transparency and democratic governance.

At present, CNGOs have not fully served as a model for democratic mechanisms such as checks and balances, transparency, accountability and equal participation. Of course, these are problems faced by NGOs around the world, not just in Cambodia. However, being tainted by patronage, nepotism and autocracy leaves CNGOs open to criticism from the government. Their own weaknesses can also make them reluctant to fully criticize the government. As one NGO director recalled having said at a gathering of CNGOs, “NGOs should not scold the government that much [because] we [NGOs] don’t have a lot of will either.”

Concluding Remarks: Future Prospects

Because of international intervention, democracy could emerge in Cambodia despite, and not because of, existing conditions. This article argues that certain conditions are crucial to democratic consolidation, and that an imbalanced power configuration between the state and society impedes

democratic consolidation. After democracy was introduced, Cambodian elites continued to employ patronage and corruption to advance their interests and strengthen their positions through the provision of benefits to members of their patronage networks. These networks extended throughout and crosscut formal political institutions. The embeddedness of these elements in Cambodian politics prevents democracy from consolidating because consolidation requires both the establishment and strengthening of vertical and horizontal accountability institutions. Without those institutions, elites will continue to employ traditional means, i.e., patrimonialism, to serve their interests. Clientelism exists everywhere, but it is more pervasive in places such as Cambodia, where vertical and horizontal accountability institutions are weak. Without such institutions, Cambodia, like many other newly emerged democracies, will continue to hold elections without substantial democracy.

The example of a court system permeated by patron-client networks and operating to protect the politically well-connected individual at the expense of less privileged groups exemplifies what is happening within all state institutions. At the same time, the judicial system is of central importance, because ensuring the rule of law is crucial to the consolidation of democracy. As this paper has shown, patronage and corruption and the near absence of the rule of law are mutually reinforcing and exist because of a lack of countervailing force.

Following the introduction of democracy in 1993, there have been new elements of civil society, including most importantly non-governmental organizations, attempting to transform the imbalance in the relationship between state and society. However, their efforts have been an uphill struggle, given the unequal power configuration. The state appears to be strong, in that it can silence and oppress government opponents; however, the state apparatus is apparently weak in providing services and ensuring the rule of law. Such weakness, as this article contends, is the byproduct of a state structure built on a patrimonial foundation rather than on rational Weberian institutions. Under this system, elites tolerate elements of a weak state, such as a politically dependent and corrupt judiciary. With weak institutions, the state, as recent events have shown, can use “legitimate, legal procedures” to silence and oppress non-government organizations, the press, trade unions and opposition leaders, further undermining the relatively weak civil society organizations.95

This paper has further argued that civil society has not acquired sufficient strength to pressure the state to adopt meaningful reform. The sources of these weaknesses are exogenous and endogenous to these organizations. Exogenously, the state continues to restrict political action, limiting CNGOs’

ability to expand democratic space and promote further democratic consolidation. Factors endogenous to these organizations also obstruct their ability to serve effectively as agents of democratic promotion. These factors are the undemocratic character of the CNGOs, dependence upon foreign funding, a lack of mass membership and the adherence to a non-confrontational stance vis-à-vis the state.

The sober reality perhaps is that civil society cannot really contribute substantially to democratic consolidation until Cambodia has a larger urban, educated population, a larger middle class, and more experience with the idea of non-political “secondary associations” to build up “social trust” and to generate “norms of reciprocity” that deviate from standard patronage networks. Therefore, Cambodia’s trajectory could in some ways be expected to resemble the patterns of other Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, where substantial political change occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. This change only came about when “… profound capitalist transformations that eventually, over periods of two to four decades, produced new socio-economic and political transformations and forces that challenged, more or less successfully and in different ways, their makers,” i.e., the political elites and their patronage networks. 96

Given current political trends, the imbalance in the power configuration between the state and society, in favour of the former, will persist into the foreseeable future. The country will muddle through unconsolidated democracy, wherein the ruling elites, in collaboration with prominent businessmen, will co-opt and coerce the rural voters, who constitute some 80 percent of the total population, into supporting the dominant party system under the control of the CPP. However, political stability depends upon other factors: global economic trends, the nature of the Cambodian economy and the government’s ability to generate sufficient economic growth to absorb the rising number of unemployed youth and reduce the level of poverty. Economic growth will afford the ruling elites legitimacy and justification for maintaining a restrictive political space. Limited economic growth and widespread economic deprivation and inequality would lead to political instability. When the opposition party increases its efforts to organize the poor and the unemployed, and civil society organizations fight to retain limited political space, political oppression will likely escalate, as the elites dig in to defend their interests. The fate of Cambodia’s public sphere will depend in large part on the international community, whose initial involvement and continued support brought Cambodia to where it is today.

Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia

Yong Cheol Kim, R. William Liddle, and Salim Said

Introduction
The “praetorian problem”—how to establish and maintain control over the armed forces by elected officials—is one of the most critical challenges facing Third Wave democracies. Among East Asian cases, South Korea appears to have successfully met this challenge, while Indonesia has not. In South Korea, a highly politicized armed forces faction was effectively subdued, two former presidents were jailed and the role of military intelligence was severely downgraded. Most observers now believe there is little chance of a military return to power. In Indonesia, by contrast, the armed forces retain most of their predemocratic position and perquisites, including the “territorial system” of military commands parallel to the civilian government hierarchy, and de facto control over their own budget. Many observers believe that a return to power remains a real, if hard to measure, possibility.

What accounts for this difference? Structurally, Korea seems much “readier” for democracy than Indonesia. Korea has a more developed economy, stronger state, more educated population, larger middle class and more vigorous civil society. Korea’s territory is more compact and its population less complex ethnically, with fewer politicized religious divisions. Koreans have long been a single nation, while Indonesia is a twentieth-century creation. For those who stress the role of foreign actors, the United States...
has been much more closely involved in domestic Korean than in Indonesian politics.

While these indicators all point in the same direction, they do not provide a satisfactory explanation. Structural factors, which may also be thought of as Machiavelli’s *fortuna* or circumstance, are only half the analytic story. The other half, *virtu*, is the skill of the human agents who shape and are shaped by structure.⁵ The contemporary sociologist Steven Lukes puts the point this way: “Social life can only properly be understood as … a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand and contract over time. Any standpoint or methodology which reduces that dialectic to a one-sided consideration of agents without … structural limits, or structures without agents, or which does not address the problem of their interrelations, will be unsatisfactory.”⁶

In this analysis, we conceptualize structural factors as forces that constrain and enable political leaders as they make decisions and act upon them. In concrete situations, skillful leaders transform these forces into political resources, mobilizing and deploying them in order to achieve their goals.⁷ Success depends both on the leaders’ commitment to a particular set of goals (here, civilian supremacy or compatible goals) and their formulation and implementation of political strategy and tactics that make effective use of available resources in specific contexts. These contexts change continuously, in part as a result of actors’ previous choices.⁸

Comparing the Korean and Indonesian cases cannot, of course, prove scientifically that human agency is an essential ingredient in a full explanation of civilian supremacy. Our more modest purpose is to demonstrate that leaders’ decisions were autonomous, meaning that they might have chosen other policies, and that they were consequential, that is, had a significant impact on the subsequent state of civil-military relations. Put differently, the Korean and Indonesian transitions are particularly rich sources of empirical evidence for a foundational argument, to be built upon later with other methodologies, that leaders do indeed make a difference.

In the case of Korea, the key political leaders were committed to or had goals compatible with civilian supremacy. They adopted effective political strategies and tactics in their particular contexts, which included sustained pressure from political opposition forces and civil society. The result was a smoother, more consensual and more complete transition than might

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otherwise have been the case. The main actors were Presidents Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the transition was more difficult and is still incomplete. The key players were Presidents Suharto and B. J. Habibie, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, and Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. The Habibie-Wiranto team was both constrained and enabled by powerful political opposition and civil society forces. These two leaders chose appropriate strategy and tactics and made genuine progress toward civilian supremacy. Abdurrahman and Megawati were under less external pressure, failed to choose effective strategies and tactics, and made much less progress than Habibie/Wiranto.

Finally, what lessons can be learned from the already completed Korean experience for the still-in-progress Indonesian case, and by extension for other uncompleted transitions to civilian supremacy? First, the comparison suggests that pressure from below is a powerful resource in the hands of actors committed to civilian supremacy or compatible goals, as was true for all the Korean presidents and the Habibie/Wiranto team. At least equally important, however, was the impact of the strategic and tactical choices of these players. Had the Korean presidents chosen differently, civilian supremacy might be much less firmly established today despite Korea’s relatively high level of modernization. In Indonesia, either Habibie or Wiranto might have chosen to go it alone, with probably disastrous consequences for civilian supremacy. Abdurrahman and Megawati, on the other hand, were not fated to fail. Other strategic and tactical choices, widely discussed in Indonesia at the time, were available that would have enabled either leader to exercise greater control over the army leaders and to push them toward further reforms.

To recapitulate: in the following sections, we show how autonomous Korean and Indonesian politicians acted in specific contexts of constraining and enabling structural factors, mobilizing and deploying resources to achieve their goals and in consequence advancing or failing to advance civilian supremacy over their respective militaries.

Korea: A Successful Transition to Civilian Supremacy

The transition to democracy

At the beginning of his presidency, Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1988) relied heavily on his ability as armed forces and coup leader to deploy coercive resources. Later, in an altered context of economic and social modernization and of changing United States policy, he chose to ride the forces of democratization. Sensitive to the hostility of democratic forces, a powerful constraining factor, Chun promoted his more acceptable subordinate, Roh Tae Woo, as his successor. Moreover, he played the two strongest opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, against each other, virtually
assuring that Roh would win the presidency. The result was a relatively smooth transition.

The Chun government was widely regarded as illegitimate by the political public because of its seizure of political power in 1979 and brutal suppression of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising. Chun also inherited a mounting economic crisis. He pursued economic reforms to make up for his unpopularity, but economic success did not translate into political resources. His Democratic Justice Party (DJP) suffered a near defeat in 1985, followed by student-led popular protests demanding a direct presidential election. Chun initially agreed, but in April 1987 reneged, creating a context in which the opposition party and mass organizations were able to forge a united front. In June, the death of a college student by police torture ignited fierce demonstrations. Faced with a severe political crisis, Chun let DJP chair Roh Tae Woo announce the “June 29 Declaration,” an eight-item statement of concessions to democratic forces, including direct presidential election.

Economic modernity and the role of the United States appear to have been the most important contextual factors constraining and enabling Chun’s choices at this time. Through the 1970s, the growing middle class had been largely silent. By the 1980s, however, the spread of democratic values and greater intolerance of authoritarian rule pulled the middle class out of the conservative closet. The change resulted partly from educational and mobilizational efforts by radical students and church activists, who themselves had gradually become more committed to democratization and broader social change.9

Civil society’s resistance was accompanied by the reorganization of democratic political forces. In January 1985 the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) was launched by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. In the elections held the next month, the NKDP won a landslide victory in the larger cities and became the leading opposition party. Democratic forces now formed a cohesive body in the polity. In May 1987 a Catholic group exposed the torture death of a student, igniting public anger. On May 27, democratic forces created the National Movement Headquarters for a Democratic Constitution (NMHDC), which held rallies in Seoul and other large cities. They were soon joined by the urban middle class, producing the June Uprising of 1987.

Though facing mass mobilization in which demonstrators overwhelmed the police in many cities, President Chun still had options. He could have used military force to crush the dissidents, or he could have capitulated totally to the demands for democratization. Some of his supporters in the

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military favoured the use of force, while others, including the defence security commander, opposed it.\textsuperscript{10} To be sure, American pressure, from the Republican Reagan Administration and a group headed by Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, was in this period uniformly against repression.\textsuperscript{11}

Chun opted for a strategy of concession that pushed Roh to the foreground and divided the opposition. In secret meetings on June 17 and 19, Chun persuaded Roh to offer a reform package including direct presidential election and restoration of the political rights of Kim Dae Jung.\textsuperscript{12} Chun calculated that Roh’s announcement would transform him from a candidate handpicked by the unpopular Chun into a popular democratic reformer. The reinstatement of Kim Dae Jung’s political rights before the election would, he believed, divide the opposition.

Chun also mobilized his coercive resources, threatening the opposition by placing all military and police personnel on standby alert. His threat had two purposes: to force the opposition leaders to come to the negotiating table and to boost the morale of regime insiders.\textsuperscript{13} The moderates in the opposition (represented by the Reunification Democratic Party, RDP) now faced two dangerous possibilities: the loss of control over the demonstrations and authoritarian backlash. On June 19, the RDP dropped many of its preconditions and proposed direct dialogue between RDP President Kim Young Sam and President Chun.

Finally, Chun balanced coercive with conciliatory tactics. Kim Young Sam was allowed to meet with Kim Dae Jung. On June 24, President Chun himself met with Kim Young Sam for the first time during the Fifth Republic. Kim Young Sam presented all of the opposition’s demands, including acceptance of direct presidential elections, amnesty and restoration of civil rights for dissidents. Enabled by swelling public support, the two Kims put further pressure on the government through a nationwide mobilization held on June 26. On June 29, Roh as DJP chair announced concessions that met all the opposition’s demands. After pretending to deliberate, President Chun announced that he fully accepted Roh’s concessions. The ruling DJP and the opposition RDP then met to discuss constitutional reform. After eighteen rounds of tense negotiations, both parties agreed that the military’s political neutrality would be mentioned in the body but not in the preamble of the constitution. Civilian supremacy was not explicitly affirmed, however.

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\textsuperscript{12} Sung-Ik Kim, Chun Doo Hwan Yooksung Jung-un [The Spoken Testimony of Chun Doo Hwan] (Seoul: Coson Ilbosa, 1992), p. 455.

The nation’s attention then shifted to which of the two Kims would be the opposition’s presidential candidate. Kim Young Sam argued that if Kim Dae Jung became a candidate, Roh’s camp would promote regional antagonism and the military might try to disrupt the transition. Military leaders saw Kim Dae Jung as a main target of Chun’s persecution. Should he become president, they feared, he would surely purge the outgoing regime leaders. In response, Kim Dae Jung claimed that his extensive popular support made it impossible for him to resign from the race.

This impasse split the opposition. When Kim Young Sam was nominated as the RDP candidate, Kim Dae Jung created a new party (Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD). The election was no longer a choice between democratic and former authoritarian forces but between individual political figures with different support bases. Regional cleavages widened. Chun and the DJP took advantage of this situation and actively maneuvered to cultivate regional votes. An old politician put it best: “Chun and his DJP wrote a brilliant script and the two Kims blindly followed it.”

Military reforms after the transition

Most of the military reforms in Korea were carried out by the next three presidents. Each developed a strategy that maximized the value of his political resources in the specific context of his presidency. Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), whose major resource was the trust of other soldiers, implemented gradual reforms that included step-by-step reshuffling from soldiers close to Chun to those closer to himself. The civilian Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) implemented a series of sweeping purges of politically linked officers within the first year of his five-year tenure, when he still commanded the resource of great popular support. Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002), once the civilian politician most feared by the military, took a more conciliatory step by not discriminating against former members of the notorious Hanahoe faction (with which Chun and Roh had been affiliated) in promotions and assignments. He made more headway than any of his predecessors in reducing the role of regionalism in the Korean military. His chief resource was the trust of civilians.

Roh’s Reforms

Roh was simultaneously trusted by the military and distrusted by society. Military leaders viewed Roh not as a civilian president but as a fellow soldier who would take care of the interests of the military-as-institution. On the other hand, opposition forces, including civil society, did not accept Roh’s

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government as fully legitimate, because of his participation in the 1979 seizure of power. Roh resolved this tension and simultaneously strengthened his own hand by choosing to stay on the reform path. He shifted military leadership from Chun’s men to his own to consolidate his personal power, limited the power of military intelligence, which might have acted against him, and reduced the level and value of prerogatives enjoyed by armed forces officers as a group, thereby reducing their capacity to act independently.

Despite Roh’s prior loyalty to him, Chun was anxious about his well-being in retirement and reshuffled some commanders at the last moment. Roh moved quickly: one month after his inauguration, he initiated a media campaign accusing Chun family members of corruption. The military hierarchy did nothing to save them, because the purge was not aimed directly at Chun. Once Roh learned that he could act with impunity against Chun, he began to restructure the military leadership. In late June and early July 1988, he replaced almost 70 high-ranking officers. Officers who were close to the centre of political power were demoted and those who had fewer political connections were promoted. Many officers who had served Roh as their commander were assigned to politically important units. The military as a whole did not react against these changes, which affected the interests of only a small fraction of Chun loyalists.

Roh’s next step was to replace the leadership of the Defense Security Command (DSC, Boansa), responsible for counter-coup operations and military intelligence. At the same time he launched a full-scale depoliticization campaign. Many officers now openly voiced their support for reform; those close to Chun were restricted to sporadic verbal protests. In March 1989, enabled by widespread popular consensus, Roh thoroughly reshuffled senior military posts. More than half the three star and higher generals changed positions or retired. Of course, these personnel changes did not mean that the military was now professionalized or institutionally subordinate to the elected government. Instead, they reflected mainly a transfer of military power from officers close to Chun to those close to Roh.

Roh’s second major action, also a popular move, was to limit the power of military intelligence. The new DSC commander promised to shrink the DSC by about 14 percent by 1990. After April 1989, DSC surveillance of the state bureaucracy was greatly reduced. Some DSC intelligence activities over civilians continued, however, until a whistleblower told the press in October 1990 that the DSC was still conducting secret surveillance of about 1,300 civilians. In an attempt to erase its bad image, the DSC was renamed the Military Security Command (MSC, Kimoosa) in January 1991. Roh received a further assist in 1992 when Army Lieutenant Lee Jimoon revealed how

16 “Chungwadae Biseosil” [Secretariat at the Blue House], Jung-Ang Ilbo, 18 February 1994.
18 “Interview with Yoon Sok-Yang,” Hankyoreh, 5 October 1990, p. 15.
military intelligence, in collaboration with army field officers, had massively manipulated soldiers’ absentee ballots. The humiliated armed forces leaders resolved to depoliticize the officer corps.

Finally, Roh reduced military privileges that were unpopular with civilian officials. A spoils system under which retired officers had been recruited as middle-ranking civil servants was dismantled. Active officers were resentful but the change was welcomed by the public and by civil servants, who had long complained about congestion in promotions. In 1991, the government opened defence spending to National Assembly scrutiny, eliminating the “sacred domain” that had long been a symbol of military supremacy.

Kim Young Sam’s Purges

Kim Young Sam was the first president committed in principle to civilian supremacy. The successes of the Roh administration provided a context in which Kim was able to conduct even more extensive purges. Roh also gave Kim a valuable political resource by joining him in a new political party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). Moreover, public pressure for reform—a powerful constraint convertible into a resource—continued during this period. Ironically, the Roh legacy enabled Kim to bring to justice both Roh and Chun, perpetrators of the Gwangju massacre.

In the 1992 presidential election, the military reacted passively to the fact that for the first time in almost three decades, the serious candidates were all civilians. Why was this the case? It was mainly due to the combined effect of Roh’s military reforms and the three-party merger of 1990, which was the joint act of three politicians. To overcome their numerical inferiority in the National Assembly, President Roh and his DJP merged with Kim Young Sam’s RDP and Kim Jong Pil’s NDRP. Kim Young Sam wished to hold Kim Dae Jung (PPD) in check, while Kim Jong Pil needed to overcome the disadvantage that his party was fourth in size. The result was a new, hegemonic governing party, the DLP.

In December 1992, Kim Young Sam ran for the presidency as the governing party candidate, winning with a 42 percent plurality. The margin of votes between the winner and the runner up (Kim Dae Jung) was 8.2 percent. As in the presidential election of 1987, regionalism was the decisive factor. The armed forces remained calm. Their leaders expected continuity, because the governing DLP, which included former authoritarian DJP elements, continued to wield power. Kim Young Sam had a different idea, however. In his memoirs, he described his decision in 1990 to merge with the DJP as a

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Strategic choice. He referred to the Korean proverb: “I went into the cave [the ruling DLP] to catch a tiger [the legacy of military authoritarianism].”

As a tactician, Kim was skillful and decisive. Taking advantage of regional and personal networks, he built loyalty within the military hierarchy. Under the Chun and Roh regimes, “TK” officers from Taegu and North Kyungsang had enjoyed more privileges than “PK” officers from Pusan and South Kyungsang. By replacing TK with PK officers, Kim Young Sam could consolidate loyalty within the military. His first purge was targeted at Roh’s men. Unlike Roh himself a few years earlier, however, President Kim did not wait until the political moment was ripe. In March 1993 he surprised everyone by dismissing the army chief-of-staff and the MSC commander. In just six weeks after his inauguration, three of the seven four-star generals were retired and two were transferred.

In May Kim again surprised the public by announcing that Chun’s December 1979 seizure of power had been “a kind of military coup staged by officers against their superior.” Many officers, mostly from Hanahoe, who had been involved in this incident were replaced, as were a number of corrupt officers tarnished by their role in a weapons modernization project of Kim’s predecessor. In sum, the first year of the Kim Young Sam government was marked by a purge of more than 1,000 military officers without visible reaction.

President Kim also deepened institutional reform. The power of the civilian defence minister vis-à-vis the active military chief was greatly enhanced. Up to the time of the Roh government, the defence minister was just one of many competitors for access to the president. Kim established a clear hierarchy between the defence minister and the armed forces. He also accelerated reform of the MSC. The rank of MSC commander was downgraded from three-star to two-star general. The MSC itself was downsized: three generals and 47 colonels were transferred to other military units. The MSC’s civilian surveillance bureau, which Roh had promised to close, was finally abolished.

In November 1995 President Kim ordered his ruling party to enact a special law to investigate the bloody suppression of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980 and to bring to justice those (including Chun and Roh) responsible for the incident. Previously, Kim had ruled out the option of putting the perpetrators at

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23 Dong-A Ilbo, 14 May 1993.
on trial. What enabled him to change his position was the revelation of a secret political slush fund amassed by former president Roh. The slush fund scandal led to a dramatic escalation of demands for prosecution. Civic organizations formed the National Emergency Committee on Enacting a Special Law for Punishing the Perpetrators of the Gwangju Massacre, which subsequently collected more than a million signatures.26

President Kim, handed a significant new political resource by this public explosion, reversed his policy. After about 15 months of investigation and deliberation, the Supreme Court announced that the December 1979 takeover was “a military revolt” and the Gwangju incident “an insurrection and murder for the insurrection.” Chun was sentenced to life, Roh to 17 years in prison. By setting a precedent that “even a successful coup is punishable,” these convictions helped greatly to consolidate civilian supremacy in Korea.27

Kim Dae Jung’s Conciliatory Reform

Kim Dae Jung was also committed to civilian supremacy. His great resource, differentiating him from all his predecessors, was the trust of civil society and pro-democracy forces. This made it politically easier for him to forgive members of the Hanahoe faction, once his sworn enemy. It also enabled him to shift the criteria for promotion and appointment from personal favouritism and regional loyalties to merit. Visiting armed forces headquarters in December 1997, the president-elect stated that he would protect the military-as-institution. In March 1998 he promised to give more weight to ability and professional expertise in promotions and assignments.28 In April, his government announced that it would end discrimination against former members of Hanahoe.29

This conciliatory attitude was made easier in the altered context of constraining and enabling factors after Kim Young Sam’s radical reforms. Kim’s appointments had not reflected purely professional standards, but rather included considerations of personal loyalty. Many officers were angered by the perceived lack of fairness. PK officers, native to Pusan and South Kyungsang, where Kim Young Sam had strong political ties, had become a privileged group.30 The Kim Dae Jung government decided that a professional standard in promotions and assignments was urgently needed to improve morale and strengthen unity.

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27 Yong Cheol Kim, op.cit., pp. 239-240.
The new defence minister recommended a better regional balance in promotions and assignments and a reconciliatory policy toward Hanahoe members. In the government’s first regular personnel promotion in April 1998, only four officers from the Cholla provinces, Kim Dae Jung’s home base, won promotion. Two Hanahoe generals who had previously been discriminated against were promoted for their expertise. In the latter part of Kim Dae Jung’s tenure, regional favouritism returned. There was no new factionalism, however, as there had been with Hanahoe. Moreover, a case can be made that some regional favouritism had a positive effect during the transitional period. To transform entrenched military establishments, reforming presidents perhaps need counter-groups of officers loyal to them. The regional and personal networks provided such supporting groups.

**Indonesia: An Uncertain and Incomplete Transition to Civilian Supremacy**

In the Korean case, opposition and civil society pressure was a contextual constant impacting all four presidents. Former generals Chun and Roh were more constrained by it, in the sense that they were pushed hard to support democracy and civilian supremacy. Civilians Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were more enabled. They could turn public pressure into a powerful political resource deployable against the opponents of civilian supremacy.

In Indonesia, opposition and civil society pressure was a variable, most evident in 1998-1999, from the end of President Suharto’s military-based authoritarian New Order regime through the tenure of transitional President B. J. Habibie. Both men were severely constrained by it. The aging Suharto chose to resign. Like Roh, Habibie was pushed toward choosing democratization but at the same time, he was a skillful political strategist and tactician whose policies advanced the goal of civilian supremacy. His successors, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia’s first democratically elected presidents, were much less constrained by public pressure. More importantly, they were also politically unskilled. Though rhetorically committed to civilian supremacy, they did little to achieve it during their time in office.

**Habibie’s and Wiranto’s choices, May 1998 to October 1999**

The democratic transition and the first steps toward civilian supremacy occurred during the presidency of B.J. Habibie and were the result of choices

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made by Habibie and Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto. These choices were constrained and enabled by the characteristics of Suharto’s New Order and by the circumstances under which Suharto fell, which included mass protests and substantial public pressure for reform.34

Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, in the midst of the worst economic crisis of his presidency, in favour of his vice president, B.J. Habibie, a civilian, aeronautical engineer and former minister of Research and Technology. Partly because he had long been a strong competitor for economic resources, Habibie was the armed forces’ least-liked civilian politician. Significantly, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto spoke at Suharto’s resignation ceremony, promising that the armed forces would respect the constitution, meaning that the sitting vice president would succeed to the presidency.

Why did General Wiranto agree so readily to the Habibie succession? Most observers expected that military rule would continue into the indefinite future, primarily because of army political self-assurance, combined with a monopoly of coercive resources.35 One popular argument was that Wiranto was constrained by insufficient control over his own subordinates and troops to stage what would have been, in effect, a military coup. He had only been appointed commander the previous month. President Suharto’s son-in-law was a rival with leadership ambitions of his own.

Wiranto himself has given two accounts of his decision. In the first, he claimed simply to be following the constitution and thus to be acting apolitically.36 In the second, he stated that a military takeover would have required him to shed the blood of thousands of Indonesian students and other protesters (“as at Tien an Men”).37 Our own view is that Wiranto chose the course most likely to keep him at the centre of the political stage, given his perception of the context of constraining and enabling factors at that critical moment in Indonesian history. These included, in addition to the specific fear of shedding student blood, a broader recognition of the army’s domestic political unpopularity and the great power of global democratizing forces.

Whatever the source, Wiranto’s decision had major consequences for Indonesia’s future. It enabled Habibie to become president and constrained the armed forces to repudiate its dual function doctrine, under which military leaders claimed the right to participate in politics. One of Habibie’s first acts as president was to declare that genuinely democratic elections would be held within a year. New political parties were free to form and newspaper

36 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 6 July 1998.
licenses would no longer be revoked for political reasons. Habibie also declared that Indonesia would once again work closely with the IMF and other international financial institutions, at the time a popular move.

Habibie’s decisions appear to have been motivated by a personal political calculation, combined with admiration for Germany (where he had studied and worked for more than two decades) as a modern democracy. He had little initial legitimacy as president but was not totally without political resources. In the early 1990s Suharto had encouraged him to become the patron of a new Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, representing modernist Muslims who had previously been shut out of New Order politics. Suharto then gave Habibie the leadership of the military-backed state party Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups), which had won by substantial margins all six of the heavily managed elections of the New Order period from 1971 to 1997.

Habibie’s decision to transform Indonesia into a genuine democracy created a context in which the armed forces were constrained to follow suit. Reform was gradual, however. It began with a surge of popular demonstrations, after Suharto’s resignation, opposing the continuation of the dual function doctrine. Evidence of human rights violations by the armed forces in Aceh, East Timor and Papua was for the first time presented to the Indonesian public by the newly free press. A few genuine military reformers emerged, precipitating a debate within the armed forces. The first official product of this debate, a 1998 armed forces document entitled Redefinition, Reposition, and Reactualization of the Role of the Armed Forces, repudiated the dual function doctrine but failed to move all the way to acceptance of civilian supremacy.

Throughout his presidency, Habibie worked closely with Wiranto, almost duplicating the positive role played by Roh in Korea as an ex-military man who was trusted enough by the active duty armed forces to enable him to make significant progress toward establishing civilian supremacy. On Habibie’s instructions, Wiranto withdrew the armed forces from the electoral arena. As a result, the 1999 election was genuinely democratic, and Golkar’s vote fell to 22 percent from its high of 75 percent in 1997, the last New Order election.

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38 A. Makmur Makka, B. J. Habibie: His Life and Career (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1999).
On only one occasion during Habibie’s presidency, the July 1998 Golkar Congress, did Wiranto directly involve the armed forces in civilian politics in a way reminiscent of the New Order. To fend off a challenge from an anti-Habibie faction led by a group of retired army officers, Wiranto quietly ordered his territorial officers to pressure local-level Golkar leaders to vote for Habibie’s candidate for national chair. Wiranto’s generally positive actions and this one negative moment should be seen as two sides of the same political coin. Habibie was of course dependent upon Wiranto, who had allowed him to become president in the first place. But Wiranto was also dependent on Habibie, who could remove or reassign him at any time.

During Habibie’s tenure as president and Wiranto’s as commander, East Timor gained its independence, an event that provided new grounds for military grievance against civilian rulers. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony (the rest of Indonesia had been ruled by the Netherlands) was invaded by Suharto’s armed forces in 1975 and occupied until 1999, when a referendum was held under United Nations auspices. The East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence, precipitating attacks on the population by Indonesian soldiers and Indonesian-controlled East Timorese militia. The decision to allow a referendum was made in early 1999 by President Habibie. Wiranto agreed to provide security, but appears to have violated that agreement from the beginning, instead encouraging, even directing, the militia who were intimidating pro-independence East Timorese prior to the referendum. Though Habibie never challenged or rebuked the armed forces on this issue, many officers believe that he is responsible for the loss of East Timor.

Habibie’s political strategy, to ride a Golkar victory in the 1999 legislative election to selection as president in his own right by the People’s Consultative Assembly, was probably the best that he could have chosen. In the event, however, Golkar’s vote was too small (22%) and its reputation too tarnished by decades of service to the repressive Suharto. Habibie had hoped that cooperation with the IMF would produce a quick economic upturn and enable him to retain the presidency. Instead, he was constrained by a banking scandal that led the IMF and other international financial institutions to signal strong displeasure with his government just before the presidential

42 Interview, Golkar chair Akbar Tandjung, 8 July 1998.
43 Under the Indonesian constitution, before it was amended in the post-Suharto period, there were two national legislatures: Parliament and the People’s Consultative Assembly. The assembly, twice the size of Parliament, consisted of all the members of Parliament plus additional appointees from the regions, social groups and the military. The assembly’s main role was to select a president every five years. From 1999-2004, the assembly consisted of mostly elected members with the exception of 38 appointed military officers and 200 regional delegates. In 2004, the president and vice president were directly elected. There is also a new elected Regional Representative Council. Under the amended constitution, the much weakened assembly today consists of Parliament plus the Regional Representative Council.
selection. When the assembly met, it chose, surprisingly, Abdurrahman Wahid of the PKB (National Awakening Party) to become Indonesia’s first democratically elected president.

*Abdurrahman Wahid’s botched opportunity, October 1999 to July 2001*

Abdurrahman Wahid did not build on the foundation of civilian supremacy established by Habibie and Wiranto, despite great personal legitimacy as Indonesia’s first democratically elected president. Instead, he attempted to impose Suharto-style personal control on the armed forces without having Suharto’s skill as a politician or his military background. This only served to reinforce the suspicions of armed forces leaders toward civilian politicians. Political and civil society pressure also diminished during this period, weakening a contextual factor that might have enabled a politically sophisticated civilian president (like the two Kims) to advance military reform.

The selection of Abdurrahman as president was a surprise because his PKB, the main party of traditionalist Muslims, was only the third largest in the 1999 legislative election, with 13 percent of the vote. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDIP (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle) was first, with 34 percent, and Habibie’s Golkar was second, with 22 percent. Abdurrahman is also nearly blind and had been hospitalized by two strokes in 1998. Megawati expected to be selected president but made no effort to put together a winning coalition. She also did not try to assuage the fears of pious Muslims that she would discriminate against them. The PDIP’s predecessor, the PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party), was a Suharto-era coerced fusion of secular nationalist and Christian parties. The largest of the secular nationalist parties, the PNI (Indonesian National Party), had been founded in 1922 by Sukarno, Megawati’s father. The PNI in the 1950s and the PDIP in 1999 were led by non-Muslims and by secular and syncretic Muslims hostile to the idea of an Islamic state. The religious beliefs and practices of syncretic Muslims are more animist- and Hindu-influenced than Muslim.

Why did Megawati not move to calm the fears of pious Muslims or to build a coalition that would support her presidential candidacy? Most observers at the time thought that her popular support, as measured by the PDIP vote, was a strongly enabling factor. The probable answer is political inexperience, combined with a sense of entitlement derived both from her party’s election plurality and her status as daughter of Indonesia’s founding

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44 Traditionalism in Indonesian Islam is a religious term, denoting adherence to the classical Syafii school of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. In contrast, modernism describes Muslims who deemphasize the teachings of the classical schools in favour of direct reading of the Qur’an and Sunnah, traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Traditionalists turn to respected scholars and teachers, the ulama, while modernists look to more contemporary interpreters.

father. In any event, the Muslim parties coalesced in support of Abdurrahman Wahid, who defeated Megawati on the first ballot. With the support of Abdurrahman, Megawati was then elected vice president. The armed forces delegates played a reactive, almost passive, role. They did not announce a public position and probably voted with the majority in both the presidential and vice presidential selections.46

Abdurrahman’s presidency began on a high note of widespread public support. In the 1980s and 1990s he had twice been elected head of Nahdlatul Ulama or NU (The Awakening of Religious Scholars and Teachers), the world’s largest organization of traditionalist Muslims. He was known for his openness toward secular Muslims and non-Muslims and had been the most prominent pro-democracy activist of the previous two decades. As president, Abdurrahman’s first choices were good ones, seeming to reflect the careful construction of a viable political strategy of his own. Megawati, from the largest party in Parliament, had agreed to be his vice president. He then appointed a “rainbow cabinet” representative of all major parties. There was general acclaim for his willingness to embrace a wide range of points of view.

A few weeks later, however, Abdurrahman peremptorily fired one of his most prominent cabinet members, alleging corruption but without offering any evidence and without prior consultation with party leaders. Within a few months he had fired two more ministers. By August 2000, when an annual session of the People’s Consultative Assembly was held at which he was required to make a progress report on his presidency, he had alienated all of the parties that had initially supported him. The wheels of the impeachment process began to turn; by July 2001 he was out of office.

Abdurrahman’s dealings with the military paralleled those with civilian politicians. He began well, by appointing Juwono Sudarsono as minister of defence and Admiral Widodo Adi Subroto as armed forces commander. Juwono was the first civilian to become minister of defence since the 1950s. A highly respected academic and former deputy head of the armed forces’ think-tank, he was the ideal bridge between the civilian and military worlds. In an armed forces long dominated by the army, the choice of the navy’s Admiral Widodo set a valuable precedent. By July 2001, however, when Abdurrahman was about to be impeached, he had alienated the armed forces leaders. In a last desperate act, he called upon the armed forces to dissolve the People’s Consultative Assembly—as President Sukarno had done in 1959—before it could impeach him. This time, however, the generals told the president that his request was unconstitutional.

Abdurrahman’s troubles with the armed forces began when he fired Coordinating Minister Wiranto in February 2000. One month earlier, the national Commission on Human Rights released a report stating that significant human rights violations had occurred in East Timor in September 1999. The perpetrators of these acts were anti-independence militia, backed by the Indonesian armed forces. When the report was released, President Abdurrahman was on a state visit to several European and Asian countries. Pressed by the Indonesian and international media, he called openly and repeatedly for Wiranto’s resignation.

Why did Abdurrahman conduct a public and long-distance hanging of Wiranto? Sources close to the president at the time reported that he feared the armed forces might stage a coup, and that he was using the international publicity as a way of forestalling that possibility. If true, Abdurrahman’s fear betrays his poor understanding of his own armed forces. General (retired) Wiranto was a minister in his government. Senior active army officers repeatedly stated that the hiring and firing of ministers was the prerogative of the president. Moreover, the dominant current for the previous two-and-a-half years had been the depoliticization of the armed forces.

Abdurrahman next tried to advance the armed forces career of Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah. Agus was a genuine reformer who wanted to end the territorial system and the practice of extra-budgetary finance. Unfortunately, he was also given to taking absolute policy positions and criticizing his fellow officers in public. In March 2000, Abdurrahman succeeded in having Agus promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commander of the army’s strategic forces. When Agus announced that he had uncovered massive corruption in an associated foundation, other officers mobilized against him. He was soon dismissed as commander by the army chief of staff.

In promoting the career of Agus, Abdurrahman may have thought that he was acting like Suharto. Suharto could intervene in appointments, however, because of his status as former armed forces commander, savior of the country from communism, and president for several terms. Moreover, he acted quietly, so that the myth of internal armed forces decision-making autonomy could be preserved. Perhaps most importantly, Suharto had had no interest in democracy and civilian supremacy.

Abdurrahman might have learned more from observing his immediate predecessor. Habibie established the foundations of civilian supremacy by creating a democratic polity to which the armed forces were willing and able to adjust. He never criticized the military in public or interfered in

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internal armed forces matters. He cultivated Wiranto personally and the armed forces institutionally. Unfortunately, much of what Habibie accomplished was undermined, even reversed, by Abdurrahman, who raised old fears that civilian supremacy threatens armed forces institutional integrity and autonomy.

Why was there little external pressure for military reform during the Abdurrahman presidency? The military had preempted its critics by renouncing the dual function doctrine and accepting democratization, steps considered unimaginable a few years earlier. Secondly, the leaders of political parties, none of which had a majority of seats in Parliament, did not want to antagonize the still autonomous and potentially politically powerful military. They might need armed forces votes in Parliament or support in their next election campaign.

Finally, pro-reform civil society organizations were in fact active behind the scenes. They trusted Abdurrahman, allowed him to take the initiative on military reform, and provided support for his maneuverings against Wiranto and for Agus. The Abdurrahman presidency is in this sense comparable to the Kim Dae Jung presidency, where the the resource of mass support was available for mobilization by a leader. The difference is that neither Abdurrahman nor Indonesian civil society leaders had an effective strategy to achieve their goals.

**Back-sliding under Megawati Sukarnoputri, July 2001 to October 2004**

Like Abdurrahman, Megawati began her presidency with substantial resources of personal legitimacy and parliamentary support. She nonetheless failed to advance the reform agenda or even to curb the increasingly militaristic statements and actions of some of her senior officers. The reason appears to have been lack of interest, not only in military reform but in politics in general. During her presidency, there was also little external pressure for reform.

One explanation for both Megawati’s and Abdurrahman’s failures to reform the military is the constraining effect of ethnic and religious violence in many parts of the country during their administrations. Both presidents, it is argued, needed the good will of the military to maintain social peace and were further constrained by fear that the generals might use widespread unrest as an excuse to return to power. On our reading, however, localized ethnic and religious conflict was an almost constant part of the political scene after 1996, well before the military renounced its dual function doctrine. More fundamentally, from early 1998, when mass opposition to Suharto began to grow, through the end of 1999, when East Timor became

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independent, the generals lost much of their self-assurance as military, let alone political, leaders. That self-assurance began to return at the end of the Abdurrahman administration, but even today few senior officers seriously contemplate a return to power as in the Suharto days.\footnote{Salim Said, *Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik Militer Indonesia 1958-2000* [The Rise and Fall of the Dual Function: The Development of Indonesian Military Political Thinking 1958-2000] (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2002).}

Some of Megawati’s actions were positive for democratic stability. She restored a sense of order after nearly two years of chaos. Even though her party had a plurality of the seats in Parliament, she began, like her predecessor, by appointing a rainbow cabinet. Unlike Abdurrahman, she stuck with her original choices, even when she probably should have made changes. Her government also made progress toward decentralization, probably a prerequisite for successful democratization.\footnote{Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).} In recent decades, demands for devolution of power have built beneath the authoritarian surface. President Habibie first responded to those demands by sending to Parliament a bill devolving substantial decision-making and fiscal authority to districts and municipalities. The law went into effect during Abdurrahman’s administration. Megawati’s government steered a middle course in the implementation process between the sometimes excessive demands of localities and the sometimes intransigent attitude of central agencies.

Finally, Megawati successfully administered the constitutional transition to a directly elected presidency. She appears to have opposed key reforms as they were being debated in the People’s Consultative Assembly, but she never questioned the assembly’s right to amend the constitution or her responsibility to implement its decisions.\footnote{Blair King, *Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in Indonesia’s Constitutional Reforms 1999-2002* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2004), chapter 3.} Her behaviour contrasts sharply with that of Abdurrahman, who unconstitutionally (like Megawati’s father Sukarno) called upon the armed forces to save his presidency in its final days.

Despite these achievements, Megawati was also responsible for a lack of significant progress toward civilian supremacy. Her minister of defence, a colourless party politician, was the weakest since democratization. Her government formulated no policies to continue the reform process begun by Habibie. Megawati also involved herself directly and too obviously in internal armed forces appointments. She reportedly appointed the hard-liner General Ryamizard Ryacudu as army chief-of-staff in part because he was from her husband’s hometown and in part because his father was a political supporter of her father.\footnote{“Ryamizard: Merusak TNI, Saya Pecat,” *Kompas*, 4 June 2002, p. 1.} None of these actions appears to have
been taken under any pressure from armed forces leaders or out of a calculated strategy to win their support.

Why was there little external pressure for reform during the Megawati presidency? When Abdurrahman was impeached, pro-Abdurrahman civil society leaders, some of whom had been complicit in his last-ditch call to the army to save his presidency, lost both respect and influence. Military leaders continued to preempt protest, most notably when they softened a bill that had appeared to restore the dual function doctrine. In the run-up to the 2004 election, political party leaders were even less likely to antagonize the armed forces, whose territorial structure might be mobilized against them as it had so often been in the Suharto years. Perhaps most importantly, the nation’s attention shifted in 2003 from military reform to successful prosecution of the war against separatists in the province of Aceh.

Conclusion

In our comparison of Korea and Indonesia, we have shown that leaders often autonomously chose goals plus strategies and tactics for achieving those goals. Whether their actions were consequential or not has depended on virtu and fortuna, skill and circumstance, that is, how well they have mobilized and deployed resources in the specific contexts of constraining and enabling factors in which they found themselves.

The Korean story is one of unmitigated success. Chun, the military dictator, decided to ride rather than resist the growing pressures for democratization. He persuaded Roh to make the June 29 Declaration and correctly predicted that the two Kims would divide the opposition vote. By dramatizing the June 29 Declaration and giving sole credit for it to Roh, he promoted Roh as a democratic reformer.

President Roh, a retired general and Korea’s first democratically elected leader, was simultaneously trusted by his fellow officers and distrusted by pro-democracy civil society groups. Acting creatively to resolve this tension, he accomplished three goals important for Korean democracy. He replaced Chun’s followers in the military with his own. At Roh’s instigation, Chun himself and many members of his family went to jail. Roh also shrank the range and power of military intelligence and reduced the level of prerogatives enjoyed by officers.

Kim Young Sam was the first civilian president, but nonetheless managed to purge more than a thousand army officers in his first year in office. He depoliticized and professionalized the armed forces as an institution, principally by strengthening the power of the defence ministry over that of the army and by downgrading the role of military intelligence. Kim Young Sam also brought Roh and others to justice. Ironically, he was able to achieve these goals because of the example of his predecessor, a military man, and because he had the foresight to merge his mainly civilian party with Roh’s
DJP, still backed by many in the military. He was also an effective mobilizer of regional sentiments, a key to election victory in democratic Korea.

Finally, Kim Dae Jung, for most of his career hostile to and feared by the military, as president became the great civil-military conciliator. Unlike Roh, he was trusted by the strongest pro-democracy forces in civil society, making it easier for him to forgive and find positions for his worst enemies, members of the Hanahoe army faction. More than any of his predecessors, he shifted the criteria for promotion and appointment in the armed forces from personal favouritism and regional loyalty to merit. To be sure, discontent within the military over Kim Young Sam’s extensive purges constrained him to move in this direction. But it also enabled him to approach resolution of perhaps the last outstanding obstacle to the establishment of a modern pattern of civilian supremacy in democratic Korea.

Indonesia’s record in establishing civilian supremacy is more mixed. A good foundation was laid by the alliance of President Habibie, who committed himself early in his presidency to a democratic transition, and Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, who put all his political eggs in Habibie’s basket. Despite differences in levels of economic development and the development of civil society between Indonesia and Korea, there is a basic similarity in the choices of their first democratizers. Like Roh, the team of Habibie and Wiranto was trusted by the military and distrusted by civil society. They too attempted to resolve this tension and retain power by choosing democratization and civilian supremacy. Again like Roh, they must be counted a success: genuinely democratic elections were held and the military remained in the barracks.

The Habibie-Wiranto team produced only the beginnings of civilian supremacy, however. Armed forces officers grudgingly and half-heartedly repudiated their dual function doctrine. They balked on four critical issues: civilian control of their budget; continuation of a large income derived from non-state sources; maintenance of the territorial system; and prosecution of armed forces personnel accused of war crimes in East Timor, Aceh and Papua.

President Abdurrahman Wahid, through his clumsy attempts at manipulation and control, deepened further the already deep distrust of officers toward civilian officials and politicians. Megawati Sukarnoputri did better, restoring order, moving forward on the economy and decentralization and presiding over the second democratic election in 2004. Megawati made no progress, however, on the problems of control of the armed forces budget, the territorial system or war crimes prosecutions. Instead, she allowed senior officers to make policy de facto on these crucial issues. One looks in vain for the counterparts of Kim Young Sam, the great purger, professionalizer and prosecutor, and Kim Dae Jung, the great conciliator who sealed the bonds of a modern democratic civil-military relationship in Korea.

Future Indonesian presidents and other developing world democratizers could do worse than to model themselves after the two Kims. Of course,
they will need to recognize that leadership is always exercised in specific contexts of enabling and constraining factors, some of which are easier to transform into political resources than others. In our cases, it is clear that civilian supremacy advanced furthest when pressure was greatest from political opposition and civil society forces. It is also clear, however, that in both Korea and Indonesia politically skillful presidents turned these pressures to their advantage and that both Abdurrahman and Megawati could have done better with the resources available to them. In other words, structure matters, but it always operates through agency, which also matters.

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Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan

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Introduction

Migrant labour is increasingly widespread in East Asia, as the lure of economic growth and diversification in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore attracts workers from across the continent, as far away as Pakistan and Iran. Although Japan has one of the most controlled borders in the industrialized world, the number of resident foreigners rose to over two million by the end of 2005. While many foreigners are old immigrants from Korea and China who were born in Japan (zainichi), over half are new immigrants from China, Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Peru, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran.¹ Zainichi, who work mostly in the service sector, get higher pay and better jobs and working conditions than other foreign workers. New foreign migrants come to work for Japanese small-medium manufacturers. Newcomers also include another approximately 200,000 overstayed foreign workers. Overstayed foreign men work in low-paying positions as construction workers, factory workers and cooks, while women work mostly in bars, but some also work as waitresses and factory workers. Their jobs are not guaranteed and none provide bonuses, paid holidays and company insurance. They are more likely to face significant hardships, including industrial accidents, unfair labour practices and forced captivity.

In response to labour migration, governments struggle to reinterpret or reform existing immigration laws and entitlement schemes in light of both economic and demographic change. The problem of state policy is the subject of a growing body of comparative literature, but this paper focuses on non-state actors that respond to the various pressures that immigrant labour forces

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place on state institutions. By coincidence, non-state actors in the form of civil society associations are gradually making their appearance in Japan. Perhaps more than other civil society organizations, support groups organized by Japanese citizens on behalf of overstayed foreigners demonstrate how civic groups in Japan can exert influence on state actors. The work of these groups raises interesting issues about class, gender and race, issues that are reflected in the type of foreigners each foreigner support group serves. Moreover, what does the existence and impact of these groups mean to the effectiveness of the Japanese state in controlling its society?

This paper attempts to understand Japan’s state/civil society relationship by focusing on foreigner support groups and the impact on these groups of the 1998 Nonprofit Organizations (NPO) Law, which grants smaller volunteer and other civic groups corporate status. Because the majority of the organizations were established before 1998 and most have remained unincorporated since the NPO law went into effect, the law has not had much impact on the growth of the majority of these small, issue-oriented groups. Nevertheless, an examination of which types of groups responded to NPO incorporation can further advance our understanding about the organization of Japan’s civil society. As scholars have consistently characterized political life in modern Japan as consisting of a strong central government, influential economic elites and a homogeneous society, much of Japanese behaviour and civic activities can be interpreted to be a result of state efforts to “mold Japanese minds” through various moral suasion campaigns. Sheldon Garon asserts that Japan’s government historically transforms people into active participants in its various projects. Has the state attempted to redirect the activities of certain civic groups through the NPO law, orienting them toward national causes in order to impose social control by moral exhortation?

Robert Pekkanen, offering a contemporary explanation of the relationship between the state and its civil society, contends that the state shapes civil society by selectively promoting certain organizations and allowing them to expand, while regulating others and making it difficult for them to survive

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2 The NPO law was designed to promote corporate status to small voluntary organizations by eliminating financial requirements and easing the approval process. Previously, the criteria for certification of incorporation were too rigid and difficult for many small voluntary organizations, due to a specified minimum level of financial assets and a lengthy approval process. The process was subjected to intense bureaucratic intervention both during and after the approval process. Since the passage of the law, Japan’s civil society groups have been growing at an impressive rate, with 22,434 NPO legal persons by June 30, 2005. On the passage of this law, see Robert Pekkanen, “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law,” Journal of Japanese Studies 26:1 (2000), pp. 111-143.


or flourish. According to Pekkanen, who points to the existence of few large civil society organizations and numerous small ones, the Japanese state provides preferential treatment to those civic organizations that are useful to the state, such as the neighbourhood associations, promoting their growth before eventually exerting influence over them. In contrast, the government makes it difficult for those issue-oriented organizations, such as environmental NGOs, to expand, because it fears that these organizations may undermine its power. He interprets the impressive increase of civil society organizations in Japan during the past few decades and the passage of the NPO law as continued efforts by the state to control and to shape civil society associations. Following this logic, has the NPO law made it easier or more difficult for foreigner support groups to operate? Has the state provided financial and logistical support to those whose agendas and activities are consonant with governing interests?

These interpretations of state-civil society relationships highlight the dominant role of the state and, consequently, portray Japan as having a dependent civil society. As such, issue-oriented civil society groups are viewed as unitary and are not expected to have an important impact on public policies. This paper refines these interpretations through an examination of the activities of six large ethnic immigrant associations and 78 small NGOs assisting overstayed foreigners. The data is based on two sequences of fieldwork in Tokyo and Kanagawa: one was conducted in 1998 before the passage of the NPO law and the other during the summers of 2003 and 2004. My findings show that the state neither promoted nor discouraged the development of Korean and Chinese ethnic associations, which grew large as a result of inter-group competition stemming from ideological differences. I also find that variations of state-civil society relationship exist among small, foreigner support groups from their diverging pattern of incorporation, which illustrates their creativeness to work with existing legal and social institutions. As in other developed countries, the provision of social welfare services to foreigners tends to be in the domain of local governments as part of their incorporation programmes. Therefore, those small groups that provide social welfare services, such as women’s support groups and medical NGOs, tend to acquire NPO status and further deepen their partnerships with local governments. When they cooperate with progressive local governments, they can have a significant impact on public

6 Under the NPO Law, the governor of the prefecture in which an NPO is located (or the director-general of the Economic Planning Agency in the case of NPOs with offices in at least two prefectures) sets guidelines and authorizes incorporation.
policies, specifically on state responsibilities for foreigners. Although the operating budget of these groups increases after incorporation, their financial situation does not necessarily improve nor does their membership increase. Community workers’ unions and lawyers’ associations, which have already been legally incorporated, have not sought NPO status.

Most interestingly, the highly ideological concerned citizens’ groups prefer to remain unincorporated. They seek cooperation from epistemic communities and directly challenge the central government, which formulates policies on immigration control and membership rules. A concerned citizens’ group has been successful in extending “special residence permission” to certain overstayed foreigners. The increased role that these small, foreigner support groups play in redefining membership rules and state responsibilities for foreign residents demonstrates their increased political strength and independence.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the state and associational life of legal foreigners from a historical perspective. The second focuses on the activities of support groups for overstayed foreigners and briefly reviews some emerging patterns. The third section examines the impact of the NPO law on selective foreigner support groups by highlighting significant changes in those groups that have acquired NPO status. The fourth section explores how the NPO law has promoted new partnerships between support groups and local governments. It then elaborates on the extent to which the new partnerships have impacted public policies, especially regarding membership rules and state responsibilities in health and welfare provisions for residents. The final section places the findings of the paper in a broader comparative and theoretical perspective.

The State and Associational Life of Legal Foreigners in Historical Perspective

State promotion of associational life for foreigners in Japan has historical precedents. After the economic recession in 1921, Pak Ch’un-kum established the Mutual Friendship Society (Sōaikai) to provide food and shelter for Koreans living in Japan. Realizing a need for such services for their “ imperial subjects,” government officials started to provide financial support for Pak’s projects, which had expanded into labour mediation. Subsequently, Sōaikai began to build close ties with the police, passing on information related to allegedly subversive Korean activities. After the military obtained control of the government in 1931, officials feared that private organizations might easily be diverted to anti-Japanese activities if they were not properly

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controlled. In 1934, they took over the association, staffed it with government officials, and renamed it the Concordia Society (Kyōwaikai). Membership was mandatory for all migrant Korean workers.9 Between the late 1930s and early 1940s, the government used the Kyōwaikai to urge Korean workers to support the industrial requirements for war mobilization, such as in supervising the training of Korean workers and inspecting factories and mines that hire them.10 Because Kyōwaikai leaders had to work closely with the police stations and handle classified information, the police insisted that only ethnic Japanese be chosen for leadership in these organizations. By 1942, all subgroups were headed by local police chiefs, and other officials in these organizations were members of the Special Higher Police.11 In this way, support groups for foreign workers during the prewar period functioned as a mechanism of control by the central government over the foreigner community.

During the postwar period, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Japanese officials continued to place Koreans, who were recategorized as “foreigners” instead of “imperial subjects,” and their new representative organization, Chōren, under surveillance.12 As tensions escalated on the Korean Peninsula and violent protests emerged against an order to close ethnic Korean schools in Osaka and Hyogo prefecture during the late 1940s, government authorities tightened their grip on Koreans, and Chōren, which maintained close ties with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). By 1949, the government passed the Organizational Control Law, effectively outlawing Chōren.13 The passage of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law and the creation of the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) in 1952 allowed the government to monitor and to control “subversive” organizations, such as the JCP and ethnic (particularly Korean) organizations. Koreans and Chinese were allowed to establish or maintain their ethnic associations as long as these groups did not engage in subversive activities or compromise public security. Zainichi Koreans who felt ideologically connected with South Korea created the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan hereafter) while those with a connection to North Korea formed the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Sōren hereafter). Overseas Chinese Associations (OCA) exhibited a similar

10 Mitchell, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, p. 82.
11 This was the case despite the fact that the Welfare Ministry Regulation 145 (26 December 1942) stated that the leaders of the Kyōwaikai had to be Koreans. Mitchell, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, p. 88.
13 Lee and de Vos, *Koreans in Japan*, pp. 81-84.
pattern of politically separated but less centralized institutions, with offices in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Osaka and Fukuoka.\footnote{14}

In general, Korean and Chinese ethnic associations promote attachment to their “imagined” homelands through educational (propaganda), cultural and business activities.\footnote{15} Zainichi turn to their ethnic associations for the purpose of reproducing their distinctive identities and to achieve socioeconomic (and sometimes cultural) integration. Meanwhile, Japanese officials have maintained a non-preferential, non-intervention policy towards these ethnic associations and their activities (including communist education) during most of the postwar period.\footnote{16} Otherwise, Chōsen Sōren and OCA affiliated with Mainland China would have found it harder to survive and grow.

In recent years, however, public opinion and the government attitude towards Chōsen Sōren have turned increasingly hostile, after North Korea launched a ballistic missile test over Japan in 1998, two encounters with North Korean spy boats in the Sea of Japan in 1999 and 2001, and the confirmation in 2002 of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens.\footnote{17} Because these international incidents directly affect Japan’s public security, government officials have begun to take a tougher stance on Chōsen Sōren, which, in the absence of diplomatic relations, they view as a representative institution of the North Korean government in Japan. In November 2001, the PSIA raided Chōsen Sōren’s headquarters to investigate the collapse of its affiliated financial institution. Governor Ishihara Shintarō also decided to end the group’s tax-exempted status in Tokyo and other local governments have followed suit. Meanwhile, Chōsen Sōren is redefining its identity and purpose by increasingly promoting transparency and reaching out to Mindan; these two rival groups have co-hosted a number of events and have worked to build a more cooperative relationship.\footnote{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{14} Tokyo has the largest population of overseas Chinese; at approximately 30,000; they are claimed by both the pro-Taiwan and the pro-PRC group.
\item \footnote{15} Personal interviews with: Chung Mong-Joo of Mindan in Tokyo, 8 December 1999; So Chung-on of Chōsen Sōren in Tokyo, 8 December 1999; Seki Hiroyoshi of the Yokohama OCA (Taiwan) in Yokohama, 28 May 1999; Wen Yao Quan of the Yokohama OCA (PRC) in Yokohama, 31 May 1999. Also see Mindan, ed., Kankoku mindan 50 nen no ayumi [The 50 Year Path of Mindan] (Tokyo: Gosatsu Shobō, 1997); Chōsen Sōren, Chōsen sōren (Tokyo: Chōsen Sōren, 2005); Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in Japan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
\item \footnote{16} Personal interview with an official of the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau in Tokyo, 8 January 1999.
\item \footnote{17} Public opinion towards Chinese has also worsened, as there has been a dramatic escalation in recent years in news of serious crimes committed by Chinese newcomers. In addition, there also exists significant media complicity in police efforts to vilify foreign workers, portraying them as a threat to law-abiding Japanese citizens, an image that resonates with the Japanese public. Illegal foreigners, in particular, are increasingly portrayed as “criminals.” See Apichai W. Shipper, “Criminals or Victims? The Politics of Illegal Foreigners in Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 32:1 (summer 2005), pp. 299-327.
\item \footnote{18} Personal interview with So Chung-on of Chōsen Sōren in Tokyo, 15 March 2006.
\end{itemize}
Support Groups for Overstayed Foreigners

Foreigner support groups also include a number of small NGOs established in recent years to assist overstayed foreigners. Japanese citizens themselves have formed these associations, which provide a range of medical and legal services, and work to increase public awareness of the harsh conditions faced by overstayed foreigners. These issue-oriented groups advocate for foreign migrants’ rights and welfare and against international trafficking in persons. Overstayed foreigners seeking assistance with any number of problems, such as forced captivity, compensation for work injury, unpaid wages, unfair dismissal, domestic violence, and access to affordable medical treatment, are often led to particular Japanese activists, due to their reputation for helping underprivileged people in the society. There are six categories of support groups for overstayed foreigners.

Christian NGOs

Although Christians comprise only about one percent of Japan’s population, it was Christian organizations that first opened their doors to overstayed foreigners in distress during the early 1980s. On 13 April 1982, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan (CBCJ) received a desperate call for help from a bishop in the Philippines to assist Filipina entertainers who had been forced into prostitution in Japan. One year later, the CBCJ established the “Society in Solidarity with Foreigners in Japan,” to provide various services to foreigners. Since then, ten other Christian NGOs have emerged to help overstayed foreigners in Tokyo and Kanagawa. Typically, they help foreigners with problems related to working conditions, such as unpaid salaries and occupational injuries and also deal with family difficulties and marriage problems. Some groups also provide prison visits to foreign inmates. Each of these organizations was created as a branch of a certain Christian church or diocese under a religious corporation (shūkyō hōjin), and many provide church services. Most do not have a membership system,


20 Interestingly, established legal foreigners generally do not come to the assistance of their co-national and co-ethnic residents; because acceptance into Japanese society is difficult for outsiders, legal foreigners tend to distance themselves from their illegal counterparts, securing their own position rather than coming to the aid of those who share their language and culture, but whose legal status in Japan is far less secure.

as their staff and volunteers are generally church people. Accordingly, Christian groups receive most of their funding from their church.

The Christian influence on foreigners and their support groups is tremendous. Christian organizations support foreigners for two reasons. First, foreigners from Brazil, Peru, Korea and the Philippines are mostly Christians. In 2000, the CBCJ estimated that 407,000 foreigners, or 91 percent of the total believers in Japan, were Catholics. Another 300,000 or so Koreans are Protestants. Second, Christians help foreigners, because they hold an ethical view that all people are equal as children of God. According to the CBCJ, “immigrants are brothers and sisters in Christ. This means that we do not merely welcome them, but strive to build up a community that respects differences.”

**Community Workers’ Unions**

The second and most confrontational type of support group is community workers’ unions. Of these, only about one-third have been particularly active in assisting overstayed foreign workers, as many unions have made agreements with others nearby to divide up activities according to their respective strengths. On 28 June 1997, for example, the Yokohama Workers’ Union, the Kanagawa City Union and the Women Union-Kanagawa established a regional network called the Conference of Kanagawa Unions. According to the conference agreement, each union is to direct new members to the union that specializes in a specific field of labour disputes. In particular, foreign workers are directed to the Kanagawa City Union, women workers to the Women Union-Kanagawa, and Japanese part-time workers to the Yokohama Workers’ Union. The Fureai Koto Union, the Sumida Union and the Edogawa Union established a similar pact, creating the Shitamachi Union on 15 September, 1998. The Fureai Koto Union, 90 percent of whose members were foreign workers in 1998, concentrated on labour disputes involving foreign workers. Membership in these groups ranges from 33 to 6,000 workers, and the membership fees provide all their operational funds.

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22 Personal interview with Akimoto Haruo of the Nagano’s Society in Solidarity with Foreigners in Japan in Atami, 27 June 1998.
26 Personal interview with Yoshida Yukio of the Yokohama Workers’ Union in Yokohama, 30 September 1998.
Although enterprise unions are prominent in Japan, not every worker can belong to one of these unions.28 Many enterprise unions do not allow part-time workers to join. Furthermore, small companies often do not have unions. Hence, part-time workers and workers at small business organizations turn to community workers’ unions, that is, “a union where anyone, even a single individual, can join at any time.” Because these organizations are open to anyone, foreign workers benefit from this institutional arrangement. To mark their distinction from the mainstream workers’ unions, most community workers’ unions use the English word “union” (yunion) in their names rather than the traditional “rōdō kumiai.”

Community workers’ unions provide labour consultation and dispute resolution. Foreign workers come to them to seek dispute settlement, mainly over non-payment of wages, unjust dismissal or compensation for work injuries. Once their disputes are resolved, they typically leave the unions. In other words, foreign workers in Japan join these labour unions not for the purpose of strengthening worker solidarity and the labour movement; instead, they join because they are seeking resolution to specific labour disputes with employers.29

Women’s Support Groups

Women’s support groups make up the third type of support group for foreigners. They include the Women’s Shelter HELP, the Group Akakabu, the Kanagawa Women’s Space “Mizula,” the Women’s Shelter “Saalaa,” and Kalakasan, among others. Many of these names are fabulously creative and entertaining. For example, saalaa is a Thai word for “resting place,” while kalakasan is Tagalog for “strong.” Mizula is taken from the English word, Ms., and adds the Japanese plural “la” to it. HELP actually stands for the “House in Emergency of Love and Peace” and carries a clear message that “help” is provided at this organization. Akakabu means the “red turnip” in Japanese. These organizations offer temporary shelters and provide legal advice and women’s advocacy primarily to Filipina and Thai women.

Women’s shelters were set up to provide assistance to women who have been abused, and need temporary shelter. For many abused foreign women, these shelters offer a compassionate alternative to government-run facilities, providing both help and confidentiality. Many Thai and Filipina women hear of them through their embassies, which have contact with these shelters.


29 In Taiwan, by contrast, the Taiwan International Workers’ Association (TIWA) has embraced foreign workers who appear to be revitalizing the labour movement there. See Marie Feliciano, “Taiwan labor movement supports Thai workers’ collective ‘uprising,’ migrant advocacy group says,” Taiwan Times, 28 August 2005, pp. 9-10.
These shelters also have rescue teams to help foreign prostitutes escape from forced captivity. Members of foreign women’s support groups also accompany foreign women to the police station to make sure that male officers do not ask intrusive and embarrassing questions that are not connected to the case.

Japanese women assist foreign women for two reasons. First, many of these groups have a Christian influence and thus hold Christian values on fidelity. They hope to sway other Japanese people’s views on prostitution by pointing to various abuses that foreign women face due to their disadvantaged positions. Second, they believe in gender equality and women’s rights that transcend national boundaries. Membership in these groups ranges from 12 to 2,500 people. They acquire the necessary funds from membership fees, church donations and subsidies from local governments.

**Medical NGOs**

Medical service providers, including the Occupational Safety and Health Centers (OSHC), account for 19 organizations, the most numerous among support groups. Several medical doctors, such as Dr. Temmyō Yoshiomi of the Minatomachi Foreign Migrant Workers’ Mutual Aid Scheme for Health (MF-MASH) and Dr. Hirano Toshio of the Kameido Himawari Clinic, both of whom are affiliated with their local OSHC, often treat patients who suffer from industrial illness and job injuries, many of whom are overstayed foreigners working in dangerous jobs. These doctors have mobilized their medical friends and members of these OSHC to support overstayed foreigners. Medical NGOs provide medical treatment and insurance schemes, assist with medical translation and make accident claims for foreigners. Their membership ranges from 650 to 6,000 people.

Medical doctors assist overstayed foreigners because they believe that medical care should be available to all, particularly to those at a higher risk of getting ill and with no means to pay for medical treatment. They have found that certain foreigners cannot receive appropriate medical treatment due to language barriers, while others are rejected by medical centres due to their illegal status. Hospitals and clinics turn away overstayed foreigners for fear that these foreign patients will not be able to pay their medical fees, since they are not covered by the NHI. Because access to the social insurance

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30 Personal interview with Ōshima Chizuko of HELP in Tokyo, 2 December 1998.
32 The NHI programme is a medical insurance system to cover local residents or self-employed persons who are not subscribers to any type of employee insurance. It is run by local governments and financed by the insurants’ premiums and National Treasury disbursements. Under this programme, the insured pay 30 percent of the medical expenses. The medical institution then receives the remainder of the fee out of the funds of the insurance system. In 1992, the Ministry of Health and
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and NHI system is closed to most migrant workers who have overstayed their visas, some private medical institutions and NGOs have been established to provide medical treatment to those who are not covered by the national insurance system. The MF-MASH, for example, has established a mutual aid scheme where members, by paying a monthly fee of 2,000 yen, become entitled to receive medical treatment for only 30 percent of the usual cost (the same reduction that is given to people who are members of the NHI programme).

**Lawyers’ NGOs**

The fifth type of support group is the lawyers’ association NGOs. Since all lawyers are required to be members of a local bar association in order to practice, most organizations providing legal services are subgroups of regional lawyers’ associations (bengoshikai), which provide some funding for their activities. The Lawyers’ Association for Foreign Laborers Rights (LAFLR), the Lawyers’ Association for Foreign Criminal Cases (LAFOCC) and the Immigration Review Task Force, which were founded by Onitsuka Tadonori, are the only exceptions. For a small fee, these NGOs provide any foreigner with legal consultation and dispute settlement on issues relating to labour, marriage/divorce and immigration. Membership in these groups ranges from 19 to 540 people.

The lawyers’ associations help overstayed foreigners because they feel that this clientele is subject to injustices, particularly those caused by Japanese government policies. Overstayed foreign suspects typically do not receive legal counsel, because they lack the financial resources and personal connections to arrange it. Public defenders reject cases involving overstayed foreign suspects, because they are troublesome, involve difficulties of language (interpretation), and offer little financial reward. If foreigners are arrested, the institutional regulations of the Japanese legal system are often not explained to them comprehensively. Furthermore, the authorities are known to have verbally (and, at times, physically) abused foreign suspects even in cases of petty infringements; the assisting lawyer can object to such unjust practices.

These lawyers also help overstayed foreigners due to their traditional opposition to the central government as members of a zaibatsu or an institution that exists apart from authority. Hence, they challenge the...
authorities. Besides handling cases in which foreigners are dealing with labour disputes, illegal confinement and violent acts, they also push for changes in the culture of authority, including better treatment of suspects being held in detention centres, prisons and immigration offices, and the professionalization of translators in legal cases involving foreigners who speak Japanese poorly.

Concerned Citizens’ Groups

The sixth type of support group is the highly ideological concerned citizens’ group. These organizations provide lifestyle and labour consultations as well as dispute settlements, primarily to South Asians and Iranians. Many evolved out of Christian groups. Concerned citizens were quick to follow Christian NGOs in establishing support groups to help foreigners during the late 1980s. Many NGO members look to both the Kalabaw-no-kai and the Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS) as the fathers of support groups for overstayed foreigners because both were formed in 1987 when few such NGOs existed. These groups have 40 to 1,700 members, on whom they rely for membership fees. Some of these groups also receive additional funds from local governments.

Concerned citizens assist overstayed foreigners because of their belief in racial equality and civil rights. Many groups help not only foreigners but also the Burakumin, the elderly, the handicapped and the homeless people. Hence, these groups are civil rights activist organizations that are seeking legal rights and protection for marginalized people.

In general, the staff and volunteers of these support groups are united by a common ideology of social equality in one form or other. Such equality includes civil/racial equality, class equality and gender equality. In terms of ethnic background, Filipinos, Koreans and nikkeijin tend to go to Christian NGOs, while South Asians and Iranians, who usually suffer from labour-related problems, turn to community workers’ unions and concerned citizens’ groups. Filipina and Thai women generally seek help and shelter from women’s support groups. Consequently, some of these organizations have developed a specialization in helping certain ethnic groups. For instance, the FLU, the Koto Fureai Union and the Hachioji Union serve mostly Bangladeshis and Iranians. The Zentōitsu Workers’ Union concentrates on Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian workers. The Kanagawa City Union specializes in overstayed Korean and increasingly Peruvian workers. Concerned citizens’ groups, such as the Kalabaw-no-kai, the APFS and the OC-Net, help Bangladeshis (and Pakistanis). Before its dissolution, Inoken specifically concentrated on Iranians. Volunteers at Saalaa have become experts on Thai women. The Yokohama Bar Association—Sub-committee on Human Rights for Foreigners has developed a particular understanding of problems faced by illegal Chinese workers.
Christians were the pioneers in establishing support groups to help foreign migrant workers in 1983. By 1987 there were three Christian groups, whose assistance had extended to various ethnic groups. As mentioned above, several concerned citizens NGOs subsequently evolved out of Christian groups. At the end of the 1980s, as foreign men entered the construction industry and small manufacturing, some labour unions and lawyers’ NGOs joined the struggle. After the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control Law and the oral directive to exclude overstayed foreigners from the NHI programme, numerous medical clinics and the OSHC began forming support groups to help overstayed foreigners. By the end of 1992, there were 57 support groups in Tokyo and Kanagawa alone. Since 1998, only four new groups have been created.

**Foreigners’ Support Groups after the Passage of the NPO Law**

The NPO law did not affect most small foreigner support groups. It made the largest impact on groups that work closely with local governments in providing social welfare services such as medical NGOs and women’s support groups. As the country faces a welfare crisis and international criticism for its lack of legal protection for women, local government officials feel the need to promote secondary associations in medical and women’s issues. As a result, four medical NGOs—the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA), the Services for the Health in Asia & Africa Regions (SHARE), the Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Resource Center (TOSHC) and the Multi-language Information Center Kanagawa (MIC Kanagawa)—and two women’s groups (Mizula and Saalaa) have acquired NPO status. Understandably, those organizations that already had been incorporated under religious corporations, labour unions, medical corporations, lawyer associations, foundations or social welfare corporations would have no reason to apply for NPO status. None of the ideologically concerned citizens’ groups, which are not incorporated in any form, have applied for NPO incorporation. They prefer to pressure the central government directly on policies concerning immigration control, such as membership rules and state responsibilities for the welfare of foreigners. In fact, most do not intend to apply, because they fear that incorporation will obligate them to disclose information to local authorities, who also supervise the overall activities of

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35 This pattern of Christian early involvement in assisting illegal foreigners is remarkably similar to that of South Korea, where more than half of its support groups are Christian. See Timothy C. Lim, “Racing From the Bottom in South Korea?” Asian Survey 43:3 (May/June 2003), pp. 423-442.

36 The 1990 revision of the Immigration Control Law demarcated the legal from the illegal unskilled foreign workers, thus allowing state officials to discriminate against illegal foreigners. The 1990 oral directive from the Ministry of Health and Welfare discontinued public-subsidized medical services to illegal foreigners, and excludes illegal foreigners from the Livelihood Protection Law.
their organizations. Indeed, while institutional capture may have benefits in terms of improved access and be worth the cost of diminished independence, most of these groups find this trade-off unacceptable.

With the exception of the TOSHC, all foreigner support groups with NPO status perform some services for local governments and are receiving financial support from them. Although local government officials choose NGOs for partnerships based on their activities/services, they prefer an NPO-incorporated group to a non-incorporated one. In contrast, they dislike big civic organizations because their large size makes them quite bureaucratic and slow to get things done. As a result, those groups that acquired NPO status have seen an increase in their operating funds, coming primarily from local governments. For Mizula and Saalaa, operating funds doubled from 21 and 18 million yen in 1996 to 50 and 36 million yen in 2002, respectively. Medical NPOs have also enjoyed more operating funds, but the increase has not been as dramatic as it has been for the foreign women’s groups. Moreover, the newly incorporated NPOs report that it has become easier for them to conduct their activities. For Saalaa, incorporation means that the group can obtain its own bank account instead of using an account of its representative. A TOSHC representative reports that his work in assessing the working environment of small corporations has become easier since incorporation. Before incorporation, small companies were suspicious of the TOSHC when its staff asked to assess the environmental conditions in their factories. Government officials, despite their awareness of the necessity for such monitoring of small companies, also showed reluctance to cooperate. All this has changed since incorporation. Consequently, the organizational activities of the groups with NPO status have increased significantly. Mizula, for example, now runs two additional women’s shelters in Yokohama and Yokosuka. The Yokohama government also outsources its consulting services for women during the weekends to Mizula. Interestingly, Mizula had received significant financial support from local governments and performed many public services before it was incorporated. In fact, it was Yokohama officials that asked Mizula to incorporate—perhaps to legitimize their decisions to outsource many public services to the group.

In contrast, some groups without NPO status, particularly concerned citizens groups such as the APFS and the Kalabaw-no-kai, have witnessed a

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38 TOSHC hopes to form partnerships with its local government soon.
39 Personal interview with officials of the Kanagawa Prefectural Government International Division in Yokohama, 4 August 2004.
40 Personal interview with Nikura Hisano of Saalaa in Yokohama, 20 July 2003.
41 Personal interview with Iida Katsuyasu of the TOSHC in Tokyo, 8 August 2004.
42 Personal interview with Kikutani Hideko of Mizula in Yokohama, 16 July 2004.
decline in their organizational activities and financial resources. For example, the number of illegal foreigners who come to the APFS has dramatically decreased during the past two years.\textsuperscript{43} However, this decline may have more to do with the recent decline in the number of illegal foreigners.\textsuperscript{44} Some groups, such as the LAFLR and the SOL, have dissolved due to financial duress and others, like the FLU, due to internal struggle within their organizations.\textsuperscript{45} Government action has not been a major factor in their dissolutions. As specific problems are resolved, the associated organizations tend to dissolve. This was the case, for instance, with the “Inoken,” which dissolved in 1998 after Iranians no longer gathered in Yoyogi Park. With a short-lived and narrowly focused organization, no entrenched bureaucracy has time to develop, and thus few interests become vested in the organization itself, as opposed to its specific task. Also, a short-lived organization avoids easy capture by existing political interests working through established institutions.

The increase in financial support and organizational activities for those groups with NPO status does not mean that they fare better than those without it. With an increase in public acceptance and financial resources usually comes greater responsibility. Both Mizula and SHARE report that their financial situations have actually worsened since incorporation. The expenditure on their growing activities and public services has increased tremendously. In addition, SHARE felt the need to improve salary and health insurance coverage to its staff after incorporation.\textsuperscript{46} Most surprisingly, membership remains relatively the same since incorporation despite the increase in the operating budget and greater ease in their organizational activities. Mizula explains that they are overwhelmed with work and now have less time for activities to raise publicity and membership. Another reason may be the fact that they are no longer dependent on members for fund raising and legitimacy.

\textbf{NGOs—Local Government Partnerships and Policy Impact}

The NPO law has deepened partnerships between certain NGOs and local governments, allowing the latter to accept more responsibilities and to provide more services without carrying a heavier financial burden. Many support groups cooperated with local governments even before 1998.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Personal interview with Yoshinari Katsuo of the APFS in Tokyo, 10 June 2003.
  \item Pesonal interview with Yoshinari Katsuo of the APFS in Tokyo, 10 June 2003.
  \item The number of illegal foreigners peaked in 1993 with 298,646 people, but steadily declined to approximately 200,000 people in 2005. Ironically, this decline is attributed, in part, to the success of the APFS in turning illegal foreigners into legal ones as will be discussed below.
  \item Personal interviews: with Pham Dinh Son of the SOL and the PACE in Kawasaki, 1 November 2005; Watanabe Midori of the LAFOCC in Tokyo, 16 June 2003.
  \item Personal interview with Sawada Takashi of SHARE in Tokyo, 31 July 2004.
  \item Until the election of Ishihara Shintarō as governor, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government sponsored multi-part seminars to enhance cooperation between its officials and NGO activists. In
\end{itemize}
Because local government officials must interact directly with foreign residents in their areas, they have come to recognize and appreciate the work and expertise that the NGOs can offer. As a local government official explains:

“NGOs provide more professional services to foreign workers than do government-run welfare centers. If these NGOs do not exist, local governments will have to do all the work, which means that many of the problems will not be resolved [for foreigners].”

In order to tap their expertise, local government officials invite Japanese activists to give talks in their offices, affiliated institutions and study groups. Some even join these groups themselves and participate in their activities. Two Saalaa volunteers, for example, are government officials. Officials of the Kanagawa government have also discovered the financial benefit of outsourcing their services and activities to Japanese NGOs. They recognize that the burdens on local institutions would be substantially greater without the work of NGOs. On the other side, activists may reap some benefits with respect to local government support simply by organizing toward clearly defined and longstanding goals. Consequently, the issues addressed by these institutions tend to be relatively durable, although these groups may not last long.

A landmark experiment that recognized the importance of NGOs and gave voice to illegal foreigners through Japanese activists was the establishment in Kanagawa prefecture of an NGO advisory council. In 1998, when it created the Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ Council, the Kanagawa government also introduced an NGO advisory group, the NGO Kanagawa International Cooperation Council. A Kanagawa government official reported that questions were raised about why Kawasaki’s Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents, established in 1994, included only foreigners, when members of Japanese NGOs were seen as their partners. Hence, Kanagawa officials saw the need to create an NGO advisory council alongside the Foreign Residents’ Council. The NGO advisory council consists of ten...
members from different NGOs, who are selected by a Committee of Specialists. For the first NGO advisory council, one of these ten members was Ariizumi Keiko of Mizula, and the subsequent council included Ueda Yoshitsugu of Kalabaw-no-kai.

The Kanagawa government established the NGO advisory council in order to elicit opinions from NGO members and reflect on them in making the prefecture’s international policy. The link between the 20-member Foreign Residents’ Council and the 10-member NGO advisory council marked the beginning of institutional experimentation by the Kanagawa government that calls for representation both from legal residents and from NGO members who support legal as well as illegal foreign residents. Such institutional experimentation gives “voice” to illegal foreigners through Japanese activists: an extremely innovative and progressive institutional arrangement of multicultural democracy in an advanced industrialized society. To be sure, the government generally cannot extend deliberative opportunities directly to illegal foreigners themselves (otherwise it will undermine its own membership rules), but it can improve democratic representation by incorporating these marginalized voices into the council through a member of a Japanese NGO. Therefore, an NGO advisory council that exists together with a foreigner advisory council like that in Kanagawa can improve fairness for the community of foreigners, by ensuring that the experiences of illegal foreigners do find voice, and receive consideration in a variety of public forums as contributors to the Japanese economy.

The NPO law allows the progressive but financially stricken Kanagawa government to improve medical translation services to all its foreign residents. In 2001, both the Foreign Residents’ Council and the NGO advisory council made an appeal to the governor for improved medical translation services to foreigners. The Kanagawa government responded by gathering a group of medical associations (Medical Doctor Association, Dentist Association and Pharmaceutical Association) and medical NGOs to deliberate with local government officials on the best way to provide medical translation services to all foreigners, with minimal financial burdens on the government. NGO leaders, led by Hayakawa Hiroshi of the MF-MASH and Sawada Takashi of SHARE, recommended the creation of a new NGO that would train volunteers for medical translation. These volunteers would then work with social welfare personnel from the local government and hospital social workers to provide medical translation and social welfare services to foreign patients.


51 Personal interview with officials of the Kanagawa Prefectural Government International Division in Yokohama, 4 August 2004.
52 Personal interview with Sawada Takashi of SHARE and MF-MASH in Tokyo, 31 July 2004.
As a result, the Multi-language Information Center Kanagawa (MIC Kanagawa) was established in 2002 with an NPO status. It has approximately 80 volunteers, who are dispatched to about 30 public hospitals. These volunteers receive routine training in medical terminology twice a year. They are sent only to specified hospitals that have legal contracts with the MIC Kanagawa and have social workers on site. Activists believe that social workers typically provide excellent follow-up services and deal not only with medical problems but also socio-economic problems that a patient may have. Since many foreign patients, especially overstayed foreigners, face medical problems that require extra social and/or economic assistance, officials at the MIC Kanagawa prefer to work with hospitals that have social workers.

Members of the MIC Kanagawa, government officials and hospital workers understand that this is an alternative to a professional medical translation service, but it is an economical and fool-proof system with NPO volunteers, hospital social workers and government officials from the social welfare division working closely together. It is a system that connects a network of resources, which allows the Kanagawa government to save lots of money, as volunteers at the MIC Kanagawa receive only 3,000 yen for their service—enough to cover their travel expenses. In essence, this partnership between NGOs and local governments allows local governments to accept more responsibilities and to provide more services without carrying a heavier financial burden.

However, NGO activists continue to struggle on getting overstayed foreigners covered under the NHI. In the early 2000s, a group of lawyers from Yokohama took the city of Yokohama to court in a case involving NHI coverage for Lee Gaku Zen, a Korean-born Taiwanese who had overstayed his visa. Mr. Lee wanted to apply for NHI coverage after he discovered that his child was suffering from a brain tumour and would require costly surgery. The Yokohama High Court ruled in January 2004 in Lee’s favour because 1) there was no specific, written policy regarding the coverage of the NHI for foreigners, 2) Lee could not obtain Taiwanese nationality, as he was born in Korea, 3) Lee had been maintaining a stable and productive way of life in Japan. Soon after the court decision, a network of immigrant rights NGOs in the Kanagawa prefecture sent a request to the mayor of Yokohama that

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54 NGO activists have proposed a Law on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that states, “All persons shall have the right to receive medical treatment ... [despite] undocumented residency. ... All persons shall have the right to participate in health insurance, welfare pension insurance, National Health Insurance, and the National Pension Plan free of Racial Discrimination.” Migrant Network News no. 59 (June 2003), pp. 3-4.
this decision be applied to other overstayed foreigners in the city.56 In June 2004, the mayor nullified the High Court’s decision by clarifying in writing the application of the NHI to foreigners who either: 1) have been in Japan for less than one year (and cannot provide a proof of intending to stay in the country for over one year), 2) have no residential visa or 3) have not registered with the local government.57

In addition, the NPO law further legitimizes certain groups, thereby elevating their policy expertise status. Policy makers are more likely to acknowledge policy expertise from groups with incorporation. Mizula, in particular, participated in a shingikai (consultative committee) of the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2000 and called for an increase in the number of shelters for victims of domestic violence and a bill to prevent domestic violence.58 In April, a Study Group of the Upper House invited Abe Hiroko of Mizula to a hearing on domestic violence counselling. Mizula and its representative, Fukuhara Keiko, participated in an important way in the drafting of the Domestic Violence Prevention Law, as they supplied the Diet with numerous survey reports on violence against spouses or partners.59 In sum, after incorporation, Mizula played an important role in the 2001 passage of the Domestic Violence Prevention Law.60

Meanwhile, a concerned citizens’ group without incorporation, the APFS, has achieved considerable success in redefining membership rules, which the central government typically monopolizes. In September 1999, it organized 21 overstayed foreigners to make a collective request for “special residence permission” at the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau. Traditionally, the “special residence permission” was granted only to those with Japanese spouses. The group sought assistance from Professor Komai Hiroshi, who then formed a committee to mobilize academics, both in Japan and beyond, to sign a petition for the Ministry of Justice in support of the APFS campaign. The academic group reasoned that these 21 overstayed foreigners have lived in Japan for ten years and their children were born and raised in Japan. Therefore, the group argued, these foreigners had sufficiently demonstrated that they had established their living bases and should be granted “special permission” to live permanently in Japan. Komai informed the Immigration Bureau that the refusal to grant “special permission” would draw extended criticism from both domestic and

60 The law, however, does not protect unmarried partners or overstayed foreign women.
international academic circles. He also threatened to file an administrative suit against the Ministry. As a result, the Ministry eventually granted special permission to these 21 overstayed foreigners. By doing so, the Ministry recognized the efforts of the APFS and its academic allies in redefining Japan’s membership rules.

The ministry’s decision was also reflected in the 2000 Basic Plan for Immigration Control, which requires authorities to treat overstayed foreigners with consideration to their ties with Japanese society. Since 2000, the Ministry of Justice has taken into account various factors such as the rights of children when reviewing “special permission” applicants who have “ties with Japan.” Between 2000 and 2004, the Ministry of Justice granted special permission to over 40,000 overstayed foreigners. The APFS hopes to push Japan’s membership rules further and is presently working on cases involving overstayed foreigners without any children.

Conclusion

In other Asian countries, civil society organizations grew rapidly only after the fall of their authoritarian governments. In Malaysia, ethnic differences have been documented to obstruct the operation of civil society and its ability to advance democracy. In the “matured” democracy of Japan, however, foreigners, especially overstayed foreigners, are promoting civic engagement and multicultural democracy. Japanese citizens are organizing support groups to help those unprotected foreigners in response to a recent influx of foreigners and a lack of government programmes to assist unskilled Asian workers. Yet Japan’s civil society appears small in comparison to other developed countries and to its Asian neighbours. But this should not lead us to prematurely conclude that these organizations lack influence.

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61 Personal interview with Yoshinari Katsuo of the APFS in Tokyo, 16 May 2001.
64 Personal interview with Yoshinari Katsuo of the APFS in Tokyo, 7 July 2004.
This paper demonstrates that it is these small, issue-oriented groups, rather than large, identity-reproducing ethnic associations, that increasingly are having an impact on policy and on advancing democracy for Japan. The APFS, with assistance from the epistemic communities, has successfully pressured the government to grant certain overstayed foreigners with “special residence permission,” while others have challenged the government to extend NHI to certain unqualified foreigners. Mizula also played a significant role in the 2001 passage of the Domestic Violence Prevention Law.

Although few foreigner support groups have acquired NPO status, the NPO law encourages incorporation among women’s support groups and medical NGOs, groups that provide social welfare services and whose agenda supports government interests. But rather than being a passive partner or co-opted by the state, these groups are pushing local governments to accept broader responsibilities in caring for their foreign residents. Increasingly, local governments in progressive areas are forging partnerships with these NGOs, as evidenced by Mizula and Kalabaw-no-kai in the Kanagawa NGO advisory council, and the MF-MASH and SHARE on the creation of the MIC Kanagawa. They seek institutional ideas and innovation from these NGOs and work closely with Japanese activists on implementation. Instead of the state moulding the civil society, civil society organizations are shaping the role of the state in actively redefining membership rules and the boundaries of state responsibilities to residents, as distinct from citizens.

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The Shadows of Kashmir
and Bombs in the Pakistan-India Conflict

Review Article


Kashmir once stood for Shangrila, renowned for valleys of sweet fruit and lovely ladies, wool from the hills for cashmere sweaters, decorous manners and floating palaces: this image was spread within India and far beyond through poetry, exquisite carpets, paintings, songs and tourist posters. But following a strange military confrontation at the moment of Partition in 1947, this image was crowded out by nasty struggles over the proper place of this small kingdom in either Pakistan or India, providing a convenient reason to boost military budgets, gather intelligence and conduct covert destabilization, while hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris moved out elsewhere, becoming refugees forced to carry their struggles to the back streets of distant cities. “Azad” Kashmir, the no less beautiful western part ruled by Pakistan since 1948, was massively damaged in the 2005 earthquake, and was probably the recent residence of Osama bin Laden. With its own president and Parliament, it became a quintessential puppet territory.
The inclusion of Kashmir in Pakistan and/or India was an open question in 1947. The unpopular Dogra kingship of Maharajah Hari Singh set the stage for organized opposition when he took the throne in 1925, so local opposition leaders were courted by Nehru (a Kashmiri, though from Allahabad) and the Congress, and by Jinnah and the Muslim League. In late 1947 both India and Pakistan maneuvered to control Kashmir. Pakistan brought in thousands of ill-equipped but tough Pathan tribesmen, who fought as mercenaries in India for generations. This was just when Pakistan claimed Afghanistan’s border districts, from which these fighters (lashkars) originated. Bad news spread about the Maharajah’s plans for Kashmir in India; he was so worried he called for Indian intervention and signed the accession of Kashmir to India on Prime Minister Nehru’s promise of Indian troops to quell an uprising. So it might also have gone the other way. When Pathan mujahedin fighters ended their war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan forty years later, they turned their attention to infighting with their cousins in Afghanistan, and also to Kashmir. Once again during the 1990s, as in 1947, hardened lashkars from the frontier, equipped again by Pakistan, stalked the hills and valleys of Indian Kashmir, while Indian soldiers likewise probed the other side of the border.

Though many scholars have thought hard about this enduring conflict, only since the nuclear tests in 1998 has the Pakistan-India conflict enjoyed serious status in the strategic analysis and academic publishing world. These books do an honest job in building on the work of those who went before them, including earlier writers without benefit of secret administrative files. The territorial, military and Cold War issues are very well treated, but we learn little here about the conflicts in either part of Kashmir and how millions of Kashmiris were affected since 1947 or 1974; this is due, in part, because these scholars study other things and in part because there are few, if any, Kashmiris among them. Moreover, it has hardly been an environment conducive to field research: as a senior Indian journalist stationed for years in Srinagar told me in 1994, “You can never really tell quite who is who.”

Given that there are 32 authors in these four books under review, generalization is called for. Two questions seem paramount: How has the gradual emergence of nuclear weapons in both countries influenced their conflict-making behaviour? And how can we better understand the conflict-making cultures of India and Pakistan?

**Conflict in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons**

Each of these four books addresses Ganguly and Hagerty’s central question in *Fearful Symmetry*: Why, despite predictions that war was inevitable, has there been no war between Pakistan and India during six crises since 1971? They note how close these countries have come to war, but conclude that the developing nuclear weapons programmes of both countries limited and
deterred them. Whether limits were seen in the weapons themselves, or in the uncertain means to deliver them (by fighter plane, bombers or missiles), there was a perception of symmetry of risk and, they conclude, “the mutual possession of nuclear weapons was a critical determinant in controlling escalation” (p.161). No author attributes this restraint to nuclear weapons alone: disagreement among them lies in the type of nuclear militarization found in each country, and then that militarization’s “strategic depth,” i.e., how long they could sustain a nuclear war.

Because so many peoples’ livelihoods are bound up in the regular declaration that this part of South Asia is one of the most dangerous places on earth, most of us have come to believe that statement, saying “the next nuclear war, if any, would probably occur here.” As a nuclear historian I am not yet persuaded, but accidents and miscalculations do occur and the risks are higher now than in the past. Some authors also point to the large size of conventional forces as a deterrence. But are the warring parties learning? Most authors’ answer is “not much”—only just enough to avoid a major war. Russell Leng in The India-Pakistan Conflict wisely addresses this “learning” question: “The two sides have been learning, but they have been predisposed by their realpolitik beliefs to draw only certain types of lessons from their behaviour. Each successive crisis raises the reputational stakes for both sides, and each success or failure is attributed to the state’s ability to demonstrate superior resolve. Coercive bargaining strategies and tactics have created a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p.125). So these two populations now fear two kinds of bombs—one that is large and unthinkable, and another that is smaller and kills by surprise in marketplaces and trains.

Though these writers are attuned to the nuances of US influence, the books were finished before there was a chance to include reference to the valuable work by Washington insider and negotiator Strobe Talbott. It is difficult to think of good metaphors for the Pakistan/United States/India relationship, but it is certainly most entangled: working within it means being constrained at every step. Talbott’s phrase in a December 1998 letter to his Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh captures an abiding quality of this relationship over the previous fifty years as the “management of mutual disappointment” (p. 140). US/Pakistan relations have been equally difficult. Yet while these books were being printed in 2005 the US announced the sale of F16 jets to Pakistan and gave promise of an even larger sale of jet aircraft to India. The secret communication behind these deals, when known, could differ but little from the variables in Talbott’s account of the 1994-2000 bargaining process between the three countries. Moreover, President Bush explained these big aircraft deals in terms of his plan to visit South Asia in 2006, and following the announcement by the US and Canada that nuclear cooperation would be resumed with India. These four books enable us to understand that process.
Conflict-making Cultures

These four books make clear that the conflict between India and Pakistan did not really require Kashmir; that is why in the introductory paragraph, I called it “a convenient reason.” The enduring rivalry between these neighbours would have found other means of expression had Kashmir been unavailable, but Pakistan’s challenge for Kashmir’s land, rivers and population and India’s anxiety about territorial integrity served both of them nicely from the start. Kashmir contained ethnic and political subdivisions that rendered it a confederation of interlocking political systems in which dominance had never lasted long. These authors clarify how Kashmir was a vexacious subject for state managers and a useful stimulant for ambitious generals on both sides. For other elites, its role is not so clear except as a focus of suspicion and self-fulfilling prophecy about the opponent. These books clearly demonstrate how all these players learned to tie the ropes of the Cold War around the Kashmir question and squeeze the big powers for as much as they could.

To understand conflict-making cultures one must study how power structures and social institutions invoke and respond to their publics, and how they play with/against the interests of foreign powers. What Prospect for Peace, Fearful Symmetry and India-Pakistan Conflict achieve well is a close analysis of party politics and their influence in Muslim life in both countries (and vice versa); identity politics began to dominate both situations, but differently. As Nasr puts it succinctly in India-Pakistan Conflict, “It was not identity that was driving the Pakistan-India rivalry, but the rivalry that was driving the identity” (p. 197). These three books make good comparisons of the ‘Jamaat-i’ political-sectarian organizations in both countries, showing how in India the Jamaat-i did not form a political party, did not form their own para-military organizations (as the Hindu parties like JS/BJP did), but did support the astonishing spread of the Tablighi movement, which originated in Lucknow. This is quite unlike the rise of sectarian political parties in Pakistan.

Devotion to Pirs and Maulanas linked Kashmiris with neighbouring Pathans/Pashtuns. On the plains north of Delhi long swept by competing armies, the Deoband Seminary began its training of clerics in the 1860s. These Lucknow and Deoband movements remained friendly to various strains of Sufi thought, and Afghan and Kashmiri pilgrims were permitted across borders to Rajasthan tombs like that of the Sufi saint Mohinuddin Chisti. The Pashtun had their own ulema families in the northwest frontier and each traced allegiance to various seminary traditions like Deoband, Barelvi and Nadwat. Pathan/Pashtun leadership in Pakistan’s madrasahs integrated a loose “Deobandi thought” with Pashtun nationalism, so Afghanistan and Kashmir refugees seized these opportunities for advancement. A new identity was made available. But there is an important difference, according to Vali Nasr in The India-Pakistan Conflict: “Deobandi
The Shadows of Kashmir and Bombs in the Pakistan-India Conflict

politics [in Pakistan] has been interested more in jihad than in legitimating Muslim communalism/separatism. Its interest in India is in the context of its vision of jihad and not because it subscribes to the communalist/separatist discourse of Muslim separatism” (p. 185).

But we need to know much more: how Kashmir’s history and populations were defined differently, how (and by whom) major decisions about Kashmir were made differently, how militaries were related to their publics and governments differently, how mass media (and films) depicted military culture and objectives differently, how this nearly all-male drama played out in women’s lives and movements, and so on. Curiously, with the exception of a few authors like Vali Nasr in The India-Pakistan Conflict and Christine Fair, Kartik Vaidyanathan, Barbara Metcalfe and Vali Nasr in Prospects for Peace, these books are almost silent on many of these questions, perhaps because conflict-making culture is seen as a “constructivist” idea, in the sense of Milliken’s work on the Korean War. There is no reference here at all to the role of elites (e.g., banking, finance, industry), other than strategic elites who intersect with foreign power leaders and state managers.

Of course, the Pakistani leadership enjoys more autonomy from public appraisal because, unlike India, it has been unconcerned about democracy for many of the decades since 1947. Fair and Vidyarthi (in Prospects) analyze three 2002 opinion surveys conducted in Pakistan by Gallup, the Herald newspaper in Karachi, and the US State Department, providing a glimpse of public opinion during the course of one year. But some of the authors write here as if strategic elites were playing chess in a vacuum, although we know the decisions were not made under any such conditions. There is a conflict-making culture that must be called into action. We are given much evidence here of the structure of military forces and deployment: some writers provide a useful comparison of the two military systems of Pakistan and India (e.g., Sathasivam). But it must be remembered that no army general (even a retired one) has ever been the president or prime minister of India (where even the civilian minister of defence was structurally disconnected from the chiefs of staff at HQ). In Pakistan, however, the situation has been quite different, as most ruling was done from the beginning by a nexus of Punjabi families with old land titles and military officers’ commissions.

Some writers remind us of the precarious situation of Indian governors of Kashmir or Pakistan’s governors of Azad Kashmir (called president following the 1970 reorganization). No political agency anywhere could have been more “supervised” from the top. But there is no treatment here of the benefits that Kashmiri populations might have obtained through the India/Pakistan conflict: in fact Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was surrounded in the 1970s by a recognized “Kashmiri Mafia,” a group of Brahmin men like PN Haksar, DP Dhar, and PN Dhar, who advised her before and after the 1971 war with Pakistan. She spoke of her strong sentimental connection to
Kashmir, and knew that her father was a causal factor in the 1947-48 affair. Was there any comparable Kashmiri influence at the top in Pakistan?

**Recklessness and Restraint**

What were the counterforces to conflict making? There is no doubt that steps were taken to limit the confrontations after the 1971 war. During the 1980s India built a 600-kilometre-long double fence (more than five times longer than the Berlin Wall and almost as long as the planned 644-kilometre Israel Wall), running from the Chenab River near Jammu to the edge of Rajasthan, some of it electrified, with searchlights on watch towers. This expensive wall made infiltration or exfiltration more difficult. Counter to the conflict-making culture yet “within” it was an emerging practice of military restraint. Since 1947-48—with three brief digressions in the Rann of Kutch (two weeks), oil installations near Karachi (three days), and the rice fields of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (two weeks)—the Kashmir-centred conflicts have actually been quite limited in spatial terms. Pakistan’s 1990 publication of a list of ideal Indian bombing targets included nuclear reactors, and Indian plans to advance in tank-formations on Lahore or bomb the nuclear site at Kahuta were threats. None were carried out—Who knows whether they were likely to have been? *Fearful Symmetry* author Devin Hagerty was told by a senior US official, referring to the 1990 crisis (after the fence was built), “there was a bit of recklessness in the air” (p. 97). But there was a notable limiting of these reckless confrontations: even the responsible co-management of the Indus Waters Treaty has survived, even though the Indus could easily have become a battleground.

*Fearful Symmetry* refers to instances of arranged restraint: first in the spring of 1965 when two air marshals agreed not to use air-war above the ground troops in the Rann of Kutch and second when, four months later, two air marshals agreed not to bomb civilian populations on either side on the Punjab border, where warfare was planned with hundreds of tanks. Third, in 1999 in Kargil, “the Pakistani politico-military leadership, no doubt cognizant of the risk of initiating a conflict with India that had the potential for escalation, chose to make an incursion in areas of no fundamental strategic or military value” (p.38). There may be other cases as well.

However, though they refer frequently to peace, none of the authors address the peace-building track-two type activities that have been going on since the 1990s (a period when the prime ministers of both countries came from the Punjab). Though hard lines were drawn to identify “patriots” on all sides and to cast doubt on doubters, because wartime mobilization was neither total nor prolonged, a mixture of coercion and volunteerism appeared. Even then there were counterforces, institutions and individuals in both countries favouring negotiation or conditional accommodation, to build peace. There is little mention of that here, nor of the offshore influences
brought to bear “at home” through the widely dispersed Pakistani and Indian diaspora communities.

The best source, then, to understand conflict-making culture and restraint among these titles is *Prospects for Peace*. Edited by scholars in finance (Dossani) and business and US government (Rowen), the book conveys an appreciation of the broader interests beyond the military/policy/aid game in these two countries. It puts the reader on the ground, so to speak. *Uneasy Neighbors* is a good introductory text for senior undergraduate students because it focuses clearly on unresolved US foreign policy issues, and why they are unresolved. *Fearful Symmetry* and *The India-Pakistan Conflict* are excellent cases for graduate and specialist study of nuclear deterrence and international relations theory because they debate their conceptual arguments clearly, and their treatment of US policy and practice is subtle. These two fine books merit very careful study by specialists. *Prospect for Peace* remains the richest source of the four for multi-disciplinary understanding of conflict in the subcontinent, and excellent for the informed reader: though the two latter books have multiple authors, their writers are disciplined and there is a minimum of duplication or repetition. One wishes this grim subject were not so important, but we see that eight small bombs skillfully placed with deadly consequences on Mumbai’s commuter trains in July 2006 were soon attributed, no matter how vaguely, to “Kashmir.”

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Resulting from sustained multinational scholarly collaboration, this volume has five major selling points. First, it focuses on the part of the world in which migration has not been studied systematically in comparative settings. Starting with a panoramic overview of demographics and migration in Northeast Asia (Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., Stephen Lam, Brian Ettkin and Glenn Guarin chapters), the book covers Chinese migration in the Russian Far East (Victor Larin and Elizabeth Wishnik); Russian (Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva), Chinese (Daojiong Zha) and Korean (Mika Mervio) migration in Japan; North Korean migration in China (Hazel Smith); and international migration issues in South Korea (Shin-wha Lee) and Mongolia (Tsedendamba Batbayar). The editors offer excellent chapter summaries and tease out some unifying themes in the introduction and conclusion. Second, five contributors are leading scholars residing in the Russian Far East, Korea, Japan, China and Mongolia. Third, all chapters use the best local statistical data and media reports, while chapters 2 through 6 and 9 report the findings from original interviews, surveys, and focused field observations. Fourth, each case study provides relevant granular detail about the demographic, political, socioeconomic, cultural and historic contexts of migration in the region (e.g., the airline service between Niigata and Xi’an was opened because the latter was home to the ibis birds once presented by the Chinese government to the Japanese emperor, p. 122). Fifth, the case studies and the summary chapters persistently examine the antecedents and the implications of immigration policy in each receiving state, with a valuable overview of emigration policies of the ROK and China.

Overall, the volume highlights the crucial challenge in the region: while economic globalization and demographic disparities shape powerful labour market demands for migration, governments in the region have failed to address the issue. They have not paid adequate attention to integration of migrants in their societies; they have overrated societal and cultural threats; and, so far, they have failed to build multilateral institutions to address the migration issue comprehensively. States and societies in the region have a long way to go to overcome what I found in my recent studies to be a widespread phenomenon in Russia, Europe and the United States: the immigration security dilemma, when excessive security concerns engender policies that, in turn,
make both host societies and migrant populations less secure. Wishnik’s chapter adds an important economic dimension to this line of analysis.

The volume is not without shortcomings. First, the promised first step toward “a new analytical paradigm” (p.1) was not taken. The key research questions are the “what” rather than the “why” questions (e.g., pp. 2, 48, 97). They do not offer non-trivial empirical or theoretical puzzles that would apply to a range of cases in a non-ad hoc fashion. Second, there is no chapter discussing the vast and applicable literature on immigration behaviour, attitudes and policy in social sciences. Third, most surveys reported in the book are based on small and unrepresentative samples, while sampling procedures and margins of error are not discussed. This makes much of the analysis (derived from findings on pp. 59-64, 75-86, 106-113, 153-160 and 228-232) suggestive at best, since any inference is indeterminate by design. Larin’s study is based on the most reliable and largest survey, although the author did not provide sampling information. But even that sample is too small to allow for meaningful comparison across different locations within a state—none of the surveys has enough cases to distinguish between the clustering effects due to location and individual difference effects on immigration attitudes. Finally, the editors should have encouraged the authors to update their factual data, most of which goes back to 1998-2002. Regardless, this is an important book and a valuable one for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in East Asian and immigration studies as well as for Asia specialists.

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MIKHAIL A. ALEXSEEV

In this book Richard Stubbs, a professor of political science at McMaster University, Canada, provides explanations for the success of the East and Southeast Asian “miracle” economies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand—the most dynamic and successful set of economies in the world. He argues that the key to the analysis of East and Southeast Asia’s economic success is war and the geopolitics of the region.

This book uses some of the core concepts from historical institutionalism, such as path dependency, which refers to a critical juncture or watershed in the life of a society. Path dependency may create a positive feedback to the society. According to this way of thinking, Stubbs points out three essential factors to the rapid and sustained growth of the seven “miracle” economies: the emergence of a “strong state,” successive war-induced waves of capital
and the availability of markets.

War is an important factor to Stubbs’s theories. Under the condition of widespread social dislocation after the Second World War, the “strong state” emerged, strengthened by the military threat posed by Asian communism. The Korean War alleviated severe capital shortages in the region. The massive economic boost from US spending on the Vietnam War generated positive feedback for the economic and political institutions in the Asian societies. Through Japan’s diffusion of foreign direct investment, aid and the partial opening up of its market, the country gradually became the main driving force behind rapid economic growth after the Vietnam War in the Asian “miracle” economies.

The disappearance of the Cold War resulted in both external American pressure to liberalize economic institutions and the internal lessening of the social unity of these societies. As economic liberalization undermined the old positive institutions, these economies became more vulnerable to an economic downturn. This policy mismatch created the economic crises of the late 1990s.

Stubbs’s analysis has several merits in explaining the reasons for the success of these economies. First of all, he argues that the series of wars in the region provided both the resources and the incentives for achieving rapid economic growth. The second merit of his analysis is the concept of positive feedback between social security and economic growth. Social stability and security helped to provide the basis for economic growth. In turn, economic growth encouraged greater social stability. Economic growth was not seen as an end in itself but rather as a means of building the state and increasing the security of the community. Thirdly, one of the most intuitive ideas is the assertion that in spite of the war-induced resources there was certainly no guarantee of success. Capital inflows by themselves did not guarantee economic prosperity. The state put the inflow of capital to productive use because the government was forced to establish national security through economic strength. The communist threat imposed a certain discipline on the governments to ensure they reduced economic corruption.

Although war and the geopolitics of the region are important factors in contributing to the success of these economies, they do not offer a complete explanation. Location could be another key factor, but it should not be overemphasized. As Stubbs points out in this book, the Philippines and Indonesia are counterexamples to his explanations.

Finally, as a Korean economist, I would like to refer to some points in dispute. Although Stubbs assumes the US pressed the South Korean government to push through land reform during the Korean War, Korean land reform started before the war. Furthermore, his argument that heavy and chemical industrialization proved to be a success is also controversial in Korea. Of course, these points do not impair his main thesis.

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Seokgon Cho
As someone who is quite intrigued by the inter- and cross-regional dynamics prevalent in East Asia, I was delighted to find that this book provides a solid empirical confirmation that inter-regionalism is on the rise in the world. In this collection of 19 chapters, the authors focus on the subject of inter-regionalism, defined as “a process of widening and deepening political, economic, and societal interactions between international regions” (p. 18). Given our very limited understanding of the phenomena, the authors’ compilation of these ongoing inter-regional arrangements into an extensive list (pp. 57-62) is in and of itself a valuable contribution, and it opens up avenues for new research. Furthermore, the book attempts to theorize this emerging phenomenon by laying out the editors’ expectations regarding both the forms and functions of those institutions (chapters 1 and 2). The editors contend that both regionalism and inter-regionalism under the “new wave” are quite complementary processes to globalism, and the systemic perspective is of utmost importance for the various functions of inter-regionalism, from balancing and bandwagoning and agenda setting, to collective identity building (pp. 300-310).

Does inter-regionalism matter? If so, how and why? These are the two central questions that tie all 15 geographically grouped empirical chapters (from chapter 4 through 18) together. When a collection has so many chapters on as many arrangements and institutions as does this one, the challenge of coherence and quality is immense. In this case specifically, the dilemma is that the more concrete details each chapter provides on certain inter-regional links, the more eclectic the institutions and thus each chapter in the collection appears. Hence, the readers are left to conclude that it is very difficult to decipher any common theoretical threads for respectively unique inter-regional entities from ASEM (chapter 7) to APEC (chapter 4) to EU-Latin America (chapters 10 and 11) or EU-Africa (chapters 12, 13 and 16). In addition, many of the empirical chapters emphasize distinctive issue areas, from security (chapter 8 on Atlantic Alliance) to politics (chapter 6 on Europe-ASEAN, and chapter 16 on Europe-ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific States]), to economics (chapter 4 on APEC and chapter 10 on EU-MERCOSUR [Mercado Común del Sur]), making it even more difficult to see much convergence or coherence in the theoretical discussion. Moreover, depending on the issue area and geographical setting, some chapters tend to focus more heavily on the link between the regions and the international system, while others are much more domestically and ideationally focused.

These challenges are typical of the coverage versus depth dilemma, and by defining and categorizing inter-regionalism as a mostly geographically
based phenomenon, the volume misses an opportunity to examine this undoubtedly intriguing trend in depth. The section with comparative inter-regionalism, and especially chapters that compare inter-regional institutions that have some systemic presence (e.g., chapter 14 comparison of APEC and ASEM) or a relatively long history (e.g., chapter 16 on ACP) provided the most fruitful analysis of the importance and effectiveness of inter-regionalism. Meanwhile, those chapters that focus on minor and very young inter-regional institutions seem to struggle with thin contents and provide limited analytical validity. In sum, I applaud the editors’ ambition in extending their reach into this uncharted territory with this very wide coverage, and I hope many complementary research projects striving for depth and a more systematic comparison of those inter-regional institutions will follow shortly.

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SAORI N. KATADA


How do we “know” what we think we know about the past? Why do disputes arise within and between countries over interpretations of history? How do different forms of representation shape the ways in which we understand “our” collective pasts and those of “others”? These questions, along with a host of others, have long served as launching points for academic reflections on the production, transmission and reception of history.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki, a prolific scholar of Japanese history, joins the growing ranks of scholars exploring these complex intersections of representation and history with The Past is Within Us. Composed of seven chapters, the book deals with the epistemological challenges latent in popular representations of the past in various media. She uses examples from Japan as her primary referents, but also discusses cases from other geographic areas. The first chapter, titled the “The Past is Not Dead,” is an introduction that lays out the issues and stakes, using the case of the recent domestic and international disputes over the approval of revisionist high-school history textbooks in Japan as its starting point. One chapter each is devoted to the following media of popular representations of the history: historical fiction, photography, films, comics and the Internet/multimedia. The seventh and final chapter, titled “Towards a Political Economy of Historical Truthfulness,” serves as the conclusion.

The book contains clear presentations of complex issues, such as the slippery issue of “truthfulness” vs. “falsehood” in photography. It also concisely presents the history of representations of modern history in Japanese manga,
and the recent controversies surrounding the popular revisionist comic-book writer, Kobayashi Yoshinori. Such overviews are very useful for readers not familiar with photographic studies or contemporary Japanese popular culture.

On occasion, Morris-Suzuki also contributes to specialized debates. For example, she has previously published in Japanese on the Japanese domestic textbook debates, and this is reflected in her discussion of the issue in the introduction. Morris-Suzuki’s interpretations go beyond simply introducing the subject to English-language readers in pointing out the limitations of the occasionally obsessive focus on empirical details by several scholars on both sides of the debate, and the dangers in the mobilization of what she calls “ersatz postmodernism” by some of the revisionists. Morris-Suzuki also smoothly segues from another critique of both sides—that the textbook debates do not speak to the larger context outside of the pages of textbooks and walls of classrooms—into the discussions of popular representations of history.

The points raised in the book are sensible. She argues that the past remains relevant in the globalized present; historical fiction mobilizes various techniques of narrative; photographs are not simply false or true; film representations of historical events are similarly contingent; revisionist comic books are simplistic and problematic; and the new multimedia generates new challenges for epistemology and history. Morris-Suzuki concludes that we should move away from nationally bounded histories and promote critical media awareness in all audiences.

While it is important to highlight the effects of various media in forming our historical “realities,” Morris-Suzuki’s analytical points concerning the epistemologies of reception would likely be very familiar to most researchers of literature, photography, film or media studies. In fact, they might note the absence of several highly relevant touchstone works on literary studies, photography and film from the pages of the book. Furthermore, the author’s clarion call for histories that move beyond national boundaries and critical engagement with mediated realities are by now staples in numerous books and articles on historiography and media studies. There is also a minor problem that some sources cited in the text do not appear in the bibliography or have the wrong publication year.

While the book does not challenge the existing boundaries of related disciplines, it is a concise and lucid take on the effects of media representations in popular understandings of history. Morris-Suzuki’s book should prove to be an extremely useful introduction for those interested in exploring the epistemological implications of historical knowledge.

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HYUNG GULYNN
For centuries, people who call themselves Akha (Hani in China) have practiced shifting cultivation in the mountainous region that now links China, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Border Landscapes examines their inclusion within the national borders and state imaginaries of China and Thailand in the twentieth century. The book focuses on Akha access to resources and land use as mediated by two processes: their location on the China/Thailand border and their incorporation within modernizing nation-states. In this comparative, interdisciplinary study based on extensive fieldwork as well as historical sources, Sturgeon examines the different trajectories of landscape change and land use among communities in contrasting political contexts. Processes of state formation, construction of ethnic identity and regional security concerns have contributed to very different outcomes for the Akha people and their agriculture and forests in China and Thailand, with Chinese Akha functioning as heavily incorporated citizens and grain producers, and Akha in Thailand being viewed as “non-Thai” forest destroyers.

This book brings together important factors relevant to contemporary China and Thailand: trajectories of state/local politics, ethnic minorities and ecological change. After a short introduction, the first chapter of the text provides an extensive and excellent review of anthropological and political ecology literature on the processes of the production of marginal peoples and landscapes, state and local visions of productivity and property rights, not only in China and Thailand, but also of relevant academic literature in general. In the following chapters, Sturgeon examines three major processes that combine to produce the “Border Landscapes”: the political production of marginal peoples and geographies, the production of national borders and resource control, and the encounter between the state and local Akha visions of the landscape under differing political regimes. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss in detail how resource access and control, on one hand by local border chiefs, and on the other by various forms of the state over time, combine throughout the twentieth century to create a complex web of distinct, negotiated tenure practices among the Akha, much to the advantage of Akha village heads and the state, and to the disadvantage and marginalization of other Akha.

Perhaps the most important and interesting elements of this book are in the final two chapters. Sturgeon examines how “landscape plasticity” (localized and flexible visions of land and resource use tied to long-range planning) enabled the Akha to live in complex environments, engage in trade and deal with early twentieth-century political regimes. “Modernizing states” in both China and Thailand then reduced the scope for flexible
landscapes, but did so differently. The imposition of state-allocated property rights and clearer, simpler landscapes clashed with more flexible and traditional production practices and landscapes of productivity and rule, typified by state-led organization intersected with landscape plasticity, with the protagonists on unequal terms. Sturgeon demonstrates that this more general historical negotiation between locals and state not only played out differently in China and Thailand, but the “negotiating room” based on state ideology and policies for minority populations also differed greatly for the Akha. While landscape plasticity has allowed Chinese Akha to engage both proactively and defensively, and respond productively to new policies, enterprises and markets in China over time, greater inflexibility of state policies toward the Akha minority and the exploitation of local resources have disadvantaged Akha and largely destroyed their forests.

Much attention has been paid to China’s environment, minority cultures and borders in recent years. Drawing on current anthropological debates on the state in Southeast Asia and on the rich and growing literature of debates on property theory, the state and minorities and political ecology, Sturgeon admirably demonstrates how local people live with the reality of continually negotiated political, social and ecological boundaries between China and Thailand. I certainly recommend this text as a scholarly, interesting and timely treatment of an important issue, the ever-changing and local nature of political and environmental transformation of a minority culture not just in a single political setting, but on the boundaries of multi-state formation and resource control.

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For the past several years, the scholarship of Manchuria (Northeast China) has gone through a gradual yet radical transformation. Understanding Manchuria as a place where global forces have crisscrossed since the seventeenth century, the scholars of China, Japan, Korea and Europe have challenged the hitherto dominant image of Manchuria as a region of warlords, eventually victimized by the Japanese imperial power. Through the interdisciplinary approach of history, anthropology, political science and literature, they also have presented the novel understanding of such foundational concepts as nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, modernity and transnationalism. In this respect, what Park calls the conventional scholarship of Manchuria, which is based on “a dichotomous notion of
national and colonial politics” (p. 67), has already been challenged. Nevertheless, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, particularly its historiography, adds far more richness and complexity to the scholarship of Manchuria and, more widely, to the scholarship of East Asia.

Park ingeniously organizes the book around an old Asian saying: bedfellows sleep in the same bed but have different dreams. The bed represents global capitalism based in Kando (Jiandao) in Manchuria from the late nineteenth century to 1931 (chapters 1 through 3) and from 1932 to 1945 (chapters 4 through 6). The area, today called the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, had attracted more than 600,000 Korean immigrants by 1930 (p. 44). The bedfellows are those who embody colonialism and nationalism. In chapter 1, they are the Japanese power holders and the Korean peasants. In chapter 2, they are Zhang Zuolin, the Chinese merchants and Japan. In chapter 3, the Kando administration (China), Korean peasants and Japan share the bed. In chapters 4 and 5, the Chinese peasants, Korean peasants and Manchukuo (Japan) share the same bed of global capitalism. Finally, in chapter 6, they are the Chinese, Korean and international (Soviet) communists, as well as Japan. Contending that capitalism was the primary determinant of social relations in Manchuria in the age of empire, Park, through the detailed analysis of the complicated relationships among these bedfellows, explains that, although they all wished for the capitalist development of Kando, they did so for different reasons. In other words, depending on who they were, their dreams contributed to the formation of distinct nations—Korea, China, Manchuria (the threeNortheastern provinces), Manchukuo, Japan or North Korea. *Two Dreams in One Bed* thus places Manchuria at the centre of a regional history of East Asia, which ultimately explains the origins of North Korea in the Cold War era.

Although the strength of the book is undeniable, Park’s language in the theoretical section (preface and introduction) tends to discourage the reader from persevering through to the book’s end. In addition, it is not only her language that is the problem: her discussion does not do much to help the reader understand the main thesis of the book. That is to say, to understand the dreams of these bedfellows, we “require an investigation of the specific historical configurations” that emerge in the interactions among nationalism, colonialism and capitalism (p. 8). This is, indeed, what Park has accomplished in the book. However, in the introduction, Park “defines” the foundational categories, such as “the social,” through other foundational categories, making her argument extremely abstract and difficult to comprehend. She is right in arguing that post-colonial study has neglected capitalism, which, in her study, refers specifically to the privatization of land. While the rich historiography that she presents clearly rectifies this problem, her endeavour of redefining “the social” and other categories does not.

Nevertheless, *Two Dreams in One Bed* is an important contribution to the scholarship of both imperial and post-imperial East Asia, and promotes the
view of transnational and multiracial Manchuria that has been squarely based on global capitalism since the very beginning of the age of empire.

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MARIKO ASANO TAMANOI


As the first published comprehensive examination of China’s *hukou* (household registration) system, Fei-Ling Wang’s book has certainly made a significant contribution to helping us better understand China’s rapid economic development in general, and its social control and stratification in particular. It seems to me the most important characteristics of this book can be summarized as follows.

First, it provides a broad historical perspective. It traces the origin and evolution of China’s *hukou* system from imperial dynasties to modern times (chapter 2). However, regardless of terminological similarities and cultural connections, there are fundamental differences between the historical *hukou* system practiced in the pre-communist era and the contemporary version implemented under Mao and carried on since then. As Wang correctly points out, “The PRC version of the *hukou* system is the most comprehensive, rigid, and effective ever in its role and capacity of division and exclusion. It is hence a qualitatively unique sequel to the imperial and ROC *hukou* system” (p. 26). The uniqueness of the PRC *hukou* system has been jointly created by Mao’s communist fantasy, Stalinist state socialism, including its *propiska* internal migration control, and the traditional Chinese concept of *hukou* and *baojia*. The communist experiment conducted under Mao’s direction by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia might be considered to represent the extreme version of such totalitarian control. Unfortunately, however, we do not have enough data on how they dealt with institutional division and exclusion in the mid-1970s.

Second, in terms of comparative analysis, Wang’s book offers broad research on the residential registration systems found in Western and non-Western societies, drawing comparisons between Brazil, India and China, and revealing some commonalities and peculiarities (chapter 6) of each state in carrying on its system. Nevertheless, by putting China’s *hukou* system in a worldwide perspective, we have to remember one important difference: while the caste system in India is in decline and therefore becoming less enforceable in many places, and “Soviet and Russian *propiska*-based control of internal migration has become both illegitimate and ineffective, with tremendous revelation about politics and governance in Russia in general” (p. 151), by contrast, *hukou*-based institutional division and exclusion is still
alive and works well in the PRC. Thus, China’s *hukou* system represents the most important institutionalized exclusion and discrimination in today’s world.

Third, Wang offers an overall assessment and deep analysis on the impact of the PRC *hukou* system, both positive and negative (chapter 5). “By circumventing the Lewis Transition, China has so far achieved rapid economic growth and technological sophistication in a stable dual economy with relatively small and slow urbanization. Urban slums have so far remained insignificant in the PRC” (p. 148). Of course, the high cost of such seemingly plausible achievements has to be born by the majority of China’s population, the excluded, suffering rural residents.

Fourth, the last chapter forecasts the possible future of China’s *hukou* system and offers concluding speculations. Following two sections titled “The Words of Reform” (pp. 181-85) and “The Actions of Reform” (pp. 185-94), the book concludes with “An Early Assessment” (pp. 195-98) and the “Epilogue: The Trends and the Future” (pp. 198-203). It is true that “actions of hukou reform so far have been limited, controlled, and localized, primarily focused on image fixing” (p. 196). I also tend to believe that, under the one-party dictatorship, the hope for fundamental change or a complete abolition of the *hukou* system is very slim (p. 198). But it might be going too far to say that it is “likely to continue to 2040 or even the end of the twenty-first century” (quoting one leading sociologist) (p. 201), or to argue that “the PRC version of China’s *hukou* system is here to stay, even if the CCP is reduced and removed from the scene” (p. 202).

I don’t see the logic and rationality for the CCP’s removal from the scene without democratization in China. Common sense dictates that democracy involves the majority of the disadvantaged organizing into interest groups and fighting for social justice and equality, either peacefully or violently. This law is universally applicable, and China is no exception.

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TJ Cheng


This book is a product of a conference held at Harvard University right after the SARS epidemic in September 2003. With contributions from academics representing several fields, a journalist and a World Health Organization (WHO) officer, this book attempts to give a balanced view of the global calamity centred on China, and has largely succeeded. The book is composed of four parts: epidemiological and public health background, economic and political consequences, social and psychological consequences, and
globalization issues. Part one begins with a clear and concise description of the epidemiology of SARS (Megan Murray), followed by a month-to-month account of the global development of the epidemic from the WHO’s point of view (Alan Schnur). Readers are then briefed on the failure of China’s public health system since the country’s economic reforms of about 20 years ago (Joan Kaufman). Next, readers are given a captivating description in the first paper of part 2 (Tony Saich) of the series of political events in the spring of 2003 leading to the disgrace of the minister of Public Health and the mayor of the capital. With another journalistic account on the unravelling of the cover-up in Beijing (Erik Eckholm), the readers are able to grasp the profound political implications of the onset of the epidemic in China under the watchful eyes of foreign journalists and international organizations such as the WHO. On the other hand, the economic impact of the disaster is shown to be limited (Thomas G. Rawski).

Even though the first paper in the third part is titled “the psychological responses of the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong” (Dominic T.S. Lee and Yun Kwok Wing), it is still very much about the political consequences of the epidemic. The authors argue that the huge demonstration held in the ex-colony on July 1, 2003, calling for democracy, was very much a result of the popular dissatisfaction with the way the government handled the disaster. The second paper in this part (Hong Zhang) shows how people’s reaction to the unprecedented crisis—spreading jokes and black humour—revealed a rapidly changing society, with the rise of an affluent, urban class. The issues of stigma and globalization are treated by the last two papers forming the fourth part. The authors of the paper on stigmatization (Arthur Kleinman and Sing Lee), using mostly data from Hong Kong, make the insightful remark that “if there ever were an appropriate use of stigma in public health policy, SARS would be it” (p. 191). Indeed, global and local policies of quarantine and segregation during the height of the epidemic reinforced stigma not only on the patients, but also on their relatives, neighbours and colleagues. The world has yet to find an effective destigmatization method. The concluding paper on the consequences of SARS for globalization (James Watson) sensibly considers the epidemic a warning of the risks involved in an increasingly globalized society and economy, with parts of the world still emerging from a “premodern agricultural system” (p. 202).

On the whole this book is particularly interesting on two points: first, the political impact of SARS in China, as her rulers finally realized that they could no longer rule in absolute secrecy in an increasingly globalized ecosystem; and second, the persistence and use of stigmatization even in an open society such as Hong Kong, and by an international organization such as the WHO.

One may regret that Taiwan is not addressed in this volume, as the epidemic also produced interesting political consequences, both domestically and in relation to China. Similarly, if the brief historical account of epidemics
in China on p. 7 were fuller and more up-to-date, it would have provided a better departure point for scrutinizing the first global epidemic of the twenty-first century.

Institute of History and Philology Academia Sinica, Taiwan ANGELA KICHE LEUNG


This is a small book that uses seven life histories—six based on researchers’ interviews and observations and one autobiographic—to construct a panoramic view of China’s post-socialist transition. Although some writers linked their stories to theoretical issues in anthropology, such as Hairong Yan’s discussion of “the subaltern’s voice (or lack of it)” and its “representation” in chapter 1, and Tim Oakes’ analysis of “the re-creation of history” and “the cultural economy” in chapter 3, the main strength of the book lies in its use of personal narratives to gain a direct and intimate look at China’s positionality in the post-socialist world.

China abandoned its socialist modernity project almost 30 years ago, and has incrementally perfected its market economy through the current “Reform and Open” policy. This has produced substantial and tangible improvement in people’s material living conditions—the envy of most other post-socialist states. And yet, at least officially and nominally, China is still a socialist state, because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still has a monopoly on political power. Hence the issues of China’s post-socialist reform as a “contingent process” and the “schizophrenic transformation” that Ann Anagnost points out in the preface.

The split personality of the Chinese economic reform can be seen, on the one hand, in the tremendous opportunities for self-improvement and upward mobility that all seven protagonists in the book actively sought. There are, on the other hand, unforeseen pitfalls and setbacks that they invariably suffered when the CCP launched new programmes or changed existing regulations. One point I found particularly intriguing is that all seven protagonists had come from rural backgrounds. While two remained in the countryside to promote rural entrepreneurship (one for cultural tourism in Guizhou and the other one exporting lamb from Yunnan to Shenzhen), the other five succeeded in establishing themselves in China’s major cities (three in Beijing, and the other two in Wuhan, Hubei Province, and Dongying, Shandong Province). Given the rigidity of China’s division between the
“agriculture population” (nongye renkou) versus “non-agriculture population” (feinongye renkou) in the household registration system and the difficulties involved in obtaining official permissions to move from the former to the latter prior to 1980s, we must acknowledge that, in terms of social and geographic mobility, the current reform has indeed been beneficial to individuals who are willing to work hard, be creative, take risks, and be lucky.

The juxtaposition of a yet-to-be-perfected market and an interventionist CCP has created difficulties in defining China’s positionality in the idealized global dichotomy between the liberal democracies, which is characterized by free markets, and the centrally commanded economy of the socialist type. The question then becomes: What role(s) should the state (or the CCP) play in this market transformation? Should the state, through various anti-poverty programmes, be actively promoting some sort of social safety net, to ensure that all those disadvantaged would have some recourse? Or should the state penalize industrial polluters and implement reforestation programmes to ensure environmental sustainability? The bottom-line question is: Can we have both cakes (i.e., the socialist and the capitalist) and eat them too? It is in this context that Dorothy Solinger, the book’s editor, pointedly raises three precepts that will be of great interest to future researchers on China’s post-socialist transformation: the continuous mutual manipulation between the state and its individual citizens; the people’s nostalgia for a misremembered past; and their fabrication of past injustices to justify current illegitimate, if not unlawful, conduct. China’s post-socialist reform defies simple labels. For scholars who wish to learn more about the predicaments that China’s transformation has inflicted on individuals, this book will definitely allow for new and valuable insights into this tortuous process.

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HUANG SHU-MIN


In a globalized age, when film has become an increasingly transnational medium, film studies is confronted with the pressing challenge to critique and complicate the notion of “national cinema.” This new anthology takes an important step in that direction by redefining its object of study as “Chinese-Language Film” rather than “Chinese Cinema.” The new rubric allows critics to examine films from Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as the Chinese diaspora, without presupposing what the editors term “the isomorphism of geography, culture, nation, identity, and citizenship.”
Such a categorization also calls attention to the complexity, multiplicity and politically charged history of the Chinese language, with its plethora of regional dialects. Paying attention to the use of language in any given film sheds light on whether and how the film asserts, challenges, undermines or reinvents nationalist ideology. The shift in critical focus from “Chinese Cinema” to “Chinese-Language Film” also enables this anthology to approach film as a transnational medium through the exploration of postcolonial experiences, diasporic identities and transcultural spaces.

Edited volumes of this kind often suffer from thematic incoherence but the essays in this book integrate exceptionally well around three very coherent clusters of concerns: historiography, poetics and politics. Section 1, which focusses on new historical approaches, includes studies that argue for alternative origins (such as Mary Farquhar and Chris Berry’s examination of early opera films as a non-mimetic precursor to realist cinema; and Zhang Zhen’s recovery of early Shanghai cinema as the “historical preconscious” of Hong Kong martial arts films) as well as new periodizations (such as Meiling Wu’s naming of a “Postsadness” Taiwanese cinema; and Shuqin Cui’s study of unclassifiable independent Mainland Chinese films that do not fit into the “Generations” trajectory).

Section 2, which focusses on the poetics and styles of individual filmmakers, is bookended by two provocative propositions: David Bordwell’s formalist study suggests that international cinematic norms facilitate transcultural reception; while Sheldon Lu’s analysis of *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* demonstrates that an imaginary sense of “locality” may be invented through globalized means.

Section 3 focusses on the politics of postcoloniality and diaspora. Whether it is the dislocated colonial nostalgia of Taiwanese films that results in a new, multi-ethnic national imaginary (Darrell Davis) or the invention of “inauthentic locality” in postcolonial Hong Kong cinema (Stephen Yiu-wai Chu), or the postmodern perspective of a Singaporean filmmaker (Gina Marchetti), the critical focus of this section demonstrates precisely the kind of analyses that would not have been feasible within a national framework of cinema study.

The corollary of the book’s most innovative critical premises may ironically lead to the eventual collapse of its titular rubric. Many of the phenomena explored in the book, such as transnational co-productions, postcolonial conditions and diasporic experiences, are contributing to a vibrant trend of inter-Asian collaborations (which has historical precedents in projects like Kô Nakahira’s remake of his own Japanese films for Shaw Brothers in the 1960s). Emerging in the wake of this trend is a transcultural, hybrid-language cinema, such as the 1998 film *A Fighter’s Blues*, a multinational co-production starring Hong Kong, Thai and Japanese actors speaking in Cantonese, Thai, Japanese and English. Such films are both irreducible, yet remain intimately connected, to the rubric of “Chinese-
Language Film.” Ultimately, the most exciting project to come out of this study may well be the exploration of cinematic histories and trends that fall outside the book’s current purview.

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HELEN HOK-SZE LEUNG


The value of this little book does not strike the reader immediately. The early chapters cover details of the important “unequal treaties” between 1840 and 1911 that do not seem to break much new ground. The exception to this may be the 1902-1903 commercial treaties signed between China and Britain, US and Japan, which are less well known in the field. Other chapters discuss the attitudes of the KMT and the CCP towards the unequal treaties; the facts are unsurprising and represent materials not hard to come by.

In fact, the more significant contribution of the book has less to do with illuminating the unequal treaties or the narration of their history, as much as changing attitudes in China towards international law during the twentieth century. The unequal treaties provide the lens through which to view how Chinese political elites formulated their attitudes towards international law and questions of sovereignty, beginning with the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. The study of a small team of accomplished legal specialists put together by Yuan Shikai, including Lu Zhengxiang, Wellington Ku, W.W. Yen, Sao-ke Alfred Sze and C.T. Wang, among others, is one of the finest parts of this book. Their negotiations and argumentation at the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference and the League of Nations hearings on Manchukuo may not have yielded many tangible results, but they did achieve smaller goals (such as treaty revisions with individual powers) and laid the foundation for the understanding of international law as a positive instrument to regain China’s rightful position in the world.

The book might have been better served if this problematic—the institutionalization and deployment of, and attitudes towards, international law—had been foregrounded. As it is, the problem is taken up mainly in the last chapter and the discussion, although quite interesting, is insufficient. Wang refers in passing to the establishment of a language and education of international law that penetrates several dimensions of public life; this topic would have made a fascinating subject of inquiry. In the last chapters, Wang proposes that Chinese political elites displayed three attitudes towards the Unequal Treaties: 1) compliance, as exhibited in the concessions signed away by statesmen like Li Hongzhang; 2) the utilization of international law
by, for instance, the group of Republican legal practitioners mentioned above, to reduce or nullify the inequalities of the treaties, and 3) political and national mobilization under (KMT or CCP) Party leadership as the only means to liberate China from these humiliating treaties.

Wang concludes his discussion on an ambivalent and even confusing note. The second or legalist approach to international law is gaining ground in China, as scholars have been able to transcend the equal/unequal paradigm, particularly with respect to some of the later treaties, for instance the US-China Friendship treaty signed in 1946, which is seen as unfavourable to China, rather than unequal. Historians have also begun to revise their views of statesmen such as Li Hongzhang, who can no longer simply be dismissed as traitors who sold out the country. At the same time, Wang alerts us to the growing intensity of nationalist history and rhetoric, particularly that circulated in the new media by Party institutions. The latter would seem to suggest the prevalence of the third approach to the question of the Unequal Treaties and China’s status in the international order: the nationalist stance. The juxtaposing of these two postures invites—indeed, cries out for—in-depth research and analysis. We hope that in the future, Dong Wang will expand his scope to a larger study of the complex history and reception of international law in China.

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Prasenjit Duara


Professors Vogel and Levine are to be congratulated for organizing a well-executed translation of the most significant document on events surrounding the seminal Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, commonly regarded as the start of the post-Mao reforms that continue in China today. The document in question is a book published in 1998 on the twentieth anniversary of the plenum by an important participant in the events, Yu Guangyuan. Yu’s focus is on the 36-day work conference preceding the plenum, which was the true turning point, the plenum itself by and large simply ratifying the outcomes of the work conference.

Yu Guangyuan, a significant reform figure in the 1970s, 1980s and beyond, had important work ties to Deng Xiaoping, including a key role in drafting Deng’s closing speech to the work conference. But Yu was not a leader at the highest level, and as a result was often in the dark concerning leadership politics. Nevertheless, Yu remains an invaluable commentator.
on the conference since he was there, played a major role himself, took many notes, and is scrupulous about what he knows from notes and records as well as what he doesn’t know and can’t remember. After discussing pre-conference political events in 1976-78, of which he has limited direct knowledge, Yu presents a detailed, partly chronological and partly thematic, account of the work conference, followed by a brief review of the plenum, and reflections on subsequent and possible future reform developments.

There are two overarching views in the literature concerning the Third Plenum (and thus the work conference). These are captured in Vogel’s introduction: “... changes began when Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s preeminent leader and launched the era of reform and opening ...” (p. ix). In other words, first, reform and opening originated at the conference and plenum, and second, the political key was Deng’s attainment of leadership power at these meetings. Yu basically signs on to these broad perspectives, thus joining most reform intellectuals in accepting Deng-era orthodoxy on leadership conflict, despite their very imperfect understanding of politics at the highest level.

Yu has no doubts about the significance of the two meetings as a historic turning point. Overall, one can take little exception: major leadership change resulted with four Politburo beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution sidelined and replaced by pre-1966 veteran leaders, most notably Chen Yun; Deng’s pre-eminent position, while arguably not new, became apparent throughout the CCP; the focus of Party work shifted to economic development; and there was a clear break from Cultural Revolution ideology, with the “two whatevers” rejected and “practice as the sole criterion of truth” endorsed. But matters were more complicated. The reform programme has been overwhelmingly economic in nature, but its first stirrings came before the work conference, notably at the summer 1978 State Council forum, where Hua Guofeng and Li Xiannian—not Deng—were key figures. The economic reform results of the conference and plenum, as Yu emphasizes, were extremely limited, lacking “profound and systematic elaboration [regarding] the concept and necessity of reforms …” (p. 185). As for political and especially ideological reform (the area Yu credits as the conference/plenum’s main contribution), it took Deng only three months to rein in theoretical discussion by insisting on the “four cardinal principles.”

Deng’s role was also more complicated than Yu presents. While there is no doubt of his significance at the meetings, arguably the most problematical aspect of the book is the title provided by the editors: *Deng Xiaoping Shakes the World*. Yu’s account indicates a less central role for Deng than what this asserts, at least before the conference’s latter stages. Deng was overseas and not present for the meeting’s critical event—Chen Yun’s November 12 speech that changed its agenda to problems left over from the Cultural Revolution, precisely the issue that energized Yu and other participants to speak their minds and place pressure on the leadership in an unprecedented burst of
inner-Party democracy. Moreover, while Deng’s prominent role in shaping the leadership’s response to conference developments was evident from about November 25, it was two-edged. While pushing for “emancipating the mind,” Deng typically sought to limit radical innovations that would damage Party unity. This was nowhere more dramatically expressed than in his November 25 comment: “Chairman Mao’s name should not be mentioned [concerning errors as it] would be divisive. … [His] greatness cannot be overestimated and … his shortcomings are insignificant [in comparison]. … [It is wrong to say that, like Stalin], he had [only] 70 percent achievements …” (p. 77).

What then of Deng “emerging as China’s pre-eminent leader” at the end of 1978? Leaving aside evidence Yu was not privy to suggesting that Deng was already the most influential leader within the Politburo from virtually the time of his return to work in 1977, Yu’s discussion points to the crucial aspect of Deng’s status. Yu insightfully compares Deng’s emergence to Mao’s rise over the 1935-45 period, correctly indicating that Mao’s rise was more contested. For Deng, Yu uses florid language that nevertheless captures the essence of Deng’s basically uncontested rise: “The status [he] achieved was due to his own moral integrity, his ability, and the love that vast number[s] of cadres and people felt for him” (p. 152). In essence, Deng’s enormous prestige as a key political-military figure in the Chinese revolution, talented pre-Cultural Revolution national leader, and “close comrade-in-arms” of Mao led the Party as a whole to look to him for leadership, and forgive him for (or remain unaware of) “shortcomings,” often quite similar to those of Hua and others of less historic status.

Yu offers unique insights into a critical event largely ignored in the existing literature. His honest account provides unprecedented detail as well as a palpable sense of the dynamics of a seminal meeting, even as it is limited by his restricted knowledge of politics at the top. All serious students of recent Chinese political history will welcome this admirable contribution to the field’s understanding.

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Frederick C. Teiwes


Proceeding from the premise that the PRC’s “rise” has cast an obscurationalist shadow that induces analysts in the elite media, academics and governments “to overly reflect China’s war-prone and self-serving misunderstandings of Taiwan” (p. xxi–xxii), this volume chooses to cast light on the subject by up-ending received wisdom. Twelve crisp chapters, written by a roster of established authorities from Asia, Australia, Europe and the US, challenge
what Edward Friedman characterizes as Beijing’s presumptuous “narrative about Taiwan as an irresponsible provocateur” (p. xv), and proceed to expose the PRC’s truisms about Taiwan as false constructs.

Disputation, rather than discovery based on empirical research, is the common tone. Consequently, the book may best serve readers who already know something about Taiwan and the vicissitudes of the cross-Strait relationship. The authors, with varying degrees of subtlety, urge readers to think anew about the PRC’s claims about Taiwan, about Taiwan’s role in generating friction in international politics, and about the implications of accepting Beijing’s worldview.

The first section comprises two stand-alone chapters. Masahiro Wakabayashi offers an elegant essay about the formation of Taiwanese identity, emphasizing the “historical and geopolitical peripherity” of Taiwan. Hu Weixing considers why the closer economic ties that have evolved across the Strait have not, as Beijing had hoped, led to closer political affiliation between Taiwan and the Mainland.

The chapters in section 2 consider the consequences of Beijing’s campaign to isolate Taiwan. Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsia survey the multitudinous ways in which the PRC has endeavoured to “embargo” Taiwan, concluding that the PRC’s “policy of suffocating Taiwan” (p. 62) has backfired by fuelling both anti-Chinese sentiment and a quest for permanent independence. Dennis V. Hickey examines how Taiwan, cross-Strait relations, and global public health—notably in the developing world—are degraded as a result of Beijing’s drive to exclude Taiwan from the World Health Organization. J. Bruce Jacobs focuses on the competition for diplomatic recognition waged between Beijing and Taipei, examining how the balance has shifted from a condition in which fewer states recognized the PRC than the ROC, to one in which the ROC is now recognized by far fewer states than the PRC. Chen Jie demonstrates how Beijing, by dominating the PRC’s deliciously oxymoronic “official NGOs,” seeks to restrain involvement abroad by Taiwan’s NGOs, impelling some of them to collaborate in Taipei’s counter-balancing diplomatic efforts. Daniel Lynch explains Taiwan’s adaptation to the “network society,” leaving readers an impression that in an era of lowered or absent thresholds to social interconnectivity, the hegemonic nature of Beijing’s relationship with Taipei, to say nothing of the PRC’s reflexive authoritarianism at home, puts both sides of the Taiwan Strait at a severe disadvantage.

In the final section, Vincent Wei-cheng Wang asserts that Taiwan is a *sui generis* case in international law, because even though most states deny it formal diplomatic recognition, most also “do not consider Taiwan a territory or dependency under PRC control” (p. 165). He focuses on the implications for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, while T.Y. Wang comprehensively details Taiwan’s bid for UN membership and the ramifications of being frozen out. Jiann-fa Yan argues that because of Taiwan’s
geostrategic value, a resolution to the cross-Strait controversy—whether peaceful or violent—has repercussions for Sino-US relations and the global economy. Violence is the underlying theme of the book’s final—and, to this reviewer—finest chapters. Edward Friedman analyzes Beijing’s “war-prone chauvinism” (p. 218) and the dilemmas entailed in using force, and Pierre Cabestan concludes the volume with a summary of how “marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security.” In short, this hard-hitting, vigorously written volume succeeds in provoking questions about the international effects of blithely accepting Beijing’s framework for understanding Taiwan.

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Why did Japan support Chinese development even though this would lead to the creation of a formidable strategic competitor in East Asia? That is the question Tsukasa Takamine tackles in his book. Japan has been the leading donor of official development assistance (ODA) to China since 1979, when the country started to open up and accept such aid. ODA to China has been a controversial issue, subject to heated debate in Japan. This study, which is partly based on a Ph.D. thesis, examines in particular the actual policy objectives and the broader interests behind Japanese aid to China, together with the process of determining these objectives and interests.

The author uses a mixture of institutional analyses and a rational actor model. He agrees with scholars such as Alan Rix and Robert M. Orr that ODA is primarily an outcome of bargaining among domestic policy-making institutions with different interests, such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Takamine claims that the aims and objectives of Japanese aid have changed over time, depending on both external and domestic changes. In the 1980s, aid was used mainly to assist in stabilising Chinese economic and social affairs, as well as integrating the Chinese economy into the world market. More recently it has become a tool to counter the growing Chinese militarism.

The weight between the bureaucratic actors have shifted somewhat so that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has become the strongest player. Takamine adds another actor to the ones usually mentioned, namely the governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He claims that the LDP is the main bargaining partner of MOFA, and that the LDP is the key player on ODA policy to China since the middle of the 1990s. This has
implications for both the perception of what Japan’s political, economic and strategic interests are in relation to China, as well as how and what kind of ODA has been implemented. Aid sanction, to counter Chinese provocative military actions, is a result of this new power configuration. The implemented aid sanctions researched in this book, however, do not appear to be the forceful strategic tools they are intended to be, and their effect must also be considered as minimal.

The book gives a good and much-needed overview of the historical development of Japanese ODA to China, but suffers from a few flaws. The chapter on the effects of Japan’s aid policy lacks convincing arguments. That China has “proceeded in line with the policy objectives pursued by the Japanese government” is not proof enough to allow a conclusion such as “Japan’s ODA policy has successfully helped to guide China’s modernisation in a more stable, transparent and liberal direction” (p. 137).

The section on policymaking and the increased role of the LDP is somewhat short and the LDP is treated as a single unit, despite the author’s own acknowledgment that the LDP does not act like a unitary rational actor as regards Sino-Japanese issues. However, the reader is not provided with any hints on how the party is divided, or over which issues.

Finally, although Takamine points out that his book studies Japanese aid to China from a donor’s perspective, it would have nonetheless been informative to learn more about the Chinese response, as the recipient’s reaction surely affect the donor’s policy as well.

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Marie Söderberg


Reprogramming Japan is an engrossing study of why Japan has performed so poorly in almost all the information technology industries. Anchordoguy’s research question is how much “communitarian capitalism” shapes markets and economic success in the four major information technology industries: telecommunications, computer hardware and software and semiconductors. She defines communitarian capitalism as the combination of “an activist state and a number of private-sector organizations that manage markets to promote development and national autonomy in the context of the broader goals of social stability, predictability and order” (p. 6). She carefully reviews the history of each industry in Japan, and scrutinizes recent policy and private firm behaviour. Anchordoguy finds that in each industry there has been a significant shift toward more market-oriented practices than before, but at
the same she also finds vigorous cooperation between business and the state to continue to stabilize markets.

The case-study chapters are fast-paced and distill two decades of research into masterful overviews of industries that have experienced tremendous technological and organizational change. Anchordoguy argues that until the 1980s, communitarian capitalism successfully promoted the development of most information technology industries by reducing risk and avoiding wasteful duplication of investments. As long as Japan was simply trying to catch up with more advanced industries abroad, and as long as the trajectory of technological development was predictable, cooperation to funnel resources toward investments by large firms worked fairly well. But in industry after industry, Anchordoguy finds that the old formula no longer works.

In telecommunications, she finds that rigid expectations about how NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company) should contribute to society and maintain employment hamstring it and prevent it from competing successfully in the international market. In the area of computer hardware, Anchordoguy notes some important successes. State support for R&D enabled Japan to produce the fastest computer in the world in 2002. And Japan has managed better than any other country outside the US to produce an independent national computer industry. But she argues that these are meager results, considering the enormous investment Japan has poured into the industry. Japan imports far more computer hardware than it exports. Anchordoguy blames Japan’s preference for incremental change, rigid labour and capital relations, close ties between firms, and favouring of domestic technology for the failure to respond to radical global change in the computer industry. In the semiconductor industry, large government subsidies for research by big companies worked until the late 1980s, but they don’t any longer. Anchordoguy finds that the computer software industry was the one industry where communitarian capitalism has never produced success. With the exception of the dynamic game software industry, which was largely ignored by the state, the software industry has always been weighed down by privileges for large firms, an education system that taught conformity, and an approach based on closed standards that was out of step with the rest of the world.

In explaining Japan’s adherence to communitarian capitalism, Anchordoguy disagrees with analysts who blame a political system that favours entrenched interests. Instead, she argues that the root problem is strong social norms that dictate against market disruption. Her best evidence is a rich body of material from her own interviews with an impressive array of Japanese business and government officials. The real jewels of the book are the quotes from these interviews that reveal Japan’s continued moral ambivalence about competitive markets.

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MARK TILTON

This is the second translated volume of Shigeru Nakayama’s five-volume social history of the development of science and technology (S&T) in postwar Japan, and it picks up from the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by Japan and the United States in 1952. The editor’s introduction explores the formation by Japan’s government of both the Science and Technology Agency (STA) in 1956, and the Science and Technology Council (STC) in 1958. Nakayama argues that these new technocratic structures filled the void left by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which he claims “did not have a clearly articulated science and technology policy” (p. 10). Instead, he argues that control over S&T policy was actually wrested from citizens and members of the academic community in 1959, when the STC was made Japan’s highest advisory organ to the Prime Minister—a shift that marked “a clear transition from democracy to technocracy” (p. 13).

In five parts, Nakayama edits 36 short case studies by 23 Japanese scholars, who document the progress of Japan’s R&D communities on their “road to high economic growth.” Part 1 considers how Japan’s industrial S&T policies developed after Allied prohibitions on research were lifted in 1952, especially in the fields of armament production, aviation, space exploration and nuclear energy. In the final case, Hitoshi Yoshioka argues that the Japanese physicists who then opposed nuclear research were in fact not engaged in a bitter struggle against the government, as many have claimed. Instead, he contends that Japan’s physicist community was actually engaged in a debate with itself, for the majority of the government’s nuclear advisors were also physicists (p. 119). Contributors to part 2 explore the establishment of: a government and business-centred R&D system; an S&T administrative system; a host of government research institutes; and developments in corporate engineering, technical training and technology importation. Significantly, Tetsurō Nakaoka tackles the question of Japanese innovation during the 1950s, and points out that during the 1950s, most citizens viewed Japanese technology as “imitative and uncreative,” and worried about Japan’s continuing dependence upon imported technology (p. 241). In part 3, contributors discuss new attitudes among contemporary scientists and engineers toward graduate schools, student-led peace movements, international conferences, and even Japan’s first research expedition to Antarctica—the last of which, concludes Toshifumi Yatsumimi, gave science an invaluable popularity boost. Part 4 explores the modernization of key industries, including electricity, shipbuilding, steel, railways, farming, pharmaceuticals, and the heavy and chemical industries. Appropriately, the contributors often reflect upon the
environmental and human consequences of Japan’s industrial progress in these fields. Finally, in part 5, a series of case studies on automobiles, machinery, transistors, medicine, television, food and household appliances consider the ways in which S&T changed Japanese lifestyles during the 1950s.

In summary, this is a highly valuable resource for any author or student wishing to reference key postwar Japanese scientific, material and technological developments. The work is well organized and is supported by dozens of relevant tables and figures. The team effort to translate this work into English is a major accomplishment and the volume makes an important contribution to the Western understanding of Japan’s postwar S&T development from a Japanese perspective. While comprehensive historical works such as this must occasionally sacrifice depth for breadth, the brevity of some of the case studies is made bearable by the provision of both a consolidated bibliography and richly annotated lists of works cited. Winner of the Mainichi Publications Award in 1995, this volume and its forthcoming companion volumes will aid many researchers in their understanding of this important subject.

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This ambitious work tackles an admirable task: a systematic analysis of the party system at the national and local levels in Japan from 1955 to 2004. Moreover, it highlights important new linkages between the two. By integrating a comparative framework, and building a model of opposition weakness from a set of propositions in the general comparative politics literature, this book has advanced the standards against which future empirical research on party politics in Japan will be judged. It will be vital reading for graduate courses and advanced undergraduate seminars in Japanese and comparative politics of advanced industrial democracies.

The central puzzles and findings are well summarized in the introduction and chapter 1: Why did the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) manage to stay in power despite growing in (apparent) unpopularity? Why was the opposition never able to capitalize on scandals and policy failures? The main argument builds on a fourfold distinction between centralized and federalist systems, and between clientelistic and programmatic parties. The essential claim is that opposition parties have a hard time winning national and prefectural/state elections in centralized, clientelist states, such as Italy and Mexico. Chapter 4 establishes these claims closely in the context of pushes
for decentralization; chapters 6 and 9 provide rich empirical detail about impediments for opposition parties at the national level; and chapter 5 usefully outlines the often-overlooked consequences at the local level. Readers of standard works on comparative public policy are familiar with clientelism in electoral politics. Readers of narrative accounts of Japanese party politics are also accustomed to the tale of opposition failure. The contribution of this book is to link the two together in the context of fiscal policy and the importance of local electoral efforts for national success.

I have one technical quibble with editorial decisions concerning supplemental material. It is unfortunate that statistical evidence important for the argument (chapter 8) and the discussion of alternative arguments (chapter 3) are made available in an on-line appendix (<www.ethanscheiner.com>), rather than in the text directly.

The logic of this book also leads to provocative speculation about the future of democracy in Japan. If the Koizumi administration succeeds in fiscal decentralization, a real transformation in party politics may be on the horizon. The establishment of a charismatic leader executing top-down policy and fiscal restraint threatens the very substance of rural-based clientelist politics. Scheiner identifies this tension in the conclusion, stating that “If the LDP demonstrates a capacity to reform some elements of the clientelist system without cutting off its dependent rural base, the LDP could maintain support for a long time” (p. 229). If fiscal policy reform is fully realized, the opposition may have new structural space to organize at the local level. But radical top-down reform also threatens the local organizing basis of any insurgent parties by eliminating local initiative. Not even LDP consultants could have predicted that the cascade of reforms and economic changes since 1988 would result in an LDP sweep of rural and urban areas alike in September 2005. The LDP may have invented itself yet again.

Scheiner’s conclusion is appropriately skeptical about the degree to which reforms under Koizumi are able to depart completely from the clientelist model. But if Japan follows the path of Mexico and Italy, in which national personalities and populism, not local bosses or party programmes, dominate politics after major reforms, then Scheiner’s account will explain not just the difficulty of programmatic opposition politics, but also the demise of party-based political competition in Japan. Can there be a “party system” with only one effective party?

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Paul Talcott
Takashi Inoguchi draws upon his extensive knowledge of Japanese political history and culture in this introductory survey of Japanese politics. The book shows how the past has helped to shape key aspects of Japan’s contemporary political economy and culture and discusses many of the political challenges that face the country today. These include the need to strengthen Japan’s legitimacy and capacity deficit in relation to the military and to continue to define for itself what it means to become “an ordinary power with Japanese characteristics” (p. 182). Throughout, the book makes comparisons to the political systems and experiences of other countries as well as to key ideas in political science (e.g., absolutism, state-society relations, social capital, nationalism and globalization).

The text begins with a discussion of how historical factors have influenced contemporary political developments. It then considers the nature of the Japanese political state, Japan’s economic rise, the country’s growing international role, the factors that have contributed to one-party dominance, various forms that nationalism has taken, the country’s evolving party and electoral systems, and Japan’s shift from being a civilian to an ordinary power. Readers will be interested in Inoguchi’s discussions of different forms of nationalism (imperial, nostalgic and progressive nationalism) and how they have come into play in relation to some major political events (the liberalization of rice imports, the emperor’s visit to China in 1992, and the first Gulf War). They will also appreciate his discussion of Japan’s continuous efforts to redefine itself and its aims as the country has been faced by changing external conditions.

Although the title suggests that this is an introductory text, it might be rather difficult for those unfamiliar with Japanese politics or trends in political science to follow parts of the book. Although the translation from the Japanese appears to be accurate, the book is choppy and reads like a translated work rather than something that was originally written in English. In addition, the book assumes too much familiarity with Japanese politics and history to be an introductory text. Thus, for example, references are loosely made to historical events and individuals with little explanatory background. Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, while familiar names to a Japanese reader, are probably not familiar to non-Japanese readers, yet the text does not really explain who these powerful Japanese daimyo were. There is frequent reference made to the bakufu and to various periods in Japanese history (e.g., the Warring States, the Yayoi, the Nara-Heian era) without sufficient definition of terms or placement of events in time.

Parts of the text come from portions of a Japanese book that was researched and written in the 1990s, while other parts draw upon articles
and experiences of the author between 1994 and 2004. As a result, in some places the book seems rather out-of-date. Thus, for example, the text refers to the names of Japanese ministries as they existed prior to 2001 without mentioning that they have changed their names and in many cases consolidated. As another example, the book discusses how the Japanese state controls non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by placing them under the control of one or more ministries but fails to discuss the important changes that have been made in laws which govern the establishment and functioning of NGOs.

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Miranda Schreurs


In Inequality amid Affluence, Hara and Seiyama examine social stratification and mobility patterns in Japan based on data from the latest wave of Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) surveys conducted in 1995. After examining changes in education, career, political and strata consciousness, and gender patterns since 1955, the authors reach two main conclusions. First, contrary to the widely held view that Japan is a “classless society,” social stratification remains live and well; indeed, strata disparities may have even widened since 1975. Second, to understand this new form of social inequality, we need to move away from the traditional Marxist concept of “class,” which is primarily focused on unequal economic and power relationships between capital and labour, to the Weberian notion of “social stratification” structured along axes of economic, status and power differentials. Much of this six-chapter book is therefore devoted to explaining the nature of new social stratification as revealed by the SSM surveys.

Some of the evidence offered in this book is interesting. For example, both household and individual income disparities in Japan have risen sharply since 1975. In terms of mobility opportunities, the odds ratio of sons of the highest occupational strata employees (upper white-collar) entering this occupational stratum is now eight times more favourable compared to those from other strata, meaning this stratum of the society has become much more closed. The authors’ explanations of these phenomena speak to the current debate in Japan. In terms of income disparities, they agree with other scholars such as Toshiaki Tachibanaki (Confronting Income Inequality in Japan, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), Kenji Hashimoto (Class Structure in Contemporary Japan, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2003), and Fumio
Ohtake (“Aging Society and Inequality,” *Japan Labor Bulletin*, 38: 5-11, 1999) about the widening disparity trend. Yet at the same time they disagree with the view that Japanese incomes are more unequal than those in the US (Tachibanaki, 2005). They argue instead that much of the recent increase in income disparities is due to demographic change. What we see in Japan is a case of growing inequality *between* different age groups, while inequalities *within* age groups have remained constant. Not everybody buys this argument, however. Economists such as Fumio Ohtake (1999) contend that while rising income inequality in Japan is largely a function of demographic ageing, this has more to do with increasing income and wage dispersion *within* age groups as the group ages. On the issue of social mobility, Hara and Seiyama also take issue with economists like Toshiaki Sato (*Fubyodo Shakai Nihon*, Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2000), who argues that Japan is as much of a class society as Britain. They caution against such a simplistic conclusion, pointing out that closure of opportunity patterns is only evident with the highest stratum, and not with other occupational strata.

The most interesting part of this book, however, addresses gender and stratification. Using data from 1985 and 1995, the authors show that unlike men, women’s higher education is inversely related to their employment, and disparities in occupational strata arising out of educational background for women are not as significant as is the case for men. This is because more educated women are more likely to become full-time housewives and drop out of work. In Japan the correspondence between women’s educational background and their family background is also very high: university educated women are much more likely to come from high occupational strata families, and more likely to marry men in higher occupational strata; while the case is reversed for women from lower occupational strata families. What this suggests are the gendered and intergenerational reproduction of social strata, and that in Japan, women’s higher education is more an investment in marriage than in the labour market.

The book is a good introduction for anyone interested in social stratification and contemporary Japanese society. However, I should warn readers that the writing is sometimes awkward and hard to follow. As this is a translation of Japanese text, readers should be wary of idiosyncratic terms such as “middle consciousness,” which I believe means “middle-class consciousness,” but since the authors do not want to imply Marxist notion of class, they have dropped the word “class.”

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ITO PENG
Isami’s House traces the history of a prominent rural family in northeastern Japan from when it was first entrusted with the office of village head in the late seventeenth century to the present. The “Isami” of the title refers to Matsuura Isami, the eleventh generation patriarch of the family. The author, Gail Lee Bernstein, professor of history at the University of Arizona, first encountered his children when doing graduate research in Tokyo in the 1960s. She states that her goal in writing this book was to “put a personal face on the last three hundred years of life in Japan” (p. xii), and in this she has largely succeeded, relating a compelling and accessible narrative of the Matsuura through three centuries of Japanese history.

Nevertheless, this is no mere melodrama of a family’s fortunes. The personal lives of the Matsuura provide sociological and cultural insights into postwar Japan: husbands die of “cancer of the esophagus, stomach, or lungs, possibly related to their heavy smoking habits” (p. 213); the wives outlive them and, “For a woman whose marriage bond was based on gratitude or respect or pride or economic security, if not a close emotional connection, genuine affection, or physical intimacy, a husband’s death brought a certain sense of satisfaction and pride in a job well done” (p. 215). Cramped quarters and daily shopping illustrate everyday life in 1960s Japan, while issues of divorce, adoption and conflict between generations belie stereotypes of the stable and harmonious family in postwar Japan.

However, some may question whether a “personal” account can, or should, be taken at face value. When a family member is posted as consul-general in Shanghai in the mid-1930s, Ms. Bernstein notes that, “Ishii and his wife, Moto, like other Matsuura relatives, were unwitting imperialists” (p. 132). For an army surgeon son and his wife sent to a military base that housed a subunit of the infamous Unit 731, “memories of Japanese army life in Manchuria were mainly of the cold, not the fiendish cruelty. Masako never heard of … Unit 731 then or later, and if her husband did, he never told her” (p. 138).

Much of what is related in the text was gleaned from interviews with family members, and the inability to understand the significance of events at the time one is living through them is understandable. Nevertheless, such passages inevitably raise the question of selective memory and historical amnesia.

What, then, is the value of a work of this nature to the specialist? For the scholar, there are some limitations here: although Japanese primary source documents are cited, secondary sources are predominantly in English, a disadvantage to those seeking access to the Japanese resources that the author
undoubtedly utilized. The absence of a bibliography makes looking up sources laborious, and a narrative that frequently jumps from the present to the past may make for effective storytelling, but disrupts historical continuity.

Nevertheless, Isami’s House is not just an absorbing narrative for the general reader. It also provides a refreshing perspective for the specialist and even mundane events can be informative, as when a Matsuura servant in the late eighteenth century is scolded for discharging a firearm. Bernstein explains that despite the Tokugawa restrictions on guns, “most villages, especially in the north, possessed muskets … lent out for protection against wild animals, such as boar, which could destroy crops and threaten villagers as well” (p. 65).

Thus, Ms. Bernstein’s new book may present some problems for the specialist, but it is still a valuable resource as it illustrates the variety of a people’s experiences and humanizes history.

The University of Toronto at Mississauga, ON, Canada CARY SHINJI TAKAGAKI


A volume of essays by social scientists on a single region of Japan is in itself of great interest. We learn something about the Tohoku region but, more importantly, we learn what is, and is not, “Japan.” We see Tohoku, in William Kelly’s phrase, as “Japan’s most archetypal region,” speaking to tropes of tradition and heritage and only somewhat ironically to the fact that these can “sell” the furusato and more generally the Japanese past. This collection examines how local, and how national, are those characteristics that are deemed “Japanese.” How far is Tohoku from what Nancy Rosenberger calls “systems of power and knowledge,” and how much do national discourses draw from or use Tohoku as a site of the project of nationalism?

The politics and economics of outlying, diminishing places in Japan are reflected in Tohoku’s present. John Mock treats Tohoku’s population decline in terms of local understandings (we are losing “energy, filiality and creativity”) and solutions, but also as a nationwide concern, noting that strategies for preserving population must address practical considerations of transport and occupational opportunity. William Kelly discusses the decline of farming and, more cogently, the “agri-nostalgia” and the cultural politics of heritage that imbue discussions. Nancy Rosenberger addresses the “multivocality of modernity” in the participation of Tohoku women, shown over time, in national visions of women’s lives. I would suggest here that you don’t need “modernity” to have many voices in
the storylines of women—one need only consult Ella Wiswell and Robert Smith’s *The Women of Suye Mura* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) for cogent examples. There is a nice paradox in this, however: as the national “systems of power and knowledge” become disseminated through media and travel, the hinterlands learn more about how far they are from the core.

How far is Tohoku from the global/international world Japan now inhabits? Tomoko Traphagan’s discussion of *kokusaika* considers the types of engagement communities can have with the greater world, both government driven and grass-roots community created, and notes that the more successful and sustaining are those that use existing frames of community support and interests.

Thompson’s essay on the “Ochiai Deer Dance” is particularly illustrative of the themes explored in this book. A folk performance, this heritage production at once identifies and preserves local identity and fuels nostalgia, which “sells” the region. The deer dance represents a home place—an aspect of *furusatozukuri*. The designation of local crafts or artistic products as *minzoku geino* (folk art) has a policy referent in the *isson ippin* (One Village, One Product) program, which characterizes the local and markets it for tourism. There is a paradox here too: in the case of the deer dance, it was not originally defined as a specific deer dance of this area, and the standards or choreography for it were fairly fluid until it became a “souvenir” event, at which point it became a standard product. The regional specialties sold as *omiyage* at railroad stations have also in this way become predictably uniform.

I would also note that people as well can be *minzoku geino*: the geisha of Kyoto are a good example, as they have come to epitomize the artistic product of Kyoto.

The complicated relationship between specificity and standardization is also demonstrated in Anthony S. Rausch’s interesting essay on lacquerware, in which notions of tradition and modernity, conservation and consumption are woven through a description of local and national, the first being *mingeihin* (folkcraft) and the second *bijutsu* (art). In Debra Occhi’s fine treatment of *enka*, older pop “torch” songs, Tohoku as Japan’s “heartbreak’s destination” also takes on a codified form, as a mere allusion to this region brings a lump to the listener’s throat. As good a summary of this fine volume as any is from one of Thompson’s respondents who, noting that the dance, and Tohoku, have become “modern, international, urban and traditional rural,” points out “that is what being Japanese has become.” But for several typographical errors and a few missing pages (in my copy), the work is well presented and nicely illustrated.

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MERRY I. WHITE
The topic of Chinese wartime collaboration with their Japanese military and civilian occupiers has long been a serious scholarly desideratum. For obvious reasons, though, it has also been a minefield, one of those topics that seem to require a lag period before they can be handled in a balanced and concerted manner. Most studies of the war years, though by no means all, have been content to reduce Chinese “collaboration” to little more than a caricature in which traitors (hanjian) is the operative term; indeed, much Chinese scholarship on the subject has understandably reconstructed the war years as a morality play between resistance fighters and hanjian. One often wonders if the entire war generation will have to pass away, and perhaps another generation who learned of the war firsthand from those who participated in it, before we might examine such sensitive subject matter in a reasonably objective manner.

Thus, the first question a reader—especially one such as myself who is deeply interested in Sino-Japanese relations—brings to Timothy Brook’s fine new book is: Was the time right? Is Brook courageous for having approached this apparently impregnable fortress, or quixotic for tilting at windmills too early? Having in the past felt as though a number of topics—such as the body count at the Nanjing atrocity of 1937-38, or Chinese complicity in the production and selling of opium—were broached by earnest and honest scholars too soon, only later to find that I was probably wrong, I was not sure if the time was right until I began reading this book. Brook has, I believe, made a valiant effort—certainly not guaranteed to please all, or even a majority, of readers, but nonetheless opening an area for serious research and challenging the field to confront this topic.

Brook has already made a considerable contribution to the study of Ming period (1368-1644) history, winning the Levenson Prize of the Association for Asian Studies for one of his studies. Although he makes an effort to situate his discussion of collaboration within a wider discourse of the topic, such as the Frenchmen who worked with the Nazis during the invasion and occupation of their homeland, he inexplicably does not situate this phenomenon within Chinese history, aside from several passing mentions. On many occasions and for much longer periods of time, “Chinese” have been forced to come to terms with alien conquerors and occupiers, including the Khitans, Jurchens, Mongols and Manchus in the last millennium alone; one might even add the British (and other Western powers), if treaty ports concession areas won after defeating the Qing in battle count. What makes the Japanese case different, if it is? Has the emergence of the modern sense of a Chinese nation and a Chinese ethnicity (contributing as they did to the
collapse of the Qing dynasty) made it impossible to treat the twentieth-century invaders as one would earlier ones? By the same token, what can we possibly learn from the French case? A completely different culture and historical setting on the other side of the world hardly seems like a meaningful basis for comparison. By contrast, Korea—a state which for centuries had absorbed Sinic culture, as well as social and political forms, and paid homage at a long succession of Chinese courts—might have made for a fruitful comparison, especially inasmuch as it was occupied (and annexed) by the very same Japanese government, only for much longer (1910-45).

It would seem patently obvious that research on such a topic would require use of documents on both sides of the conflict, but Brook is really the first scholar writing in English and perhaps in any language to do this so extensively. Culling primary materials from both Chinese and Japanese archives, he successfully squeezes out the story of the Chinese elites whom the Japanese occupation teams sought out to help control the populace and to get the social and economic wheels of lower Yangzi society turning again. He tries ever so hard to understand Chinese motivations, aside from pure venality, in working with the Japanese. Not everyone will accept his conclusions, but the sources—critically read—allow us to enter the minds of the people involved only so far.

The text jumps around to a variety of locales during the war years; indeed, Brook goes wherever the sources take him. We learn many new things in the process. I was struck by how much more involved in the business of occupation the South Manchurian Railway Company was than previously imagined. I also found intriguing the comparisons between the Guomindang’s reforms and those introduced by the Japanese. Ultimately, while “heroic resisters and cringing collaborators” will not completely disappear from the record as a result of this study, relegation of the discourse of such passing as the main story should indeed devolve into the realm of myth. The Manchus ruled China for 268 years. “Who,” as Brook concludes, “could know, at the beginning, that the [Japanese] occupation state would not outlast Japan’s defeat by one day?” People make accommodations for themselves and their families. Four years after it was over, as he suggests, the stakes grew much, much higher.

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Joshua A. Fogel


The rapidity and totality of the fall of British Asia in the face of the Japanese army’s assaults after Pearl Harbor shocked the British, shocked their colonial
subjects and collaborators in the region, and shocked even the Japanese. Emboldened by the scale of victory in the face of their enemies’ collapse, the Imperial Japanese forces moved to seize all of Burma, which had not been a war aim before the conflict commenced. For those at a safe distance, defeat was a profound humiliation that made forging the new working alliance with China, for example, a very tricky business. For many of those (surviving) on the ground it was a violent, confused and abject experience, while others found it a moment of revelatory clarity, which put the practices and pretensions of British empire into perspective.

We know much about the individual campaigns, the different occupation regimes that ensued, and the different nationalist movements that mobilized, but the broader, integrated perspective is often lacking. Most importantly, we have lacked accounts that place the campaigns in the context of the societies they shattered, explore their tensions and fractures, and show how these shaped the character of the multiple, overlapping conflicts which actually ensued. In *Forgotten Armies*, Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper present a lively, accessible and stimulating popular overview of the crisis, the fightback and its legacies, not least the “forgotten” armies of the book’s title. Some of those forgotten are the forces which continued fighting after the Asia Pacific War ended, or the forces which fought on the wrong side, or on both sides, but mostly these are also the Asian “armies of fighters, labourers, comfort women and nurses” (p. 463), whose individual journeys shaped the contours of the four years of conflict, and whose impact reshaped the region after 1945.

The focus is on the British crescent, Singapore, Malaya and Burma, but India and China are also foregrounded. Integrated into the British imperial world before Pearl Harbor, these colonial spaces were refashioned by war into “Southeast Asia,” and administered as such at the war’s end. In the period between, the inhabitants of the crescent encountered the theory and realities of Japanese “pan-Asianism,” but as Bayly and Harper point out, the significance of that initiative “lay not in what it achieved for the Japanese Empire, but in what it allowed others to achieve for themselves” (p. 316). The impact on nationalist and regionalist imaginations was profound. The volume begins with a survey that highlights above all the modernity of the urban sites of this war, and the “jazz-age imperialism” (p. 34) of Singapore and the Malaya cities, more modern than London, air-conditioned and knowing. The contrast with the cruder race politics and race assumptions that underpinned British rule was made clear as the imperial state collapsed. The contrast could not be greater with the lands laid waste by the scorched earth policy in retreat, and with the arid and hungry years of occupation.

This is an ambitious book, pithy and punchy, which covers much ground, and so might be forgiven the odd slip (Stilwell was not in command of Chinese forces in 1941, p.100). Overall, *Forgotten Armies* puts the British in their place, and integrates expertly and convincingly the armies of stories that need to
be told to fashion an understanding of the terrible years of war and their legacy.

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ROBERT BICKERS

A WOMAN WITH DEMONS: A Life of Kamiya Mieko (1914-1979). By

This is the English version of Ota’s book Soshitsu kara no shuppatsu: Kamiya
Mieko, a well-known psychiatrist and clinician in a leprosarium in Japan, is
almost unknown outside of Japan, but Ota, a professor of Japanese history
at McGill University, has now introduced her to an English-speaking audience.

In this biography, Ota focuses on Kamiya’s journey in search of her self
and her struggle to survive the loss of her objective in life, precipitated by
the shocking ending of her first love. By analyzing Kamiya’s depression and
thoughts of suicide, Ota explores how this traumatic event led to her strong
identification with human suffering and her desire to work to alleviate it.
Through a close reading of her major work, What Makes Our Life Worth Living
(1966), her other books, and her unpublished private documents, Ota
corrects the myths about Kamiya, portraying a far more complex figure (a
woman with demons) than her popular image as a philanthropic doctor
who worked with leprosy patients. Ota writes that Kamiya herself was keenly
aware of the complexity of her personality. He quotes from her diary, in
which she describes “a person possessed with seven demons—that truly is
me” (p. xiii). She also refers to herself as an “epileptoid,” and as “in many
respects a person who is psychologically abnormal, and I realize now how by
necessity and fate I was led to the study of psychiatry in the process of my
self-exploration” (p. 167).

A mystic but visual experience—dazzling light like a lightning bolt
crossing her field of vision—came to Kamiya after the death of her lover,
Nomura Kazuhiko. Similar to the Quaker concept of “inner light,” it saved
her from the depths of despair and possible suicide. After that she acquired
strength and hope and began the gradual rebuilding of her new life. However,
she retained her inner turmoil and felt cut off from the ordinary world,
where people seemed to take the value of life for granted. It was when she
was in this state of mind that she visited a leprosarium, Tama-zensho-en in
Tokyo, in 1934. The realization that Kamiya’s encounter with leprosy took
place while she was still depressed by her lover’s death casts a new light on
her desire to devote her life to leprosy victims, despite her own tuberculosis,
cancer, and opposition from her family. Although the root cause was different,
Kamiya found that the despair ensuing from her lover’s death was almost
the same as the experience of leprosy victims. This reverses the prevailing philanthropic interpretation, that the privileged Kamiya was motivated by a sense of obligation to the underprivileged, much as Albert Schweitzer had been (pp. 64-68).

Kamiya became a member of the medical staff of the Department of Psychiatry at Tokyo University Hospital in October 1944. However, she could not get along with her supervising professor and a colleague who was envious of her. She wanted to deal with psychiatry from the perspective of both the human sciences and the natural sciences. But her professor had little understanding of the former approach. Disappointment with the world of academics and her interpersonal problems made her feel strongly that she would like to be a writer more than anything else. Among Kamiya’s collected works in 13 volumes, the best one is considered to be *What Makes Our Life Worth Living*. It has been read by millions in Japan.

Kamiya’s trauma resulting from Nomura’s death lasted a very long time, until 1960, even following her marriage to Kamiya Noburo in 1946. However, Ota points out that Kamiya’s life had a happy ending, because her obsession with the loss of Nomura disappeared completely with the fulfillment of the writing of her *magnum opus* (p. 219).

The author successfully relates an impressive life story of a remarkable Japanese female doctor and writer of complex character, a narrative that resonates timelessly within a reader’s soul and mind. In this sense, this vitally convincing biography of Kamiya Mieko by Ota deserves to be widely read by English readers around the world, even beyond the field of Women’s Studies.

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TSUNEHARU GONNAMI


Japan is a land of sacred sites, some of little more than local importance, many of much wider significance. The history of religion in Japan is often told through major figures, doctrinal developments, institutional and political rivalry, or the growth of sects, but a very different kind of history with a different kind of depth can be written by concentrating on the sites themselves. In this well-written, wide-ranging study, Max Moerman picks a place that is ideal for this kind of treatment and succeeds in giving us a panoramic view of its relevance for Japanese history and culture.

Kumano, a term that in fact covers three closely related sites situated in the south of the Kii Peninsula, Hongu, Shingu and Nachi, is first mentioned
in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* in connection to the Izanami and Izanagi myth, as well as providing a backdrop for the early activities of Jinmu Tenno. From that point on it never lost its key role as one of the most powerful sacred sites in Japan, close enough to the centres of culture and yet isolated enough to be truly forbidding. Today one can make the trip by train and bus, but the line is still single track for much of the way and from Osaka to Hongu can take a good five hours. To set out on a pilgrimage to Kumano before these comforts must have been an extraordinarily arduous undertaking. It could take months to complete and so difficult was the mountain terrain that there was an ever-present threat to life and limb. Yet thousands made the effort over the years, from ex-emperors with bulky retinues to single women in search of a route to paradise.

The word “panoramic” is apposite because in his search for a way of dealing with this many-faceted subject, Moerman has found an ideal vehicle in the form of a sixteenth-century painting, the *Nachi Pilgrimage Mandala*, which depicts a whole series of figures and events associated with the site. Having situated the area in both geography and history, he then proceeds to pick a series of scenes from the painting, using them as illustrations or springboards for four major themes. Chapter 2, “Emplacements,” discusses the complex nature of Kumano as a site that managed to hold significance for a whole series of different religious groups, Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Chapter 3, “The Theater of State,” gives a detailed account of the use of pilgrimage to Kumano as a tool of authority by ex-emperors in the twelfth century. Chapter 4, “Mortuary Practices,” concentrates on the practice of ritual suicide known as Fudaraku Tokai, whereby devotees would set out in small boats to reach Kannon’s paradise in the certain knowledge that they would perish. Chapter 5, “A Woman’s Place,” discusses the particularly difficult position of women in Buddhist practice in general and the special role played by Kumano as a space where women achieved a position of unusual freedom of movement and expression.

This is an important book not only for anyone interested in the culture of premodern Japan but also for those concerned with the nature of sacred locales in general.

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**RICHARD BOWRING**


Those of us approaching mid-career will recall the days when all the interesting work on Japanese art seemed to be done on Edo. Those times
are now gone, and one looks with some envy at scholars concentrating on the Meiji field. This splendid contribution is an instance of how far we have come. Thirteen essays on a range of themes address many topics. Of course, any reader can find omissions and, to my mind, striking absences could be spotted in two areas: new Meiji public icons such as statuary, coinage and stamps, and continuation of the art of wood-block printing, such as the oeuvre of Hiroshige III. Still, though the impression is more of a scattering of essays rather than an overall survey, this book does give a nearly comprehensive guide to the arts of the period, focusing mostly on painting and architecture, but also addressing ceramics and photography and art theory.

There are also themes that bind the essays together. We have the well-known Meiji shuttle between binarisms: of modernity and conservatism; statism and popular culture; religion and secularism; and national and international. Issues of Westernism and its attendant Realism are inevitably brought to the fore, compelling almost all the people who figure in the book to think about them, and to take a (sometimes changing) stance. In her essay, Doris Croissant explores how the ensuing debates had already been underway early in the nineteenth century, and we are made to recall how the European presence was far from negligible throughout the Edo Period, and extended well beyond the little Dutch enclave in Nagasaki. The extent to which Westernism and Realism went together—or, conversely, did not—was only to be discovered in Japan at the end of the century, when students returned from Paris with news of attacks on the Academy and the rise of Impressionism. But Realism did not have to mean Westernism, although it was enhanced by it. There was a long-standing respect for simulacra in East Asia, too, and Martin Collcutt’s rich essay (which may rank as the most extensive and thorough treatment of a single work of Japanese art in English) notes how Kano Hôgai was an adherent of Obaku Zen; that school placed much emphasis on lifelike chinsô portraiture.

Many of the Westerners in Japan, as well as importers of Japanese goods in Europe and the USA, and organizers of World Fairs, were aghast at how Japan seemed to be rushing headlong for novelty. The figure of Ernest Fenellosa appears frequently under this rubric. Indeed, one of the pleasures of this collection is getting to know people, not just Fenellosa but, for example, Kiki Ryûichi or Harada Naojirô, through several essays, as their lives move in and out of different realms of activity and various groups, such as the Dragon Pond circle. The apparent over-Westernization of Japan was retarded in equal measure by Japanese and foreign cultural conservatives, although in most instances, the putative binarisms turned out to be far from neat opposites.

The book’s carefully worded title refers both to the challenge that Meiji practice presented to prevailing norms of art, and also to the challenges made by Meiji practitioners to each other, and, I think, additionally made to us today as scholars or enthusiasts. Conant’s introduction to the book is a
lucid overview of the way in which Meiji art has been ignored and deleted, but already this charge of omission is out of date. Meiji art is now extensively studied, admired and collected—this book proves as much. The title does slightly oversell the contents insofar as virtually all the essays focus strictly on Meiji, and not on the nineteenth century, over half of which fell within the Edo shogunal regime.

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TIMON SCREECH


Alexis Dudden’s ambitious book is a welcome addition to historical studies of the Japanese colonial empire. It will serve as an excellent departure point for further investigations into the processes leading to the annexation of Korea, especially how the Japanese government leaders, civilian intellectuals and the Euro-American diplomatic community colluded to create conditions of “legality,” both materially and discursively, within which Japan could colonize Korea.

The strongest parts of the book are chapters 3 and 5, entitled “The Vocabulary of Power” and “Mission Législatrice,” respectively. Chapter 3 begins with Itô Hirobumi’s manipulation of English language to eject Japan from the Sino-centric world of diplomatic relations. The author emphasizes that Itô and Mutsu Munemitsu, during the peace negotiations following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), compelled the Qing representatives to accept English as the language of diplomacy. Thus, Japan’s step-by-step colonization of Korea, first by turning it into a protectorate (1905), followed by annexation (1910), is put into the context of the Japanese empire’s development of conceptual and linguistic tools to legitmatize its status as a colonial power. According to the author, “Japan’s decision to establish the protectorate arrangement underscores the Meiji leader’s determination to describe its Korea policy in internationally recognizable terms.” At the same time, this policy “indicates apprehension about exceeding potential limits the [“Western”] Powers might have set for Japan’s privileges [in Korea]” (p. 63). Korean nationalists looking for reinforcement in their judgment that the Ûlsa Protectorate Treaty was “illegal” will be disappointed by Dudden’s pronouncement that “Japan did not act treacherously, but ... acted imperialistically and with the approval of the international arena” (p. 64). Chapter 5, the most substantial and, research-wise, the most original section of the book, discusses the Japanese legal discourse on judicial reform in
Korea. Here, the author traces how the idea of a “civilizing mission,” as expressed through Japanese legal reforms such as elimination of torture and provision of defense counsel, was later adapted by Japanese legal experts such as Kuratomi Yuzaburō for the purpose of legitimatizing the colonization of Korea.

Chapter 4, “Voices of Dissent,” is most successful in its recounting of the accounts of Chang In-hwan and Chŏng Myöng-un, the Korean assassins of the “pro-Japanese” diplomat D.W. Stevens. Its section on the Korean “righteous army,” on the other hand, is curiously listless and uninformative. This strange imbalance makes me wish that the author had jettisoned the righteous army leader Hö Wi and instead focused on the Japanese (and “Western”) views of the armed revolt against the Japanese, both “official” ones and those expressed in public opinion.

The author digs into an impressively wide variety of materials, especially French- and English-language sources, such as the scholarly output of the Meiji state’s legal adviser Gustave Boissonade, and the American news media reports of the arrest and trial of Chang and Chŏng. Unfortunately, romanization of Korean names, places and titles is seriously inconsistent throughout the book: for example, I am guessing that “Manch’uguk Kunguk üi Chehesük” is meant to be spelled Manjuguk konguk ŏi chaehaesŏk (A Reinterpretation of the Establishment of Manchukuo); I have no idea what “Guko p’aldo yorup” is supposed to mean in Korean.

Japan’s Colonization of Korea is an insightful and intellectually stimulating study of the instruments and apparatuses with which the newly rising Japanese empire could claim legitimacy among the “Western” empires. It significantly advances our knowledge and understanding of the modern Japanese empire in its “young adult” phase, beyond the existing studies by Hilary Conroy, Kim Key Hyuk and other pioneering scholars. On the other hand, the Korean voices, in their multiplicity and complexity, do not come across clearly in this work. Despite the author’s obvious sympathy toward the colonized Koreans and their predicament, they are still largely presented through the eyes of the “conquerors” and “civilized” observers. This is a problem that cannot be overcome just by condemning the apologists for the Japanese empire, or by criticizing the scholars “who … continue to explain away the horrors perpetrated in the colonies by describing the details of Japan’s overseas acquisitions in so-called rational terms” (p. 146). We should remember that viewing the colonized as perpetual victims (and thus denying them agencies as historical actors) could be just as problematic as denying or rationalizing the atrocities and exploitations visited on them by the colonizers.

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*Kyu Hyun Kim*

The Korean diaspora emerged out of the tumultuous history of modern Korea. What began as a trickle in the nineteenth century, with famine-stricken farmers migrating to neighbouring China and Russia, became a tidal wave during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), as millions of Koreans—from conscripted labourers and comfort women to political exiles and students—became scattered throughout Asia and beyond. The exodus continued in the decades following the end of colonial rule, driven by the politics and economy on the peninsula.

Forever Alien, the autobiography of Korean-American political activist Sunny Che (Ch’oe Pong-sun), tells the story of one woman’s personal experience of this massive displacement. Che was an infant when her family moved to Japan, fleeing poverty in search of economic opportunities. Her father eventually established a successful practice in Asian medicine. The family spent the years 1930 to 1944 in Japan and returned to Korea toward the end of World War II. The first half of the book deals with Che’s childhood in Japan, and the second half with her repatriation to Korea before leaving in 1951 for study in the United States.

Che’s earliest memories are of growing up in Japan, and her account is filled with childhood nostalgia. With a keen eye for detail, she paints a vivid portrait of everyday life in 1930s and 1940s Japan, with rich descriptions of food, clothing, customs—even popular books, songs and movies. At the same time, Che weaves her personal narrative with the big picture, recounting the major historical events that marked various points in her life.

As reflected in the title, Che never felt entirely at home in Japan. She could speak Japanese fluently and pass as Japanese in appearance, but she always sensed that she was different. This feeling developed not so much from discrimination; the book has few instances of overt Japanese prejudice toward Koreans. Rather, it came from her parents, who instilled pride in her cultural heritage.

But when Che returned to Korea in her teens, she discovered that she did not fit in there, either. An outsider in her own land, she bemoaned the “feudal world” and “simple, primitive lives” of her countrymen, and she longed for the “lost paradise” of her childhood in Japan. So intense did this desire become that she and her brother disguised themselves as repatriating Japanese and made a futile attempt to go back. She never adjusted to life in Korea, and she ultimately decided to leave again. Escaping the ravages of the Korean War, she struck out for a new life in America.

Che’s autobiography explores with extraordinary candour the ambiguities of ethnicity. It posits no conventional template of identity crisis resolved through ethnic affirmation; Che’s story is almost the reverse. Nor is
there some call to ethnic solidarity; the people who help Che and her family in times of need are often non-Koreans—the Japanese and the Americans. Common humanity, not race, seems to be the theme.

At one level, Che’s story is uniquely her own: a family history and a coming-of-age memoir. It is a powerful narrative full of drama, replete with tales of forbidden love, an evil stepmother, infanticide, etc. Yet at another level, her story is also one that resonates with countless others in the Korean diaspora. Che is simply one of the first to record her experiences and thoughts, especially in English. She has consequently contributed a valuable document not only to diaspora studies but also to the fields of Korean and Japanese history. But her task is not yet finished. The sequel—the story of her life is America—is much anticipated.

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An edited collection of well-researched papers carries the burden of an introduction that speaks to specific contributions and overarching themes, and conveys a general argument. That this is an exceptional collection of articles makes the task all the more onerous. Similar collections have viewed migration as a window into the uneven and indeterminate commodification of land, space and labour, or of the ways in which migrancy cuts across a diversity of struggles over livelihood and entitlement across the boundaries of country/city, waged/unwaged, regulated/unregulated, legality/illegality and so on. Ethnographies of movement have also been well poised to question boundaries between native and expert knowledges. While it would seem vital to introduce this issue by asking what makes South Asian migration different, it is unclear that the generic key words of migration, modernity and social transformation are adequate for the task. While the introduction falls short, the essays offer a wealth of argument that does convey a differentiated, ethnographic exploration of migration in South Asia. Before pointing to some insights from the papers in the order in which they appear, I would like to signal exceptional contributions from Roger Ballard, Edward Simpson, Maya Unnithan-Kumar, Ben Rogaly et al. and Randal Kuhn.

The initial essay by Jonathan Spencer suggests, and calls for more ethnographic evidence of, the ways in which a migrant critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state questions its articulation of sedentarism and ethnoracialism. Ballard’s lucid exposition on shifting effects of transnational migration between Britain and Mirpur District, Pakistan, explores the ebbs
and flows of attachment and investment by family members, whether in supporting those at home, or in investing in flashy but empty houses, monuments to success in competition between endogamous biraderi descent groups. Through creative use of evidence, Francis Watkins explains apparent disinterest in household accumulation in a village receiving considerable migrant income by showing how, rather, savings are channeled into forms of collective consumption. Simpson’s elegant account of seafaring and its effects in Kachchh, Gujarat, opens the black box of remittances by considering their value as both gifts and commodities, and the varied effects these confer to variously ranked and gendered groups. Edward Simpson situates concepts like “tradition” and “modernity,” correctly in my view, as they are actually invoked in transactions and struggles over status and affiliation, as upstart sailors and ship owners seek to transform elements of the social order. Filippo and Caroline Osella suggest that migration has led to the heightened commoditization of the sacrificial ritual of kuthiyottam, but they more effectively demonstrate that migration fuels anxieties about authenticity in religious practice. C.Y. Thangarajah shows how “Islamic” consumption practices by migrant women from Ullur village, Sri Lanka, who are employed as housemaids in the Middle East, opens up new areas of circumscribed agency. Maya Unnithan-Kumar’s rich essay on women migrants to a basti in Jaipur, Rajasthan, illuminates the dialectics of freedom and control in conjugal and reproductive choice. This nuanced argument gives concrete content to the idea of migrant “ambivalence” touched on in the introduction to the book, to show how women experience new forms of access to reproductive services alongside new forms of medicalized control over their bodies. Arjan De Haan’s arguments about “modernity” are largely unhinged from research evidence, but he does show that migrants to Titagarh in Calcutta retain rural connections that diverge by region, gender (in a decidedly second-wave feminist or universal-binary sense of gender), generation, religion and caste, though with little ethnographic or historical elaboration on these concepts. Jonathan Parry’s essay on migrants to the steel town of Bhilai shows how a privileged section of the working class might imagine a linear transition from country to city, which less privileged sections may not. Parry looks closely at migrant narratives to make multiple claims, such as, for instance, that the highly individualistic narrative form reflects rural worlds left behind. Geert De Neve also carefully studies migrant biographies, and suggests differentiation between local and non-local migrants in what he calls their “commitment” to urban industry in Tiruppur, Tamilnadu. Because I share De Neve’s ethnographic commitment to this site, I remain unconvinced by some details but further, and more importantly, by the theoretical status of “commitment,” a category that seems drawn from employers’ talk. Ben Rogaly et. al. report from an intricate, thoughtful collaborative project spanning multiple trajectories and sites of intra-rural migration to Barddhaman District, West Bengal. They show how various
constructions of social and spatial difference are constitutive to ongoing processes of migration and agrarian capitalism. Randall Kuhn’s similarly thoughtful multi-site, collaborative research provides an exceptional set of insights on the mobilization of identities and rural/urban networks in accessing credit, negotiating gatekeepers and dealing with new risks and uncertainties in the migration process. Finally, Vinay Gidwani and K. Sivaramakrishnan theorize what they call the “rural cosmopolitanism” of intra-rural migrants; despite drawing on their own research in Gujarat and Tamilnadu, they are less convincing on the concrete stakes in posing circular migrants as cosmopolitans who “straddle a world of difference.”

On the whole, the collection is exceptional; it is unique in its specialist topic, but also covers a range of issues, themes and ideas that will be very useful for undergraduate and postgraduate students, as well as scholars interested in questions concerning migration, South Asia, political economy, development and materialist ethnography.

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SHARAD CHARI


Debates over definitions of “Indianness” and “Indian culture” have been at the heart of Indian politics since independence. The resurgence of Hindu nationalism at the cultural and political levels since the 1980s has brought these debates into a highly politicized arena, in which “Indian” is often equated with “Hindu,” and purity is attributed to an ancient “golden age.” Crucial to this politics is the idea that “foreign” influences, easily definable as such and thus easily separable from what is really “Indian,” should be eradicated if Indian culture is to thrive.

This book, although not explicitly located in relation to contemporary forces in Indian politics, can be seen as a response to and argument against this politics. The editors have somewhat loosely focused the essays around the broad theme of what they variously call syncretism, hybridity and fusion: the results of indigenous traditions encountering modern ideas and practices and the global market and its compulsions. As a collection, the volume tackles disparate fields where there seems to be something at stake in defining what is “Indian”: on the one hand music, art, literature and theatre; and on the other hand feminism, history writing and science.

Since the essays deal with so many different topics, the volume tends not to hold together in a very convincing way. It definitely needs a more
persuasive framing; the editors, while they make several programmatic kinds of statements about claims to Indian culture and Indianness, fail to locate these claims (or arguments against them) in terms of their politics. The editors pit an idealized, homogenized notion of Indian culture against “a contrasting notion of composite culture that does not merely acknowledge diversity but builds it into the very conceptualization of Indian culture as plural and syncretic” (p. 23). However, the individual essays, for the most part, do little to address or support this theme. Several of them, in fact, ironically seem to argue for another version of cultural purity, suggesting that India needs to go back to its indigenous traditions and reject colonial or other foreign “impositions.”

The volume is ambitious in combining essays by academic scholars with pieces written from the practitioner and activist perspectives. While this can be valuable if done in an intentional and managed way, the result here is a collection that seems very uneven in tone and content. A few of the essays, such as Tapati Guha-Thakurta’s contribution on discourses about the history of Indian art, and Uma Chakaravarti’s piece on the place of women in historical writings, are detailed in their historiographical approach and citation of other works. The majority of the essays, however, hardly cite other works at all; they are more like thought pieces, programmatic statements or, in some cases, simply opinions unsupported by evidence or any historical or anthropological research. Claude Alvares and Gita Chadha, for instance, decry the hegemony of modern science but instead of looking at the history of cultural encounters behind this dominance, they suggest the need for a rediscovery of an “indigenous science” that would lie outside of modern Western science. Ashok Ranade’s article on music, while claiming to make a historical argument about mixing and fusion always having been part of Indian music, in fact cites no historical sources at all, further contributing to a widespread tendency to view music and other performing arts apart from their social, historical and political contexts.

The articles on translation, particularly those by Meenakshi Mukherjee and U.R. Ananthamurthy, are genuinely interesting, offering provocative meditations on the politics of what gets translated into English, what gets recognized as Indian literature, and what it means to translate works in Indian languages into English. It is regrettable that the collection as a whole is not more consistent.

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AMANDA WEIDMAN
The hierarchical nature of the caste system is simultaneously its most widely
known characteristic and its most disputed one. While some degree of
hierarchy between castes, conveyed in the terms “upper” and “lower” castes,
seems to be accepted as conventional wisdom, a large volume of scholarly
work is devoted to either questioning the hierarchy altogether or advocating
a nuanced view of hierarchy. Much of this literature has as its focal point
Louis Dumont’s seminal work *Homo Hierarchicus* (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980, English edition, revised), which suggests a universally
valid, linear hierarchy along the scale of ritual purity/pollution.

Dipankar Gupta has been engaged in formulating a critique of Dumont’s
linear world view for some time. In this collection, he argues that in contrast
to Dumont’s view of caste hierarchy, “we now have a plethora of assertive
caste identities, each privileging an angular hierarchy of its own,” and thus
“… there is hardly any unanimity on ranking between jatis” (p. x). He suggests
that castes are proud of their identity, regardless of where they might be
placed in the purity/pollution scale. He discusses how agricultural castes,
not long ago considered “shudra,” have effectively challenged the Brahman-
Kshatriya dominance. He thus argues that the articles in this volume ought
not to be seen as discordant or as anomalies, but as articulations of a system
where “discrete identities constitute first order realities.”

The individual papers in the volume are detailed and persuasive, and
provide evidence in support of Gupta’s thesis. However, even if these accounts
persuade us to reject the linear world view of Dumont, would we be correct
in inferring that the jati system is now merely a system of competing equalities?
The macro-level economic data do not give us reason enough to dismiss
hierarchy altogether. These are available only in terms of very broad
categories: Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes and, more recently,
Other Backward Castes (OBC) and “Others,” the residual category. These
categories are very broad and miss many of the nuances of the placement of
jatis vis-à-vis one another. However, by any measure of socio-economic status,
disparities between these categories are strikingly evident. The disparity
between the SCs and Others is better known; the real revelation is the disparity
between OBCs and Others, even when the former include several prosperous
land-owning jatis. In addition, there is ample documentation of covert and
overt instances of untouchability, both in rural and urban India. Caste
panchayats also ensure that certain hierarchies and distances are maintained
between the castes, and that those who dare to transgress these divisions are
punished.

Even the essays in this volume, while they broadly question the existence/
acceptance of a Brahmanical hierarchy, raise issues that compel us to think
otherwise, certainly about the existence of some sort of hierarchy, not necessarily linear and not necessarily uncontested. Anuja Aggarwal’s intriguing account of the Bedias demonstrates how the Bedias have their own version of caste hierarchy, as well as of their own place in it, despite their dependence upon prostitution, which renders them “the lowliest of the low.” They do not see themselves as inferior at all and, in fact, several Bedia offspring take upper-caste last names, or identify themselves as upper caste. However, this subjective perception (of being upper caste) seems to be at variance with the actual reality: offspring of Bedia women and upper-caste men are not accepted by the caste of the fathers. Thus, both the claim of high-caste ancestry on the part of the Bedias and its rejection by the upper castes smack of the persistence of hierarchy, not its abolition.

Similarly, Jodhka’s interesting discussion of Sikhism and the caste question highlights how a religion where caste has no role in the scriptures nevertheless persisted in the maintenance of these distinctions. In addition to economic inequalities, there are other indicators to suggest that while the Ad-Dharmis do not accept their inferior status easily and have been disassociating themselves from the stigma of traditional jobs, the association of privilege and upper-caste status has not disappeared.

Thus, on the whole, this is an important collection of papers that certainly persuades us to rethink Dumont. What remains a puzzle is how, despite the large-scale reshuffling of the deck and the questioning of hierarchy, certain overlaps between caste status and privilege continue to persist. The subtitle of the volume asks if caste is identity or hierarchy; the papers in the collection indicate that it is both.

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ASHWINI DESHPANDE


This publication is historic because seven of the nine contributors are senior scholars who have not only witnessed in their lifetimes formative developments in the subject matter, nation building, but helped to shape the scholarship on it. It is thus a valuable addition to the publisher’s series on the history of nation-building.

The chapters by senior scholars include those by the editor himself, Wang Gungwu, who wrote the introductory and closing chapters; by Craig J. Reynolds and Anthony Reid, who wrote on Thailand and Indonesia respectively; by Cheah Boon Kheng, Anthony Milner and Lee Kam Hing, who wrote a chapter each on Malaysia; and by Tony Stockwell, who wrote on both Malaysia and Singapore. Caroline S. Hau and Albert Lau, the two
younger scholars, contributed chapters on the Philippines and Singapore respectively. All are historians with the exception of Hau, who is in cultural studies.

The nature of the relationship between state and nation is a recurrent theme in the rich and diverse offerings of this book. Hau quite helpfully theorizes the relationship by resting on the work of Reynaldo Ileto. What becomes clear from her “reading of Ileto’s work is the mutual interpenetration between state and society far beyond that suggested by even scholars and activists working before and even since Ileto” (p. 48).

The penetration between the ruling regime and its citizens is evident to different degrees in all the chapters. Lee, for instance, highlights the problematic in the case of Malaysia, where “there is concern whether nation building is a continuing process of multi-ethnic negotiation or that it has become predominantly a nationalizing process by the state” (p. 187). This concern is pitched more broadly when Wang observes the need for congruence between “a clear national identity” and the culturally diverse—and even transnational—constituents of the nation-state (p. 253).

State and society are differently emphasized but interlinked in the respective chapters on Malaysia. Milner offers nuanced and fresh readings of the territorial, political and cultural claims of historical writing. Cheah underscores the foundations and significance of the bargain struck between inter-ethnic elites, while Lee examines more closely its mutation and recent implications. Turning to Singapore, Lau observes that the ruling regime’s “political dominance has made the close identification of party and national interests almost impossible to separate” (p. 231). Stockwell forces a serious consideration of the colonial architecture of nation building in Malaysia and Singapore and the politicking of nationalist leaders in response.

The five chapters on Malaysia and Singapore constitute more than sixty percent of the text. The emphasis may be justifiable, given how the five perspectives add depth to the question of nation building in the two countries. Little of such diversity in perspectives, however, is offered for Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. This weakness nevertheless may possibly be a strength if the book were read as a comparison of Malaysia and Singapore with the three other countries. Such a tack could only add to the editor’s own estimation of the significance of the overrepresentation (pp. 4-5).

A comparison of the kind suggested above may be made by turning to Reid’s cogent discussion of the weight of national histories before and until the end of the Suharto era, and the challenges posed subsequently by Indonesian historians such as Asvi Warman Adam (pp. 84-85) By contrast, the violence associated with the narratives in question and the ongoing struggle to reshape them today are of a scale unknown in Malaysia and Singapore.

Hau claims that “writings of and on history—even scholarly ones—cannot be treated as abstract commentaries [and] are part and parcel of nationalism”
Should scholars indeed be implicated in nationalism, it would appear from this volume that Singaporean and Malaysian nation building has fostered scholarship centred on the state rather than its citizens. It is harder, as a result, to envision the part played by citizens in the history of nation building in the two countries in question, as opposed to Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

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SUMIT K. MANDAL


This volume, comprising an insightful introduction and essays from seven anthropologists and one historian, explores how religion is a site for the expression and negotiation of transcendent nationalist discourses in Southeast Asia. The essays reveal the efficacy of religion in manoeuvring what the editors call the “ironies, anxieties, and uncanny effects” (p. 21) of nationalist ideologies and the prominent role played by urban middle-class actors in mediating this intersection of religion, state and public life. In highlighting the link between the political unconscious of states and selves in religious action, the volume deftly captures the inseparability of the secular and the sacred in the constitution of Southeast Asian public life and makes an important contribution to symbolic anthropology by pinpointing contradictions within nation-state ideologies as an alternative logic shaping religious symbolisms other than the usual suspects of capitalist exploitation or commoditization.

Contributors provide case studies from the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The chapters by Smita Lahiri and Fenella Cannell highlight the entwineement of religious discourse and political rule in the Philippines. Studying public exchanges between a national politician and a religious sect leader at Mt. Banahaw, a renowned site for unorthodox Catholicism, Lahiri argues that these exchanges are effects of discursive elitist imaginaries, where Mt. Banahaw symbolizes authentic Filipino culture. Cannell explores how the constant uncertainty of American colonial definition of Filipino culture and ethnicity was shaped by an unconscious Protestant ideology that associates lowland Filipinos with “idolatry” and the idea of the “fetish,” which saw the colonial zeal to convert Filipinos to American cultural practices but also colonial fear and distrust when locals began mimicking their masters. Erick White and Thamora Fishel highlight reciprocities between middle-class religiosity, public culture and national imaginaries in Thailand. White studies a public campaign to ban Thai spirit
mediums by a Buddhist monk and intellectual and shows how the persistence and reform of this popular religion are intricately tied to Buddhist ideals and Thai public imaginaries of the state as the guardian of societal interests. Fishel examines how changing middle-class Buddhist aspirations are transforming traditional patterns of Thai funeral rites and political patronage, resulting in new forms of local political cultures. The chapters by Suzanne Brenner, Andrew J. Abalahin and Kenneth George extend discussions using cases from Indonesia. Brenner shows how recent political divisions on Islam and gender in Indonesia emanated from contradictory ideologies on Islam and gender in the Suharto regime, while Abalahin examines the impact of another New Order decree, which outlawed Confucianism, on the struggle of an Indonesian Chinese couple to get their traditional rite marriage recognized and the resultant debates on Chinese religion and identity in wider Indonesian society. George’s intriguing analysis shows how the aesthetic evolution of an Acehnese painter tells a tale of struggle, hope and betrayal as the artist strives to reconcile his art with the transcendent discourses of Indonesian nationalism, Islam and Acehnese identity. Willford’s chapter analyzes the spiritual experiences and aspirations of a female Tamil spirit medium in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, within the context of Tamil-Hindu marginalization amidst politics of cultural authenticity in Malay nationalist discourse.

The essays gathered here are all solidly grounded in ethnographical and historical research, with sophisticated analyses that draw on psychoanalytical and anthropological frameworks. Readers may find some essays more accessible and convincing than others; those unfamiliar with Cannell’s work may struggle over her piece while Willford’s fascinating essay lacks wider evidence on the “demonization” of Hinduism in Malaysia, given its sole reliance on the rhetoric of ex-prime minister Mahatir. Nonetheless, this is an important volume offering rich empirical evidence and original theoretical engagement on the nexus of religion, nationalism and public life in Southeast Asia.

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BENG-LAN GOH


Ronald Bruce St. John, an independent scholar with lengthy military and commercial experience in Southeast Asia, describes his book as an exploration of “the economic and political reforms implemented by the governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam over the last three decades”
He sees these three countries as taking divergent reform paths, which increasingly separate neighbours once viewed as closely related. Seven chapters cover the historical background, attempts at socialist transformation, limited early reforms in Laos and Vietnam, the acceleration of reform in the 1980s, the divergence of paths in the 1990s, the challenges and prospects of development, and the implications for each country and the region.

A descriptive study based largely on secondary sources, the book does not break new ground. Its interpretive observations are conventional, for example: North Vietnam’s economic model was failing before it was imposed on the South, for which it was unsuited. The Laotian state has never matched Vietnam’s capability to implement transformational policies. Reforms begun in 1979 as “minor repair” (p. 191) have blossomed into models that resemble those of most other Asian states. Parties in all three states have sought to exchange economic growth for popular acceptance of their rule. Different initial conditions produced different institutional as well as performance outcomes, as “each country increasingly followed its own path to modernization” (p. 100). The tendency of all powers to treat the three countries as a strategic unity died with the 1991 Paris agreements, ending the conflict in Cambodia. If any sense of “Indochina” lives on in the framework of a revitalized Mekong River Commission or ASEAN, this will not be on Vietnam’s terms. Such observations and many others throughout the book are perfectly sound and well supported, but they do not depart in any significant way from grooves worn by journalists and academics over the last three decades.

Although St. John acknowledges that “[e]conomics and politics are intrinsically related dimensions of a single social reality” (p. 193), he treats them under separate subheadings and seldom discusses how one affects the other. He thus mentions but does not analyze how societal pressures and regional rivalries can impede as well as push reforms forward. Other problems that figure prominently in the literature on the political economy of transition get short shrift here. As for economics, descriptions (or just lists) of policies, laws and decrees take up a lot of space, without comment on their substance or impact. Economic performance is described in terms of annual change in inflation rates, investment flows, GDP growth and the like, where a few well-designed tables would suffice (there are no tables). Facts are presented as though all had equal importance. Did it matter that North Korea’s titular head of state joined Hanoi in issuing a 12-point communiqué on public health, double taxation and cultural exchange (p. 169)? If so, the author does not tell us why. This does not make for interesting reading.

That said, there are things to commend this book, and it can be read profitably by anyone seeking a survey of what three decades of tumultuous change have wrought in the former Indochina. With 42 pages of citations and 28 pages of “select bibliography” (for 203 pages of text), the book synopsizes, and can be read as a kind of guide to, a substantial portion of the
secondary literature. It is a judicious presentation of the facts so far as they are known. The concluding chapter, in which the author appears to tap his considerable experience in the region, pulls everything together in a few highly plausible and insightful prognostications. A pity that what precedes it is flat-footed description.

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WILLIAM S. TURLEY


This is an admirable assessment of Myanmar’s political and economic stasis, with a view to possible solutions. The book evolved from a conference held in Yangon, in February 2004 (this could not have happened without Myanmar government approval). Chapters by the seven contributors to this book contain thoughtful criticism of the military regimes that have dominated the polity since 1962, but the contributors assiduously avoid reference to Myanmar’s notorious human rights record and appear careful not to offend the current junta. The central aim is to argue that the introduction of democratically elected civilian rule as a solution to the country’s current woes is simplistic—too much would be expected of a civilian government, and there is anyway what one contributor calls “a psychological resistance to cooperation” (p. 167).

The contributors are uniquely qualified to address their chosen themes. R.H. Taylor builds on the premise that the state, handed to Myanmar’s politicians at independence in 1948, “had not been created to meet the expectations of the second half of the 20th century” (p. 9). From the beginning, the Tatmadaw (armed forces) took on a key role as the state’s guarantor and protector. The increasingly inept military governments that have dominated the country for 45 years are thoughtfully examined. There have been a few advances, such as the many crucial ceasefires with dissident ethnic forces worked out in the 1990s (though the name of Khin Nyunt, the presently disgraced architect of these agreements, is never mentioned, just as the noun “Burma’ is entirely avoided in this book).

N. Ganesan unfolds the issue of Myanmar’s foreign relations with America, Europe, Japan, India, China and ASEAN. He shows how Myanmar foreign policy has been largely reactive rather than proactive, and how the reaction of the military regime to the civil unrest of 1988 marked a distinct deterioration of relationships with the West. China’s current financial and moral support for the junta has consequences for India and even Japan. Martin Smith focuses on the need for new approaches to ethnic politics,
pointing out the staggering failures of post-independence governments in building any adequate dialogue or fostering reconciliation with minority peoples (who make up one-third of the population). He argues that Myanmar’s neighbours would not welcome the break-up of the state, but certainly want access to Myanmar’s economic potential (e.g., natural resources). David Steinberg avers that without political liberalization, economic progress in Myanmar is impossible. He also provides a list of government failures, including excessive centralization, lack of incentives, and no exposure for society at large to “broad discourses” on politics or economics. This is the only section in the book that, however briefly, seriously tries to come to grips with the involvement of the armed forces in governance and economic policies. Steinberg concludes that the Tatmadaw will hold on to significant power for a long time. The question now is what other kinds of career prospects, apart from the armed forces, can be opened up to permit social and economic mobility.

Rachel Safman reflects on the implications of Myanmar’s woefully inadequate health care infrastructure, as well as the widespread use of narcotics. Alex Mutebi traces the history of Myanmar’s civil service over a period of six decades, describing a “gigantic, often grotesque” bureaucracy (p. 151), and pointing to the need for new laws to govern civil service recruitment, promotion and compensation. Finally, Morten Pederson reiterates that there is no chance the military leaders will quietly agree to withdraw from government, and that the only way forward is gradual transition. The book deserves a better map than the murky one provided, but in general, this is a valuable study recommended for the range and detail of its topics.

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BRUCE MATTHEWS


As Khoo Gaik Cheng illustrates in Reclaiming Adat: Contemporary Malaysian Film and Literature, the best literature of any country, region or language does not address itself to an already existing “people,” but rather seeks to engage in a process of inventing this imagined people. This is clear in the case of postcolonial Malaysian writing in English in that, by seeking to address the colonial claim that “there are no people here,” the authors that Khoo analyzes engage and embody the shifting sets of relations that constitute the process of becoming Malaysian in the postcolonial world. Writing against a residual colonial discourse of nonbeing and the mythical discourses of Asian modernity, traditional Malayness and adat (“custom”) of the postcolonial
state, the works Khoo discusses cut across a double colonization, in that these authors represent in literature both what concretely exists and the conditions that make such living impossible. Although contradictory on the face of it, Khoo’s own text is skilled in demonstrating how this seeming impasse drives a small but provocative body of English-language literature in Malaysia and how the link between literary creation and a certain lack is an important factor in larger considerations of Malaysian national identity.

The strongest chapters of the book are “Malay Myth and the Changing Attitudes towards Nationalism: the Hang Tuah/Hang Jebat Debate” (chapter 2), and “The DissemiNation of Malay/sia” (chapter 3). These chapters stand out due to the fact that Khoo consistently illustrates the process of becoming Malaysian both through the careful analysis of a recurrent motif (the court legend of Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat) and a close reading of several individual authors, including Rehman Rashid, Salleh Ben Joned, Karim Raslan and Amir Muhammad. Relying on Homi Bhabha and Jacques Lacan for her theoretical framework, Khoo offers the reader a careful, imaginative account of what she terms (borrowing from Bhabha) the writing of the nation. These acts of writing, linked to the ambivalence of a coming Malaysia that is simultaneously multiethnic, modern and yet ethically and culturally rooted in “properly” Malay and Islamic traditions, are deftly described and analyzed. Impressively, Khoo demonstrates how this “minor” literature speaks to the conditions of marginalization these authors often face and yet concretely embodies many of the conditions and tensions within “Malay” literature and nationalism in the wider sense.

Although quite skilled in its discussion of literary works, Khoo’s analysis of cinema is problematic. Beginning with a useful critical reading of previous works on Malaysian cinema, her own analysis is derived from the position that film can be understood “as literary text.” Applying frameworks by Louis Althusser and Wimal Dissayanake that appropriate cinema to the domains of print media and “ideology” proves to be an insurmountable error. The Idea in cinema, conveyed through the image itself rather than through narrative in the textual or literary sense, escapes Khoo in these sections. Lacking the tight focus of the chapters analyzing literary works, the productive marginality of anglophone writers in Khoo’s analysis is absent in her largely negative theorization of Malaysian “Cinema of Denial.” Although Judith Butler’s notion of performativity is effectively used to discuss notions of gender in later chapters that cite both literary and cinematic works, cinema is never discussed on its own terms, but rather consistently subordinated to an analytic framework more suited to literary analysis.

Reclaiming Adat is an important contribution to the relationship between language, tradition, literature and cultural production in the formation of the postcolonial Malaysian self. In more specific terms, Khoo effectively addresses the need for a better understanding of English language literature
in Malaysia and its relation to the ambitious cultural politics of a state that seeks to position itself as simultaneously traditional and modern.

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RICHARD BAXSTROM


This book contains the most comprehensive analysis available of political opposition in Indonesia during the long rule of Suharto. The book is impressive in that it deals with a wealth of data and complicated developments over a long period, and yet does so in a coherent and readable manner. At first glance, it may seem that Suharto’s fall in May 1998 was sudden. Though there is no doubt that the consequences of the Asian Crisis had much to do with his fall, this book suggests that it is hard to fully understand the circumstances surrounding the demise of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ without charting the nature of political opposition over time. One of the book’s strengths is that the discussion—particularly that touching on the more radical opposition—establishes that the dramatic student-led uprising in 1998 was the culmination of many years of development.

Theoretically, the book attempts to merge elements of the voluminous transitions literature on democratization and aspects of more structural analyses. Clearly, however, the balance is tilted toward transitions approaches, which provide a lot of room for human agency, in the form of negotiation (especially among elites) within circumstances that are understood to be basically fluid rather than structured. This is clearly shown in the author’s reliance on the theoretical framework of such scholars as Juan Linz. In spite of the book’s detailed description of conflict among state elites (e.g., Suharto versus the military), the real focus is on attempts by opposition elites, based in civil society, to strategize, cope with, and react to Suharto’s policies of political domestication—based on coercion and selective reward, as well as a measure of tolerance to those deemed less threatening. The most informative parts of the book are the ones that deal with NGO- and student-based opposition, rather than the ones that deal with (relatively well-traversed) subjects like opposition by the Petition of 50 or the Democracy Forum. The detailed look at the behind-the-scenes wrangling within Megawati Soekarnoputri’s party, the PDI/PDI-P, is also full of useful insights. The book concludes with some brief but noteworthy reflections on post-Suharto Indonesia and the problems of democratization.

A core idea presented is that the New Order, like political opposition to it, changed over time. Borrowing from Linz, Aspinall argues that late Suharto rule was “sultanistic” in nature—in other words, heavily personalized and
arbitrary—compared to the early New Order, when a number of political forces within the broad coalition that underpinned it competed under more equal terms. It is true that the New Order did become increasingly centralized, but this reviewer remains unconvinced about the explanatory (as opposed to merely descriptive) power of “sultanism.” For example, is it more useful to understand Suharto as a modern-day “sultan” or as the head of a capitalist family as well as of a broader capitalist oligarchy?

What the book does lack is engagement with some core development and political economy issues. Ultimately, it is not possible to understand what the New Order was and the stakes involved in struggles against it without an appreciation of the dimension of political economy. After all, one needs to ask: What kinds of interests did the New Order serve, and what kinds did it systematically exclude? What dictated these choices? Nevertheless, this is an information-packed book that is strengthened by the quality of analysis it provides. The book should be the first stop for anyone interested in political opposition in the highly authoritarian New Order, and will answer questions about how it was able to survive years of repression.

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VEDI R. HADIZ


These 17 papers were among over 50 presented at the international Chinese Heritage of Australian Federation conference at the Chinese Museum in Melbourne in 2000. They update earlier histories of Chinese people in Australia written while Australia’s White Australia policy was still operating, isolating the country politically, intellectually and emotionally from Asia, and from its own Asian (primarily Chinese) residents. Today, increased Asian immigration, a vastly altered social awareness and a more robust political and economic dialogue with Asia are changing how this history can and must be understood.

The discussion of citizenship and community in the early chapters could profitably be required reading in Australian high schools, given most Australians’ vagueness about the terms of their citizenship. Indeed, we see that, apart from an expressed determination to privilege the “British type,” the drafters of the Constitution were almost silent on citizenship, its obligations and rights; since Federation, immigration legislation has consistently had less to do with clarification than with political and economic expediency, too often lightly disguising xenophobia.
The Immigration Restriction Act, enacted by the new parliament in 1901, with its notorious “dictation test” that persisted until 1958, is the dirge behind the melody in most chapters. Thousands of records remain, notably those documenting the exemptions sought by “domiciles” to visit their homeland and return (though readmission was never guaranteed). The files are a rich seam yet to be fully mined, but some fascinating excerpts here distil a human dimension from dry records, commending them for further study.

A recurrent issue is the enormous gender imbalance, in part caused by immigration policies. For example, in one count in Victoria in the early 1860s, the Chinese made up 12 percent of the population, with 24,724 males but just 8 females! Liaisons with Anglo women (even those of poor character and behaviour) often heightened resentment, and offspring suffered the liminal status familiar the world over, perhaps even more on visits to China than in Australia. In cases where men married in China, it was not until the 1960s that many of these wives were able to join their husbands in Australia.

Gradually and often painfully, as the second half of the book shows, the Chinese and Anglo-Celtic communities reached a lasting accommodation, overcoming mistrust and hostility. Opportunities afforded by World War II and a common enemy were squandered in the Cold War fear of communism and the “Yellow Peril” from the north. But by contrast, Chinese participation in the quintessentially Australian sport of Australian Rules football, and paradoxically the Chinese Masonic Society (which grew out of the Hung League secret society), helped promote integration into Australian society.

Informative this book certainly is, but given the subject matter and the time it covers, it could hardly be a “pleasant read”—accounts of institutionalized racism, even when overcome, never are. But the adaptability and optimism of the Chinese Australians who people its pages, and frequent evidence of decency on the part of many ordinary Australians and officials (including commendable instances of true impartiality on the part of the courts), provide the key to the successful multicultural mix that is Australia today. The Pauline Hanson outburst of the 1990s shows that the racism so malignant in nineteenth-century Australia still festers in some. But the main message here is that for a century and a half, ethnic Chinese subjects (even when not citizens) have contributed much to Australia’s developing society. It reaffirms what has been shown in so many countries, that people of goodwill and common purpose from very different backgrounds not only can live together, but can grow a truly syncretic community. It is a message that politicians worldwide should reflect upon in these troubled times.

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RODERICK EWINS

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In Dancing with Strangers, Inga Clendinnen engages readers with a thoughtful analysis of British-Australian interactions in and around Port Jackson. Taking the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788 as her starting point, Clendinnen weaves together British letters, diaries, official accounts, watercolors and sketches into a fresh examination of the first nine years of the British settlement’s unfolding drama. “Dancing” epitomized these encounters, with moments of violence and compassion characterizing the two parties’ first steps. Full of accounts of difficult episodes, the book is remarkable for the clarity of its prose and the riveting manner in which Clendinnen reveals both her own assumptions and that of her sources to give a sense of the Australian ‘view from the log’ (p. 237). Enlivening this narrative of the past is Clendinnen’s explicit aim in writing this book: the hope that in understanding the contingencies of the dances that took place at Port Jackson, contemporary reconciliation may be better met.

Using the metaphor of snorkeling, Clendinnen takes readers down into the depths of this past, and outlines the facets of her limited sources, namely the writings of Governor Arthur Philip, Captain John Hunter, Judge-Advocate David Collins and the insightful Captain-Lieutenant of Marines Watkin Tench. She works authoritatively with this material mapping out the cultural dispositions of British society in the late eighteenth century, and reveals both how insightful and how blind her commentators were in their new surroundings. Governor Philip, for example, emerges as a humble but fallible leader who attempted to found and run a settlement based on cross-cultural understanding. While this source material inevitably gives a better appreciation of the elite British men involved in this drama, Clendinnen offers new insights into the actions of the prominent Australians involved: the first captive, Arabanoo; the later captive, Colbee; the important cultural broker, Baneelon; his resilient wife, Barangaroo; the elusive Boladeree, and the tragic Bungaree.

After introducing her sources, Clendinnen relates key episodes in this unfolding dance, outlining the various understandings of these episodes through available sources before reimagining these encounters. For example, she convincingly reconceptualizes the non-fatal spearing of Governor Philip at Manly Cove in 1790 as an Australian ritual punishment for the various transgressions of Philip and the British. Clendinnen convincingly shows possible cultural logics to this and other such events, and in so doing offers glimpses of how graceful the Australians were during these encounters. Baneelon emerges as a warrior attempting to situate himself as the hinge man between the newcomers and his own people. His failure to achieve
equitable relationships envisioned in local kinship idioms is at once a personal and collective tragedy. In a subsequent chapter, Clendinnen paints a vivid portrait of Baneelon’s wife Barangaroo, who refused to wear a petticoat, and dined at the Governor’s table naked defiant of her husband’s wishes and British protocol. Such illuminations abound in Clendinnen’s narrative, and cannot be adequately addressed in this short review. Following these episodes, Clendinnen relates the circumstances surrounding her sources’ departures from the settlement, and uses their leaving as a window to reflect on the increasing disintegration of British-Australian relations.

On a more practical level, Clendinnen has forgone the use of footnotes. Interested readers need only consult a section entitled Notes on Sources to learn further about of the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of Clendinnen’s sources. While some may miss the citations, their absence enables Clendinnen’s humanistic narrative to flow. Scholars and students interested in Australian colonial history will find this book both thought-provoking and at times arresting. Similarly, those interested in historical anthropology will also enjoy the text for the clarity with which Clendinnen deals with her sources, guiding us through their various twist and turns. This book represents ethnographic history at its best.

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Joshua A. Bell


The role of the public intellectual is not as well developed in Australia as in other English-speaking countries and has not been taken up by indigenous Australians either. Hagan is one of the few authors who fits this category. His recognition came about initially through his outspoken protest against the name of a local cricket stadium pavilion, the Nigger Brown Stand, named for a popular white Australian sportsman nicknamed “Nigger.” Support for Hagan’s efforts to have the name changed was marked by ambivalence, but it brought him to public attention. Since then he has become a regular columnist for the Koori News, an influential fortnightly indigenous newspaper in which he comments on a range of issues.

Hagan’s is an informed voice, provocative, and one not afraid to take on highly politicized and contentious issues. He brings his own frame of thinking and a quirky sense of humour to his analyses. He is not, and does not attempt to be, the voice of Aboriginal and Islander peoples. He does not use a biographer, editor or a ghost writer, and this alone makes his book a noteworthy addition to the growing corpus of indigenous literature. His
analytical style adds a depth not always encountered in the highly personalized genre of Aboriginal autobiography. A strong political value is placed on the right to one’s personal autonomy in Aboriginal cultural practice, which extends to a rejection of the political value of representation, including the telling of other people’s stories. Biography is thus a key way in which political views and histories are expressed. Unless a reader is versed in Australian Aboriginal experience, the biographies may seem too personalized for some tastes. Hagan manages a balance between biography and commentary that is distinctive and makes his story of wider interest.

The ‘N’ word of the title plays on the widely recognized unacceptability of the word “nigger.” It does so by implicitly linking this to the “f—” and “c—” words, which have occasioned innumerable arrests of Aboriginal people for “the use of unseemly words,” and hence to the hypocrisy of the “nigger” usage. Hagan describes his own upbringing as the background that led to his position on the Nigger Brown Stand. This action exemplifies a variety of efforts in Australia to have a racist history both recognized and changed. Even as a nickname, nigger has always been denigrating: ‘Nigger’ Brown apparently derived his name from the black ‘Nigger’ boot polish he was known to use—the associations are clearly racist in the naming of the polish. It was not a term in common usage in Australia’s past to refer to Aboriginal people, except at particular historical times and places, but it sits alongside equivalent insults, such as “Abos,” “coons” and “natives.” Australians are known for their larrikin use of derogatory words as terms of endearment. So it is unsurprising that someone would have attracted such a nickname in the past, although hard to imagine it would be countenanced today, with a stronger Aboriginal voice in public affairs, and a slowly growing consciousness among non-Indigenous Australians of the extent of violence to which Indigenous peoples have been subjected. But Hagan’s complaint struck sensitive nerves in Australian subjectivities, implicitly attacking this culture of endearment, the Aussie “mates” who stick by each other, the sporting heroes, even the right to name—itself a powerful act, rarely conceded to Aboriginal people. Aboriginal voices may be more common today but they are acceptable only to the extent that they do not challenge the status quo.

Hagan has taken his case to almost every court, vowing he will persist. The story has not yet ended. By now, however, many Aboriginal people in the town of Toowoomba oppose his stance, fearing the backlash, or perhaps they are beyond caring. This book illustrates the ongoing struggle over how Australia is to understand its own history.

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This is an important volume that belongs in the library of anyone seriously interested in Bougainville before, and after, the conflict. Like all volumes that derive from conferences, it contains a variety of viewpoints and professional orientations—so many that it might be subtitled "Ways of Seeing Bougainville." Although the first two sections of the book’s five sections are written by "the usual suspects," the next three sections include work by authors new to me. It is a fine thing to see new names associated with Bougainville research and commentary, and even finer that among the 23 authors (of 30 chapters) 6 are Bougainvilleans. (Disclaimer: I am a Bougainville anthropologist and know many of the authors; I was asked to contribute a chapter, but was unable to do so in time for the publication.)

Contributors to the first section (“The Place and the People”) represent archaeology, geology, linguistics and anthropology. All make the point that Bougainville language and culture are impressively diverse and complex. For example, there are perhaps 25 languages among some 175,000 people. Numeric caution is required here, as elsewhere in the book: the authors have as many ways of counting and classifying as ways of seeing. This is a virtue, not a defect, because Bougainville has been in a state of flux for many decades. These, and other, chapters offer no support for those who might prefer to characterize Bougainvilleans as homogenous.

The second section (“The Colonial Period to World War II”) is the work of historians. The chapters are of uneven quality, and overlap considerably. There is ritual flogging of eurocentric observers: Peter Elder accuses Richard Thurnwald, Bernice Blackwood, E.W.P. Chinnery and Douglas Oliver of “extracting intellectual property in the form of sociological and ethnographic data...” (p. 164); I cannot think how what they did differs from what a modern fieldworker does. Helga Griffin, in a chapter dominated by praise for Thurnwald, attempts to locate “hidden values” (p. 205) among fieldworkers of the 1960s and 1970s, but the connections seem superficial.

I found the third section (“Economic and Social Change Post-World War II”) to be the most interesting. The contributors—an economist, an agricultural researcher (Buin), a miner, a historian, a teacher (Buin) and politicians (Buin; Torau)—are a varied lot, and ironies abound. For example, Joachim Lummani wonders whether Francis Ona and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army’s (BRA) attempt to “restore egalitarian fairness by trying to suppress developmental change” may actually have “contributed to an ever-widening situation of inequality,” because Bougainvilleans “are even more dependent on cash-crop income than before the conflict” (p. 252).
The other chapters give examples of unintended and unforeseen consequences, perhaps nowhere more so than in Don Vernon’s contribution, a forthright statement from a CRA/BCL miner’s perspective. I found his many “had we only known” statements unconvincing. The information Vernon regrets not having could not have been difficult to obtain; the search for “hidden values” would be fruitful here.

The fourth section (“Perspectives [sic] on Particular Bougainville Societies”) comprises competent journeyman descriptions of Buin, Haku, Nasioi and Nagovisi. The writers—all anthropologists, one a Bougainvillean—also provide short, impressionistic post-conflict portraits.

The final section (“Towards Understanding the Origins of the Conflict”) is especially useful, because both writers were substantially involved with the crisis and its aftermath: Regan as an outside advisor, and James Tanis (Nagovisi) as a BRA functionary, a peace process worker and BIPG (Bougainville Interim Provincial Government) minister. Tanis’ piece moves effectively between detailed descriptions of village life and the broad sweep of the Crisis.

One final comment: most of the authors take pains to cite multiple causes of socioeconomic change and the conflict. The list is not surprising: missionization, plantations, World War II, cash cropping, the copper mine, unwelcome migrants, etc. However, I was astonished to find only one (passing) reference to the taro blight that fundamentally altered subsistence and forced dramatic socioeconomic change in many areas in the post-World War II period. If this volume has a systemic defect, it is that the authors commonly explain change exclusively in terms of human behaviour. None of the authors (except Lummani) consider ecological factors except as asides or when assessing mine-related environmental disasters. It is sad that a volume representing multiple points of view lacks this important perspective.

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Seeking a readable history of Rapanui? Save your money instead of buying this book: an authoritative, more readable and better-illustrated effort is available by anthropologist G. McCall (Rapanui, Tradition and Survival on Easter Island, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). Coming a decade after McCall’s study, Island at the End of the World (IEW) includes recent information on island politics and more historic details, but its broad scope reveals the author’s inexperience with science, detracting from its value as a
work of scholarship. In particular, Fischer fails to explicate the cultural ecological issues raised by Rapanui’s case, relying for ideas upon popular works of a human catastrophist bent, such as *Easter Island, Earth Island* (by P. Bahn and J. Flenley, London: Thames and Hudson, 1992). While the views in such works resonate with many concerned with the Earth’s biological integrity, their assumptions about past cultural behaviour and its consequences at Rapanui are not uncontested by experts.

*IEW* contains an introduction, followed by five chapters: “The Polynesian Frontier,” “White Men and Birdmen,” “Pirates and Priests,” “Rancho Isla de Pascua,” and “Museum Island”; a guide to Rapanui-language writing conventions and a useful index are also provided. The later chapters are based upon events and attitudes gleaned from the works of Rapanui specialists such as Grant McCall and J. Douglas Porteous, as well as from numerous diaries and letters, many revealing an appalling disregard for the humanity and cultural integrity of the islanders. Cumulatively, this modern history is a powerful indictment of private enterprise, the church and government, and provides insight into the frustrations of many present-day Rapanui. Of course, similar conclusions could be drawn from reading McCall, Porteous and others directly.

In earlier chapters, however, the author’s depiction of Rapanui’s cultural past misleads readers. There is no access to primary scientific documents and to the complexities involved. Here one finds untutored notions of cultural change directed by individuals, of rapid human population growth and territorial expansion never observed in nature, and even a discussion on climatology, with the suggestion that the disappearance of Rapanui’s palms has caused the rains to diminish, exacerbating the islanders’ self-made problems.

The long chronology of prehistoric occupation proposed in *IEW* fits Fischer’s theory of Rapanui’s language origins and development, namely, that the parent language, “Proto-South-Eastern Polynesian,” was spoken by the first Rapanui in the early centuries C.E. But the archaeological record suggests the island was most likely settled in the early second millennium C.E. (M Spriggs and A. Anderson, *Antiquity* 67(255): 200-217, 1993 and T. Hunt and C. Lipo, *Science* (311): 1603-1606, 2006). Evidently, this theory has led Fischer to ignore data that undermine his claims—ironic, because the theory is dependent, as all branching models in historical linguistics are, upon archaeological findings and datings. These data include thousands of fragments of charred wood at archaeological sites occupied between 1300 and 1600 C.E., attesting to the presence of a wide variety of trees, including the Rapanui palm (*Paschalococos disperta*), during the centuries when people had already supposedly deforested the island. My own theoretical orientation as a cultural ecologist precludes an easy acceptance of demographic isolation of Rapanui for two centuries prior to initial European contact in 1722, as Fischer envisions. Small islands are best viewed as “population sinks,” where
human densities are a function of immigration rates, which undoubtedly fluctuated throughout Rapanui’s human past.

Lay readers of *IEW* can hardly be expected to confront these problems head-on, and this is not the place for a full rebuttal. Suffice it to say that the fanciful story of prehistoric islanders transforming their lushly forested island into a droughty, eroded wasteland over the course of a few “turbulent” centuries should be viewed with skepticism, if not amusement. It is more noteworthy for or what it reveals about its tellers.

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Rosalind L. Hunter-Anderson


*Pacific Journeys* comprises 15 articles that address French explorers and explorations in the Pacific. As a Festschrift for John Dunmore, the writers follow a number of paths of academic enquiry that carry forward threads of his writings on the history of those French explorations in the Pacific, but only a few acknowledge this link explicitly. The papers are arranged chronologically by subject matter, so the reader is left to find her/his own linkages. French activities in New Zealand, French Polynesia and New Caledonia and the seas between are covered, while also reflecting on the wider impact that maritime history is having on historiography.

French contributions to a history of the Pacific are demonstrated through examination of the influences of individual explorers, expressed in their writings; the collection also addresses how those writings were perceived then and have been re-evaluated today. The issue of hybridity between Kanak and French communities and their oral and written traditions (R. Ramsay, p. 190) pervades several of the other papers. The early maritime reports, F. Moureau suggests, were targeted at those who wanted to read about writings (and dramas) from the sea as distinct from the land-based explorations seen through maps and collected artefacts. This led the writings to move beyond an emphasis on scientific reporting to express more openly political and economic messages. The scientific theme that Christian Huetz de Lemps considers for the French Restoration period of ‘grands voyages’ is treated in micro-scale by Edward Duyker’s presentation of Felix Delahaye’s garden in Tasmania in association with Jacques Labillardière, as written by Bruny d’Entrecasteaux, and by the botanical influences of Metrosideros varieties (J. Dawson). A. Frost suggests that we can attribute the ill discipline on voyages
such as that of the *Bounty* to dissatisfactions with food on long voyages, and
the misuse of authority over food supplies by those in charge, such as Captain
William Bligh. Science by these maritime explorers was expressed in terms
of what they considered peoples of their day wanted to read.

This close proximity between science and the imaginary, exotic or fantasy
aspects of these writings is exemplified in this volume by several contributors.
C. Mortelier discusses Jules Verne’s realism in his novel about Cabidoulin,
as shown by descriptions of accidents to whalers, while R. Arnoux examines
the links between ethnography and fiction using Victor Segalen’s writings.
S. Faessel’s reflections on the dual authoring by a Kanak and a French
Caledonian of a New Caledonian play based on the myth of Captain Cook’s
death, link Polynesian Lono with a New Caledonian counterpart. The issue
of whether translation does justice to the many layers of meaning in texts
(Ramsay) is as appropriate to our understanding of the writings of Jacques-
Antoine Moerenhout and Louis de Bougainville as it is to the modern writings
of Dunmore and others.

Lesser-known French contributors to Pacific history, including whalers
and settler families such as the Morrell family in New Zealand, have left
their mark in their logs and other records (P. Tremewan). I. Church brings
to light French intentions to annex the South Island for France, while J.
Munro records the impact of the priest Jean-Marie LeGrange’s relations with
nineteenth-century Maori communities. Similarly M.R. Owens demonstrates
how Maori such as Wiremu Tauri, Hoani Wiremu Hipango and Ruke
Aperahama assisted Richard Taylor in spreading the Christian message.

This Festschrift is a welcome addition to Pacific history, as it is both
descriptive and reflective. Ten of the papers are in English, and four in
French. The absence of an index and an error (p. 144) that places Mangaia
in the Society Islands, rather than the Cook Islands, are the book’s major
weaknesses. The editors could have assisted students by providing an
introduction that highlighted the themes presented by the contributing
authors, if only to show how they illustrate Dunmore’s legacy beyond his
own ten books and other papers.

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